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Introducing social and
economic networks
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutual-
ity, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects
one directly, affects all indirectly.
Martin Luther King Jr.
1 Introduction
If you search in Econlit for papers published in economics that
contain the word "network" in their title you would receive only
18 observations between 1974 and 1983, such number would in-
crease to 195 between 1984 and 1993 and you would be over-
loaded by 1127 observations in the last decade. Similar results
can be obtained using different search methods. This suggests
that the study of networks is a growing field and leads us to
ask why is it so? What is a network and why should we study
networks? What are the new insights we could obtain by ex-
plicitly modelling network relationships? In the rest of this brief
introduction of the thesis, we shall show that those models ex-
plicitly taking into account networks are tractable and capable
of providing interesting and somewhat surprising insights.
Economic agents generally operate in environments of imper-
fect information. When choosing where and what to buy con-
sumers do not fully know which products are available, their
qualities and their prices. When applying for a job a candidate
would like to be aware about the various openings and how
many other applicants are competing for the same vacancies.
Doctors have to decide on new treatments without having a
complete knowledge of their efficacy. In each one of these situ-
ations, before choosing, we all try to gather some information.
Our friends, colleagues, acquaintances generally represent our
main providers. Hence, what we choose depends on how much
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informed we are, which partly depends on our social and eco-
nomic relationships.
But this is just a part of the story. Indeed, as connections are
valuable to an individual, it is natural to think that an individual
will strategically decide to whom to be link with. Neighborhood
segregation and ghetto formation are widely studied empirically.
Schelling (1975) shows that even if members of a group are not
inclined to segregation, it can still emerge as a result of the
self-organization of the group. In this sense, segregation is a
mere consequence of the structural properties of the pattern of
interactions across players.
These examples illustrate the abundance of situations in which
networks play a role and the crucial importance of networks in
shaping the final outcome of these interactions. However, the
above mentioned examples deal with many different subjects.
What a network is remains unclear. One useful way of explic-
itly defining a network is by using a mathematical object: the
graph. A graph is defined as a set of nodes connected via links.
Depending on our specific interest, we may name the nodes as
individuals, firms, consumers, countries, ideas, languages, sci-
entific papers, and the links among them as relationships. In
this way we move from a mathematical object to its ontolog-
ical counterpart: the network. The use of graphs as a device
to model network relationships allows to develop a systematic
theory, which examines the interplay between the structure of
relationships and the individual incentives, in a variety of strate-
gic situations.
In what follows we will survey some recent works on net-
work formation, networks and games of conflict and networks
and markets. We will proceed by elaborating on the empirical
evidence of each subject considered. We will then describe the
related main theoretical findings to then conclude by introduc-
ing the contribution that the present thesis provides in each of
the aforementioned issues.
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2 A theory of network formation
Networks in many instances share some robust structural prop-
erties. Whatever network you map, let it be the World Wide
Web network, scientific collaboration networks, sexual connec-
tions, communication networks, phone call networks and so on,
you will notice that most agents in the network have only few
links and only few players have many direct neighbors. The few
players with many links are central in the network and they
reduce dramatically the average distance among players. This
leads to a second intriguing property of social networks: the
small-world property. In words, even if two individuals do not
hold a direct relationship, they are relatively close in the social
structure as there exists a short chain of intermediaries con-
necting them. For example, Rogers and Kincaid (1981) present
communication networks from rural areas in different parts of
the world. They report that in these networks there are only
few very well connected players (central players). Albert and
Barabasi (2002) report similar evidence for a number of large-
scale networks. For example, the World Wide Web exhibits high
centrality and short average distances (within the core set of
nodes). This high centrality arises because some nodes have very
high number of outgoing links, while some others have very high
number of incoming links. Phone calls networks display similar
properties.1
This widespread regularity of networks motivates the develop-
ment of a systematic theory of how networks form. This theory
aims at predicting which networks of relationships we should ob-
serve when the individuals have the discretion to strategically
choose their connections. Doing so, we would also be able to
describe the role that networks have in determining the aggre-
gate performance of the system, which allows for a normative
analyses to be implemented.
The study of socioeconomic networks is well established in so-
1See also Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga-Gonzalez (2003) for coauthorship networks
in economics and Newman (2001) for coauthorship networks in other fields.
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ciology.2 This literature provides useful insights on the role net-
works play in different settings. It focuses mainly on understand-
ing the role that different types of connections play. However, a
study of how such connections come about and their implication
for efficiency is missed. In this perspective the economic theory
of network formation should be seen as complementary to the
sociological theory.
In what follows we will discuss the connections model, which
has been extensively studied in the literature. The basic idea of
this model is that social networks are the result of the choice
of individual players who trade-off the cost of investing in links
and their potential rewards.
2.1 The connections model
A network, g, is a list of pair of players, i and j, linked to each
other and it is the result of the decision of each player belong-
ing to a finite population, N. The basic element of a network
game is the network formation process. In a static game, the
network formation process is a set of rules, which specifies when
a connection will be formed. In a dynamic setting, the evolv-
ing process of networks must be specified as well. The natural
way of analysing how networks shape the individuals’ incentives
to invest in connections is one where links are costly and they
generate externalities. Forming a link with another individual
requires to make some costly effort and it allows access, in part
and in due course, to the benefits available to the latter via her
own links.
There are two versions of the connections model. The case
where individual players can form links unilaterally was in-
troduced in Bala and Goyal (2000a) and Goyal (1993), while
the case where links are formed on the basis of bilateral agree-
ments was introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).3 Both
2See, among others, Coleman (1988), Burt (1992), Granovetter (1973, 1974). See
Wasserman and Faust (1994) for an introductory book on socioeconomic networks in
sociology.
3The term connections model is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
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these versions have been extensively studied in the literature.4
Heuristically, the requirement of bilateral agreements is more
adequate when we model network relationships such as friend-
ships, co-authorships, family relationships and firms alliances.
Conversely, the unilateral formation process is better when we
focus on connections forming theWorldWideWeb, the networks
of quotations in referee journals, telephone calls and, more gen-
erally, investments in social ties which bring benefits to both
parties. The distinction between bilateral and unilateral agree-
ment is not simply a conceptual one; indeed, with respect to
the formation process we specify, we need to consider a different
equilibrium notion. For this reason we proceed first by reporting
the main findings of Bala and Goyal (2000a) and then we will
turn to the model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
• Bala and Goyal (2000a)
The unilateral formation process allows us to analyse the
game using standard tools from non-cooperative game theory.
For our purposes, it is enough to focus on the static version of
the model.5 The strategy of each player, say gi, is a vector de-
scribing with whom player i wants to form a link. The cost of
each link, say c, is paid by the player who sponsors the link. Each
player is endowed with some non-rival good, which has a value
v, and the benefit to each player is increasing in the amount of
information accessed directly or indirectly in the network. Bala
and Goyal (2000a) examine two versions of this model: the case
where the link formed by player 1 with player 2 creates benefits
for both parties, the "two-way flow model", and the other where
only the player who sponsors the link obtains benefits, the "one-
way flow model". For simplicity, we provide here a discussion of
4McBride (2003) studies a connections model where players have imperfect infor-
mation about the structure of the networks. Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller and
Sarangi (2001) examine a connection model where links are not fully reliable. John-
son and Gilles (2000) introduce players’ heterogeneity in the framework of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996).
5Bala and Goyal (2000a) also examine the evolving of networks under a myopic-best
response dynamics. See Goyal (2003) for a survey on theoretical models on learning in
networks.
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the two models in the case where the length of the path does
not matter in defining the benefits (i.e. there is no decay).6
The starting point is to examine the structural properties of
Nash equilibria: a network g is Nash when no player has a strict
incentive to deviate, given the strategies of the other players
as fixed. Not surprisingly, Bala and Goyal (2000a) show that
both in the one-way and two-way flow model there is a huge
number of Nash networks: any minimally connected network
and the empty network are Nash equilibria for some range of
parameters.7
The huge multiplicity of Nash equilibria leads the authors to
refine the equilibrium concept in order to obtain sharper predic-
tions on the architecture of the equilibrium networks. A natural
way of doing so is to consider the notion of strict Nash network:
a Nash network where each player is playing his unique best
response. The refinement of strict equilibrium is a quite useful
one. In the one-way flow model a strict equilibrium is either the
empty network or the wheel. In the two-way flow model a strict
equilibrium is either the empty network or the center-sponsored
star network. Figure 1.1 illustrates these architectures in a so-
ciety composed of 5 players.8
6See Bala and Goyal (2000a) for a partial characterization of equilibrium networks
when there is decay in the information flow. See Feri (2004a, 2004b) for an analysis of
stochastically stable networks in presence of decay.
7A connected network is one where each player can access all other players. A mini-
mally connected network is a connected network where it is enough to delete an arbitrary
link to break connectedness.
8 In the center-sponsored star network a bold line on a link next to a player indicates
that this player has formed the link and pays for the link. In the wheel network we
represent a link gi,j = 1 as an edge starting at j with the arrowhead pointing at i.
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Center-sponsored star 
architecture
Wheel  architecture
Figure 1.1. The star and the wheel architecture.
The star is a very asymmetric network with two main struc-
tural properties. The first is that there is one player, the cen-
ter, who plays an important role in connecting the others, who
would be otherwise disconnected. This underlines the relevant
role centrality plays in information networks. The second prop-
erty is that there are short distances among players. In contrast,
the wheel is a symmetric network in which each player forms and
receives one and only one link.
In order to answer to the question of whether these networks
are efficient, Bala and Goyal (2000a) consider a notion of aggre-
gate efficiency: a network g is efficient if it maximizes the sum
of the utilities to each player. The most important result here is
that, for intermediate levels of the costs of linking, there exists
a trade-off between individual and social incentives. Players do
not fully internalize network externalities. Such conflict is clear
in the center-sponsored star. The benefit the central player ob-
tains by maintaining a link with a spoke player is simply a unit
of information, while the network externalities such link pro-
duces are huge as each player connected in the network benefits
from accessing the spoke player. It is clear that when the costs
of linking are moderately high, the central player will not be
willing to keep this link, even if it enhances efficiency in the
society as a whole.
• Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
The symmetric connections model introduced in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) shares the same features as the 2-way flow
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model in Bala and Goyal (2000a), but differs in that each player
pays a cost c for every link formed. Moreover, the requirement
of mutual consensus for the formation of a social tie leads to
consider some sort of coalition equilibrium concept. Elegantly,
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce the notion of pairwise
stability in the attempt to model directly what a stable network
is. More precisely, a network g is pairwise stable when each in-
dividual player does not wish to delete his links and every pair
of players does not find profitable to form a new link.9 Clearly,
there are limitations with respect to this notion, as only pair-
wise deviations are taken into account. Nevertheless, the notion
of pairwise stability has been extensively used in the literature
and turns out to provide interesting insights.
Let us suppose that information flows through paths with
some decay factor. This being the case, when the costs of link-
ing are sufficiently low, a network where every pair of players
forms a link is uniquely stable. More interestingly, when the
costs of linking are moderate, the star network emerges and
when costs are too high the unique stable network is the empty
one. Similarly to Bala and Goyal (2000a) when the formation of
a link requires mutual consensus there exists a trade-off between
individual and social incentives, for some range of parameters.
This last result underlines, together with the results mentioned
above, that there exists an inherent trade-off between individual
and social incentives in the formation of network relationships.10
Summarising, the connections model is a natural framework
for studying the formation of network relationships. The pre-
dictions provided are sharp and replicate the main properties
of real social networks. The analysis of the formation of social
ties from a strategic point of view, as well as the focus on its
efficiency properties are the two main features that distinguish
the economic literature of network formation from that of other
9More precisely in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) only the deviation of deleting a link
is considered; Goyal and Joshi (2003) modify the notion of pairwise stability allowing to
delete any link a player has.
10 See Jackson (2003) for a more detail and general survey on the trade-off between
individual and social incentives in network games.
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fields, as sociology and physics, among others.
The models presented, and indeed most of the existing liter-
ature, focus on homogeneous players network games. However,
ex-ante players’ asymmetries arise quite naturally in several con-
texts. For instance, in the context of information networks, it is
often the case that some individuals are very much interested
in particular issues (such as computer software) and, therefore,
better informed, fact that makes them more valuable as con-
tacts. Similarly, individuals differ in their communication and
social skills. Finally, individuals can often be classified accord-
ing to distinct groups (based on geographical and for cultural
characteristics). It is natural to think that forming links within
a group is cheaper than forming links across groups. This rea-
soning motivates the analysis of strategic link formation when
players differ with respect to values as well as costs of linking.
Such analysis represents the focus of chapter 2 and 3 of the
thesis. Let us now proceed to illustrate our main results.
In chapter 2 we study the two-way flow model.11 We begin
by analysing a general model of heterogeneity and show that
value heterogeneity determines the level of connectedness of the
network, but not the equilibrium network’s architectures. By
contrasts, costs of linking heterogeneity shape both the level
of connectedness and the architecture of equilibrium networks.
This leads to ask: does strategic link formation have something
to say in settings with particular type of cost heterogeneity?
To address this question we examine a society which is divided
into distinct groups, where intra-group links are cheaper with
respect to inter-group links. We find that inter-connected stars
with locally central players are prominent in equilibrium.12 Such
finding suggests that centrality and short-distance are robust
features of social networks.
11This chapter subsumes two joint papers, ’Equilibrium networks with heterogeneous
players’, by Galeotti and Goyal, and ’Stable equilibrium networks with heterogeneous
players’ by Galeotti and Kamphorst.
12For example, in a society composed of two groups an inter-connected stars archi-
tecture is a network where each group forms a star architecture and there exists a link
between the two centers of the two groups.
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In chapter 3 we focus on the one-way flow model. As in the
two-way flow model, both values and costs asymmetries are cru-
cial in determining the level of connectedness of the network.
Interestingly, we find unconnected equilibria to be asymmetric
and the possibility for central players to emerge. Furthermore,
as far as the costs of linking are not partner-specific, equilibrium
networks are wheels (and its variants). Otherwise, different ar-
chitectures, such as the flower or its variants, constitute an equi-
librium.13 These findings suggest that in the 1-way flow model
with heterogeneous players centrality is a distinctive feature of
equilibrium networks.
The findings of chapters 2 and 3 show that even in settings
with substantial players heterogeneity the theory of strategic
links formation delivers sharp results, which are in line with
the empirical evidence. Centrality and short distances continue
to be distinctive features of equilibrium networks in settings
where benefits flow in both directions (chapter 2). When players’
heterogeneity is taken into account, centrality emerges also in
settings where benefits flow only toward the investor (chapter
3).
3 Networks and games of conflict
Even if cooperation behaviors occur in many situations, tradi-
tional economics fails to explain it. The classical example pro-
vided by economists is the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma where
the unique Nash equilibrium is defection. A way of explaining
the emergence of norms which are able to sustain cooperation
is to consider infinitely repeated interactions. Mechanisms of
punishment and, more in general, of social control are neces-
sary conditions for this to occur. Few theoretical works, though,
examine the influence of the social structure on the individual
incentives to cooperate, whereas, a large body of empirical work
suggests that network of relationships matter.
13The flower network is a bunch of wheels (petals) which have in common a single
player. Such player, the center, connects the different petals.
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For example, Coleman (1988) shows that gains from inter-
actions are easier to obtain in networks that are clustered. In
a recent experiment, Rield and Ule (2002) examine the role of
endogenous network formation in the way rational players play
a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. Comparing a treatment
where the network is exogenously given with treatments where
the network is formed endogenously, they observe that in the
latter case cooperation rates are significantly higher than in
the former case. Finally, Cassar (2002) analyses the cooperative
behavior in three classes of networks: random networks, small
world networks and regular networks. Her main result is that
small world networks exhibit a lower level of cooperation than
the one appearing in the other network structures considered.
The examples above show the importance of developing a
structural analysis of individual incentives in games of conflict.
In this respect, there exists an extensive literature on the spa-
tial evolution of social norms which spans the fields of biology,
computer science and physics, in addition to economics.14 In
economics, the main contribution to this literature is the work
of Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998). They study a dynamic
setting where players are exogenously arranged in a circle and
learn by imitating their neighborhoods. Players choose to be
either altruistic or egoistic after comparing the average payoffs
from the two actions. The authors’ main finding is that altruistic
behavior arises when altruistic agents are grouped together. This
being the case, they primarily benefit by reciprocating altru-
ism. Differently, egoists survive only if they are few and strewn.
Given that the society is large enough and that the players’
initial strategies are determined by i.i.d. variables, these mixed
configurations where the society is composed of a majority of
altruistic individuals and a minority of egoistic players are the
only absorbing states.
A different and natural approach to examine the interplay
between networks and incentives to free-ride is to consider the
14See, e.g. Ullman-Margalitt (1977), Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982), Wynne-Edwards
(1986), Nowak and May (1992), Axelrod (1997).
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scope of cooperation in repeated games when they are played
on networks. It is surprising to notice that there are few works
which have taken this direction. In a recent paper, Haag and La-
gunoff (2000) analyse a prisoners’ dilemma game where players
are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their discount fac-
tor and they play with their immediate neighbors. They mainly
focus on the network architecture which supports high coop-
eration. Their main result is that, when players are restricted
to play the same action with respect to each player they are
interacting with, the network architecture which best sustains
cooperation requires that a set of players are fully connected
and that each of these players is linked with some other players
outside the clique. The players belonging to the clique must be
substantially patient and they always cooperate, while the other
players will be quite impatient and they will always free-ride.
The purpose of the analysis of Haag and Lagunoff (2000) is to
select the architecture which is most desirable to enhance coop-
eration. However, we do not know whether these networks are
strategically viable. A recent theoretical paper, which considers
endogenous cooperation networks is Vega-Redondo (2002). In
this paper, agents play a collection of infinitely repeated pris-
oner’s dilemmas on the current social network. The payoffs in
the prisoners’ dilemma game fluctuate over time and players
can communicate via their links information regarding the be-
haviour of their acquaintances. The analysis addresses two main
questions. The first attains the structural properties of endoge-
nous networks that may sustain cooperative behavior. The sec-
ond issue tackled is how these structural properties vary when
the level of uncertainty (payoffs uncertainty) in the society is
altered. Vega-Redondo’s main result is that, for a sufficiently
low level of payoff volatility, cooperation is sustained in dense
networks. The intuition is that network density, together with
the possibility for players to communicate behavioral informa-
tion along links, makes monitoring more effective and this mit-
igates the individuals’ incentives to free-ride. In line with this
finding, Vega-Redondo (2002) shows that in more uncertain en-
vironments cooperative networks exhibit lower average distance
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among players.
In Vega-Redondo (2002) the effect of networks on coopera-
tive behavior is due to the possibility of players to communicate
behavioral information along links. Many are the situations in
which connections serve to share non-rival goods, such as infor-
mation and knowledge.15 In these cases, the externalities pro-
duced by the network are fully realized only if relationships are
stable over time. However, free-riding problems, among others,
may undermine the stability of (more or less) informal relation-
ships. Chapter 4 of the thesis presents a model by means of
which we study the effect of endogenous network externalities
on cooperative behavior.16 Players first invest in connections and
this then results in a network of relationships specifying the in-
teraction pattern among players. Once the network is formed,
each pair of linked players plays an infinitely repeated game
consisting of two games. On the one hand, each player plays a
prisoners’ dilemma game with each one of his immediate neigh-
bors. If two linked players cooperate (defect) they share the
cost of the link at the cooperative (defection) level, while if one
player cooperates and the other defects the former must entirely
pay the cost of that link (at the exploitative level). On the other
hand, each player, endowed with some valuable information, de-
cides whether to provide or withhold such information to each
of his acquaintances. Networks with different architectures will
allow for more or less sever punishments and this allows for a
systematic analysis of the interplay between stable network ar-
chitectures and individual incentives in games of conflict.
We show that when network externalities are taken into ac-
count players may sustain efficient interactions in situations that
would not be possible otherwise. We also observe that the ar-
chitecture of a network is crucial in determining the strategical
viability of efficient interactions. More precisely, when an effi-
cient interaction requires players to mutually cooperate, efficient
15Examples are scientific collaborations, collaborations for the development of new
products, friendship relationships, agreement among different cities to built up common
infrastructure.
16This Chapter is based on a joint work with Miguel Melendez.
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social norms are best sustained in symmetric networks, i.e. the
line network. By contrast, when an efficient interaction requires
players to play asymmetrically (one cooperates and the other
free-rides), efficient social norms are best sustained in fully cen-
tralized architectures, i.e. the star network. These results illus-
trate the importance of carrying out a structural analysis of the
individuals’ incentives, in many strategic situations.
4 Networks and markets
We are used to think of markets as made of two sides, the buyers
and the sellers, freely interacting with each other. Prices coordi-
nate these interactions. However, a large body of the empirical
work suggests that interactions within one side of the market
and across the two sides are built up on a variety of networks
relationships. R&D collaborations among firms are an exam-
ple. Hagedoorn (2002) shows that, in recent years, joint R&D
and technology exchange agreements are more prominent than
joint ventures (which were instead intensively used in the early
60ies). Therefore, firms undertake research projects with shared
resources and joint product development agreements and then
compete in the market.
Network of relationships also play an important role on the
consumers side. In the marketing literature it is well established
that consumers obtain much of their information by interact-
ing with their social contacts (Feick and Price (1986,1987)). In
relation to this, firms have increasingly recognized the need for
using informal channels as a way to market their product. The
practice of consumers referral is an example.17 According to the
Direct Selling Association (1999), annual sales of firms that rely
entirely on consumer referral grew from 13 billion to nearly 23
billion dollars, between 1991 and 1998.18
17Firms provide different sort of benefits such as discounts to clients who bring new
costumers.
18We provide another example. Granovetter (1974) shows that in the process of finding
a job, people rely intensively on their social connections. Therefore, phenomena such as
unemployment, wages distribution and inequality are also affected by the interactions
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Also the relationships between buyers and sellers play an im-
portant role. For example, in the process of producing and sell-
ing goods, firms must discover from whom they can purchase
inputs, the potential demand they will encounter and who is in-
terested in distributing their products. To this end, when trans-
action costs are too high, informal relationships may be of help.
Nishiguchi (1994) shows how, in the Japanese electronics and
automobiles sectors, firms always rely on specific subsets of sup-
pliers with whom they maintain close business relationships.
These examples motivate the development of a theory explain-
ing the role network relationships play in the way markets func-
tion. We now discuss the main theoretical contributions in this
respect.19
Kranton and Minehart (2001) analyse what drives buyers and
sellers to form links with multiple partners and whether these
networks are efficient or not. The natural way of modelling these
relationships is to consider that trade between a buyer and a
seller may occur only if a link is in place. The buyer’s and seller’s
network thus specifies with whom each player may transact. In
such a framework, buyers have independently and identically
distributed utilities for the object. They form costly links with
sellers, each one of which has a single unit to sell. The price
of each transaction is the result of an ascending-bid auction.
Each buyer knows his own evaluation but not the evaluation of
other buyers. Buyers drop-out of the bidding as the price exceeds
their evaluation. This process continues until demand equals
supply. The main results the authors obtain are the following.
First, competition generates an efficient allocation of goods in
the network. Second, the network connecting buyers and sellers
is crucial in determining the price at which transactions take
place. In particular, the utility to a buyer equals the marginal
social value of his participation in the network.20
structure of the society. See also Calvo and Jackson (2004a, 2004b) and Montgomery
(1991).
19 See Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2003) for a survey of models on firms, markets
and networks.
20Other works on this issue are Kranton and Minehart (2000), Corominas-Bosch (1999)
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Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) study the incentives of
competing firms to form collaborative agreements with each
other. More precisely, there is a finite number of firms, which,
prior to competing in market, form pair-wise collaborations with
other firms. Once the network has been formed each firm chooses
a level of costly R&D effort.21 Thus, for each link connecting two
firms the R&D output is determined, which results in a lower
cost of production for the two partners. Finally, firms compete
in the market taking as given the costs of production. Goyal
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) find that when firms compete by
setting quantities, firms’ R&D effort is declining in the level of
collaborative activity. Social welfare is maximised under an in-
termediate level of collaboration. Since firms in some cases can
gain market power by increasing the number of suitable agree-
ments, firms may have an incentive to form too many links and
as a consequence inefficiency may emerge in the market.
In Chapter 5 we develop a theoretical model to analyse the in-
terplay between network relationships among consumers and the
functioning of the market. We examine a search model a la’ Bur-
dett and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a consumers
network and they may search at a cost for price quotations. The
information thus gathered is non-excludable along direct links.
To maintain symmetry on the consumers’ side we assume that
each consumer holds the same number of connections. Varying
the number of connections that each consumer has allows us to
investigate the effect of network relationships on consumers and
firms’ incentives, as well as on market competitiveness.
The first result is a full characterization of the equilibria of
the game. When the network is empty (there are no connections
across players), in equilibrium consumers randomize between
searching for one price and for two prices (high search inten-
sity equilibrium).22 By contrast, when network externalities are
and Wang and Watts (2002).
21Goyal and Joshi (2003) analyse a similar model where firms do not choose the effort
level and therefore the extent of costs reduction is exogenously given.
22 In this case the model degenerates to the duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd
(1983).
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taken into account this equilibrium exists only for sufficiently
low search costs, otherwise a new equilibrium where consumers
randomize between searching for one price and not searching at
all emerges (low search intensity equilibrium). The second find-
ing is that, in both equilibria, consumers search less frequently
in denser networks. An increase in the density of the network
leads consumers to free-ride more on each other. Finally, we
show that this free-riding effect may have somewhat surpris-
ing consequences on equilibrium pricing and social welfare. In
particular, in the high search intensity equilibrium the more
connections consumers have the higher is the expected price in
equilibrium as well as the social welfare, while the lower is the
consumer surplus. These results are reversed in the low search
intensity equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The role of social and economic networks in shaping individ-
ual behavior and aggregate phenomena has received increasing
attention in recent years. This work has been accompanied by
research of sociologists, economists and physicists into the char-
acter of actual networks. This research shows that communica-
tion networks, scientific collaboration networks, social networks
and the web exhibit high levels of centrality and small aver-
age distances.1 This widespread stability of centrality and small
distances has led researchers to develop theories of network for-
mation which can explain these features.
The connections model proposed in Bala and Goyal (2000a)
offers a simple framework for the study of network formation.2
In this model there is a set of players who each gain from ac-
cessing other players. Player 1 can access player 2 directly by
forming a link; this link also allows player 1 access to other play-
ers that player 2 is accessing on his own. We will suppose that
the link formed by 1 with 2 creates a similar flow of benefits to
1See Rogers and Kincaid (1981) for networks of communication, Goyal, van der Leij
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2003) for co-authorship networks in economics and Newman
(2001) for co-authorship networks in other subjects, Burt (1992) for work on social
networks, Albert and Barabasi (2002) for evidence on the architecture of the World
Wide Web.
2There are two versions of the connections model: the case where individual players
can form links unilaterally was introduced in Bala and Goyal (2000a) and Goyal (1993),
while the case where links are formed based on bilateral agreement was introduced in
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The term connections model is due to Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996). Both the versions have been extensively studied in the literature. Theoretical
work on this model includes Bala and Goyal (2000b), Deroian (2003), Dutta and Jackson
(2000), Feri (2004a, 2004b), Haller and Sarangi (2001) and Watts (2001a, 2001b). There
have also been several experimental tests of the predictions of the connections model;
see e.g., Falk and Kosfeld (2003), Callander and Plott (2004) and Goeree, Riedl and Ule
(2004).
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2.3 Bala and Goyal (2000a) show that if a player’s payoffs are in-
creasing in the number of other players accessed and decreasing
in the number of links formed, then an equilibrium network can
have only one of two possible structures: it is either a center-
sponsored star (a network in which one player, the center, forms
links with all the other players) or the empty network (which
has no links). We note that a star exhibits high centrality and
short distances between individuals. In this paper we examine
the impact of ex-ante player heterogeneity on these findings.
Ex-ante asymmetries arise quite naturally in many contexts.
For instance, in the context of information networks it is often
the case that some individuals are more interested in particu-
lar issues (such as computer software) and therefore better in-
formed which makes them more valuable as contacts. Similarly,
individuals differ in communication and social skills. Finally,
individuals can often be classified into distinct groups (based
on geographical or cultural reasons) and forming links within a
group is cheaper as compared to forming links across groups.
We start with a general model of heterogeneous players: the
costs to player i of a link with player j as well as the benefits
of such a link are allowed to depend on both i and j. In ad-
dition, we assume that the length of the path does not matter
in defining the benefits (there is no decay). We first consider a
particular form of cost heterogeneity: for any player i the costs
of forming links with every other player are ci but we allow
this cost to vary across players. In this setting we find that if
benefits are homogeneous then a strict equilibrium is either an
empty network or a center-sponsored star. By contrast, if val-
ues are heterogeneous then partially connected networks can
also arise, though each (non-singleton) component constitutes
a center-sponsored star (Proposition 2.1). These results suggest
that heterogeneity in benefits is important in determining the
3Examples which can be interpreted in this spirit are telephone calls in which people
exchange information, investments in personal relationships which create a social tie
yielding value to both partners, and the creation of blogs (short for web log). When a blog
user i enters another blog user j, he or she can leave a comment and this automatically
creates a link from j to i.
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level of connectedness of a network. We then move to a model
with general cost heterogeneity where costs of forming links vary
across individuals and in addition for the same individual the
costs of forming links are sensitive to the identity of the poten-
tial partner. In this setting we obtain the following equivalence
result: a strict equilibrium network is minimal and conversely
every minimal network is a strict equilibrium for suitable costs
and benefits. We also find that this equivalence obtains even
if benefits are restricted to be homogeneous (Proposition 2.2).
Taken together these results suggest that cost heterogeneity is
important in shaping the level of connectedness of networks as
well as the architecture of individual components. These results
also clarify the role of different forms of cost heterogeneity and
in particular imply that the ‘everything is possible’ nature of our
equivalence result is closely related to cost heterogeneity which
arises when the costs of linking vary for the same player.
This last finding on the impact of cost heterogeneity leads us
to ask: Does strategic link formation have something to say in
settings with restricted types of cost heterogeneity? This ques-
tion is the motivation behind the insider-outsider model where
the society is composed of distinct groups. The cost of forming
a link between two players is (weakly) increasing in the distance
between the groups to which the two players belong. Thus, the
distance among groups may be interpreted as the degree of het-
erogeneity across players.
We start with a study of a static model with no decay. In this
setting, we obtain two main results. Our first result is a complete
characterization of strict Nash equilibrium networks. It shows
that an equilibrium network is either a center-sponsored star
or a variation of this architecture (Proposition 2.3).4 Figure 2.1
depicts all the strict Nash architectures in a society composed
4The following phenomenon which is widely observed corresponds to center-
sponsorship: one friend acts as a host to a social gathering in which friends are invited.
The host (center) sponsors the invitations (center-sponsorship) and the social gathering
offers an opportunity for sharing information and goods (two-way flow of benefits). A
specific example of this is mentioned in Rappaport (1968); he points out that in the
Maring tribe of New Guinea periodically one clan acts as a host (center-sponsorship) to
a big feast in which all neighboring clans participate (two-way flow of benefits) .
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of two groups.
Our second result is about efficient networks. In the insider-
outsider model, it is clear that an efficient network must min-
imize the number of outsider links since they are costlier as
compared to insider links. Thus in a society with 2 groups
an efficient connected network has each group entirely inter-
nally linked and 1 outside link (Proposition 2.4). By contrast, a
(connected) strict equilibrium network is a generalized center-
sponsored star,5 with n−nl outsider links (where nl is the num-
ber of players in the core group). If there are 2 groups and 50
players in each group then an efficient network has 98 insider
links and 1 outsider link, while a strict equilibrium network has
49 insider links and 50 outsider links! The relative abundance of
across group links is a reflection of the center-sponsorship prop-
erty of the network. This leads us to examine the robustness of
the equilibrium predictions.
We do this by examining the role of a small amount of de-
cay. We show that a strict equilibrium always exists and stars
(and variants of stars) are prominent in equilibrium networks.
However, we also find that center-sponsorship is not the only
way a star can arise in equilibrium; there is a much wider range
of parameters for which periphery-sponsorship prevails in equi-
librium (Proposition 2.5).6 Periphery-sponsorship is intimately
related to another feature of equilibrium networks: the existence
of stars constituted of members of a single group. Group-based
stars minimize inter-group links and this suggests that there is
5This network is formally defined in section 4 of this Chapter.
6Periphery-sponsored centrality is widely observed empirically. We present three ex-
amples to illustrate this. The first example is rural communication networks. Rogers and
Kincaid (1981) present communication networks from rural areas in different parts of
the world. One of the distinctive features of these networks is the presence of a few very
well connected people (stars). In these examples the average person connects with these
well connected people (periphery-sponsorship). The second example is the World-Wide
Web. Albert and Barabasi (2002) report that the Web exhibits high centrality and short
average distances (within the core set of nodes). This high centrality arises because some
nodes have very high number of outgoing links (center-sponsorship) while some nodes
have very high number of incoming links (periphery-sponsorship). A third example is
the network of telephone calls. Albert and Barabasi (2002) report that these networks
also exhibit high centrality with some nodes having a very large number of periphery
sponsored links.
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considerable overlap between equilibrium and efficient networks,
in the presence of a small amount of decay.
Finally, we consider the dynamic stability of equilibrium net-
works. We show that a dynamic process based on individual
myopic best responses converges to a minimal curb set and we
provide a full characterization of these sets. We find that a mini-
mal curb set is either a strict equilibrium identified in the static
model or is an interlinked center-sponsored stars network (in
which each group constitutes a center-sponsored star and there
exists a single link between the center-sponsored stars (Propo-
sition 2.6)). Therefore, local centrality can arise in the long run;
this reduces across group links and brings about a closer align-
ment between social and individual incentives.
We summarize our findings as follows: even in settings with
considerable heterogeneity, strategic models of network forma-
tion yield sharp predictions and equilibrium networks exhibit
high centrality and small average distances.
The theory of network formation is a very active area of re-
search currently.7 Most of the existing literature focuses on ho-
mogeneous player models; we now briefly discuss three other
papers which examine heterogeneity. Johnson and Gilles (2000)
considers two-sided link formation in a model where individuals
are located around a circle and costs of links are increasing in
the distance between players. McBride (2003) focuses on value
heterogeneity and partial information about network structure.
In a new paper Hojman and Szeidl (2003) develop a general
model of decay and show that periphery-sponsorship is a robust
feature of equilibrium networks. In contrast to these papers, the
focus of the present paper is on the impact of different forms of
heterogeneity on the architecture of equilibrium networks. We
first show that value heterogeneity is not important while cost
heterogeneity is critical in shaping equilibrium network architec-
tures. This motivates the study of network formation in a model
of restricted cost heterogeneity, the insider-outsider model. We
7See e.g. Aumann and Myerson (1988), Jackson and Watts (2002), Kranton and
Minehart (2001), Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001).
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find that centrality and short-average distances are features of
equilibrium networks in the insider-outsider model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 presents results on equilibrium networks
under general cost and value heterogeneity. Section 4 analyzes
an insider-outsider model, while section 5 concludes
2 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of players and let i and j be typical
members of this set. We shall assume throughout that the num-
ber of players n ≥ 3. Each player is assumed to possess some
information of value to himself and to other players. He can
augment his information by communicating with other people;
this communication takes resources, time and effort and is made
possible via pair-wise links.
A strategy of player i ∈ N is a (row) vector gi = (gi,j)j∈NÂ{i}
where gi,j ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ NÂ {i} . We say that player i
has a link with j if gi,j = 1. A link between player i and j can
allow for either one-way (asymmetric) or two-way (symmetric)
flow of information. We assume throughout the paper that a link
gi,j = 1 allows both players to access each other’s information.
The set of strategies of player i is denoted by Gi. Throughout the
paper we restrict our attention to pure strategies. Since player i
has the option of forming or not forming a link with each player
of the remaining n−1 players, the number of strategies of player
i is clearly |Gi| = 2n−1. The set G = G1× ...×Gn is the space of
pure strategies of all the players.
A strategy profile g = (g1, ..., gn) can be represented as a
directed network. Let g ∈ G. We use g − gi,j to refer to the
network obtained when a link gi,j = 1 is deleted from g. To
describe information flows, it is useful to define the closure of
g: this is a non-directed network denoted g =cl(g), and define
by gi,j = max {gi,j, gj,i} for each i and j in N.8 Pictorially, the
8Note that gi,j = gj,i so that the order of players is irrelevant.
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closure of a network simply means replacing every directed edge
of g by a non-directed one. We say there is a path in g between
i and j if either gi,j = 1 or there exist players j1, ..., jm distinct
from each other and i and j such that
©
gi,j1 = ... = gjm,j = 1
ª
.
We write i
g←→ j to indicate a path between i and j in g. Fur-
thermore, a path between i and j is said to be i − oriented
if either gi,j = 1 or there is a sequence of distinct players
i1, i2, ..., in with the property that: {gi,i1 = gi1,i2 =, ..., gin,j = 1} .
Define Nd (i; g) = {k ∈ N |gi,k = 1} as the set of players with
whom i maintains a link and let µdi (g) =
¯¯
Nd (i; g)
¯¯
be the car-
dinality of the set. The set N (i; g) =
n
k ∈ N
¯¯¯
i
g←→ k
o
∪ {i}
consists of players that i accesses in g, while µi (g) = |N (i; g)|
is its cardinality.
Given a network g, we define a component as a set C (g) ⊂ N
such that ∀i, j ∈ C (g) there exists a path between them and
there does not exist a path between ∀i ∈ C (g) and an player
k ∈ NÂC (g) . Given a network g, let #C (g) be the number of
components in g. A network g is said to be minimal if #C (g) <
#C (g − gi,j), for any gi,j = 1. Moreover a network g is said
to be connected if it is composed of only one component, i.e.
#C (g) = 1. If this component is minimal, then g is said to be
minimally connected. Finally, network g is partially connected
if it is neither empty nor connected.
We note that center-sponsored star, gcss, is a network archi-
tecture in which one player forms links with each of the other
(n− 1) players and there are no other links.
To complete the definition of a normal-form game of network
formation, we specify the payoffs. Let Vi,j denote the benefits
that player i derives from accessing player j. Similarly, let ci,j
denote the cost for player i of forming a link with player j. The
payoff to player i in a network g can be written as follows:
Πi (g) =
X
j∈N(i;g)
Vi,j −
X
j∈Nd(i;g)
ci,j (2.1)
We shall assume that ci,j > 0 and Vi,j > 0 for all i, j ∈ N. Given
a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained when all
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of player i’s links are removed. Note that the network g−i can
be regarded as the strategy profile where i chooses not to form a
link with anyone. The network g can be written as g = gi ⊗ g−i
where the ‘⊗’ indicates that g is formed as the union of the links
in gi and g−i. The strategy gi is said to be a best response of
player i to g−i if:
Πi (gi ⊗ g−i) > Πi (g0i ⊗ g−i) for all g0i ∈ Gi. (2.2)
The set of all of player i0s best responses to g−i is denoted by
BRi (g−i) . Furthermore, a network g = (g1, ..., gn) is said to be
a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi (g−i) for each i, i.e. players are play-
ing a Nash equilibrium. If a player has multiple best responses
to the equilibrium strategies of the other players then this could
make the network less stable as the player can switch to a pay-
off equivalent strategy. This switching possibility in non-strict
Nash networks has been exploited and has been shown to be
important in refining the set of equilibrium networks in earlier
work (see e.g. Bala and Goyal (2000a)). So we will focus on strict
Nash equilibria in the present paper. A strict Nash equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium where each player gets a strictly higher
payoff from his current strategy than he would with any other
alternative strategy.
We now define social welfare and efficiency of a network.
There are different ways of measuring efficiency; we follow the
convention in this literature and focus on the sum of payoffs of
all players. Formally, given a network g, its welfare,W : G → R,
can be stated as follows:
W (g) =
nX
i=1
Πi (g) for g ∈ G. (2.3)
A network is said to be efficient ifW (g) >W (g0) for any g0 ∈ G.
Our notion of efficiency is equivalent to the concept of strong
efficiency in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).9
9An alternative definition would be in terms of Pareto dominance. In settings where
utility is not transferable, efficient networks are always Pareto-efficient, but the converse
is generally not true. However if payoffs are transferable across players then clearly the
two notions are equivalent.
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3 General heterogeneity
In this section we shall study the scope of individual incentives
in restricting network architectures in a setting of general costs
and value heterogeneity. Our main finding is that value het-
erogeneity is important in determining the connectedness of a
network while heterogeneity in costs matters both for the level
of connectedness as well as for the architecture of individual
components of a network.
We start with a consideration of a setting in which players
may differ in their costs of forming links but the costs of forming
links for an individual are independent of the potential partner.
Our first result establishes an equivalence between the set of
center-sponsored star networks and the set of strict equilibrium
networks if values are homogeneous. On the other hand, if values
are allowed to vary freely then we find an equivalence between
the set of minimal networks in which non-singleton components
are center-sponsored stars and the set of strict equilibrium net-
works.
Proposition 2.1. Let payoffs satisfy (2.1) and suppose ci,j =
ci, ∀j ∈ N. If Vi,j = V,∀i, j ∈ N, then a strict equilibrium
is either empty or a center-sponsored star; conversely any such
network is a strict equilibrium for some {ci, V } . If values vary
freely then a strict equilibrium is either empty or a minimal
network in which every (non-singleton) component is a center-
sponsored star; conversely any such network is a strict equilib-
rium for some {ci, Vi,j} .
Proof:We note first that any equilibrium network is minimal;
this follows from the no decay assumption. We next show that
if ci,j = ci, ∀j ∈ N then any non-singleton component C(g)
in a strict equilibrium network g must be a center-sponsored
star. If there are two players in this component then the claim
is obviously true. So let us consider a component with 3 or more
players. Without loss of generality there is a pair of players i and
j such that gi,j = 1. We note that player i cannot access any
other player k via this link with player j. If there were such a
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player then since ci,j = ci, ∀j ∈ N , player i would be indifferent
between linking with j and k and g would not be a strict equi-
librium. We next note that no such player k forms a link with
i. If k formed a link with i then k would in turn be indifferent
between linking with i and j. Combining these observations it
follows that player i must be forming links with all players in
the component and so it constitutes a center-sponsored star. We
next take up the cases of homogenous and heterogeneous values,
respectively.
First, we consider the case of homogeneous values. Suppose g
is a non-empty (strict) equilibrium network. We will show that
it is connected. Let C1(g) be a non-singleton component in g and
let j /∈ C1(g). From above it follows that there exists a player
i ∈ C1(g) who is central and sponsors all links in C1(g). Since
g is a strict equilibrium this implies that ci < V . The marginal
payoff to forming a link with j is at least V , and so player i can
increase his payoff by forming an additional link, contradicting
the hypothesis that g is an equilibrium. Thus g is connected
and we have proved that if values are homogeneous then an
equilibrium network is either empty or a center-sponsored star.
We now take up the converse case. The empty network is a
(strict) equilibrium if ci > V for all i, while a center-sponsored
star with i at the center is a (strict) equilibrium if ci < V.
Second, we consider the case of heterogeneous values. From
the above arguments it follows that any component in a non-
empty (strict) equilibrium network must be a center-sponsored
star. We now prove the converse. Fix some minimal network g
in which every (non-singleton) component is a center-sponsored
star. Let there bem components in this network, C1 (g) , ..., Cm (g) .
Let i ∈ C1 (g) be the central player in C1(g). For any link gi,j =
1, set ci < Vi,j, while for every component Ck (g) , k = 2, ...,m,
set
P
j∈Ck(g) Vx,j < cx,for all x ∈ C1(g). It follows that the links
of i are optimal while no additional links are profitable for any
player x ∈ C1(g). Since C1(g) was arbitrary, the proof follows.¥
The above result illustrates the role of value heterogeneity in
defining the level of connectedness of networks: homogeneous
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values ensure connectedness of networks, while heterogeneity
can generate partially connected networks. We next note that
the introduction of costs heterogeneity decreases the multiplicity
of equilibria. Indeed, only players who have a sufficiently low
cost of linking can be at the center of a center-sponsored star
network. We finally note that ci = c is a special case of the above
result. This tells us that the results on equilibrium networks
with homogeneous costs and values obtained in Bala and Goyal
(2000a) can in fact be generalized to allow for heterogeneity in
costs of forming links across individuals. Is this also true if costs
of forming links are different for the same individual, depending
on the potential partner? The following proposition shows that
matters are quite complicated in this case.
Proposition 2.2. Let payoffs satisfy (2.1) and suppose costs
vary freely. Then a strict equilibrium is minimal; conversely, any
minimal network is a strict equilibrium for some {ci,j, Vi,j}.
Proof:Minimality follows directly from the no decay assump-
tion. We now prove the converse. Fix some minimal network g.
We set the costs and values as follows: Vi,j = V, ∀i, j ∈ N and for
any link gi,j = 1, let the corresponding cost ci,j =  < V, while
for any link gi,j = 0, set the corresponding cost ci,j > (n− 1)V.
The proof follows. ¥
This result shows that if costs of forming links for an individ-
ual vary across partners and costs of forming links are different
for different players then strategic interaction imposes no re-
strictions on network architecture. We also note that the proof
of the second part of the result actually uses homogeneous val-
ues to support arbitrary minimal networks. This shows that, in
case of general cost heterogeneity, the level of value heterogene-
ity plays no important role in determining network architecture.
We summarize our analysis of the general heterogeneity model
in the following table.
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Minimal networksMinimal networksHeterogeneous
ge, minimal networks 
in which every non-
singleton component 
is a center-sponsored 
star
ge, gcsscij=ci
ge, minimal networks 
in which every non-
singleton component 
is a center-sponsored 
star 
ge, gcssHomogeneous
HeterogeneousHomogeneousCosts \ Values
Table 2.1. The role of general heterogeneity
This table tells us that value heterogeneity is important in
determining the level of connectedness of networks. We also ob-
serve that cost heterogeneity is important in shaping both the
level of connectedness as well as the architecture of individual
components. Finally, this table also highlights the significance
of different forms of cost heterogeneity in shaping networks. In
particular it implies that the ‘everything is possible’ nature of
our equivalence result is closely related to cost heterogeneity
which arises when the costs of linking vary for the same player.
This finding motivates an examination of settings with specific
types of cost-heterogeneity.
4 An insider-outsider model
In this section we consider a society in which individuals are
divided into pre-specified groups, and the costs of forming links
within the groups is lower as compared to costs of forming links
across groups. This leads to a model in which costs of linking are
partner specific. We start with a basic static model with no de-
cay and provide a complete characterization of equilibrium and
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efficient networks. We then examine the robustness of the find-
ings to decay and dynamics. Our main finding is that centrality
and small distance are robust features of equilibrium networks.
We consider a society composed of m groups. Let nl = |Nl|
be the size of group l, with l = 1, 2, 3, ...,m. The set of players
is then N ≡ ∪ml=1Nl. We assume perfect symmetry in value
across individuals and we normalize it to one, i.e. Vi,j = 1 for
all i, j ∈ N.10 To allow for cost heterogeneity we consider a
spatial cost structure: groups can be ordered in a line according
to some well defined characteristics. The distance between two
groups can be interpreted as a measure of the heterogeneity that
distinguishes them. Given two players i ∈ Nl and j ∈ Nk, the
cost of forming a link gi,j, is:
ci,j = cj,i = f (|l − k|) (2.4)
If i and j belong to the same group we let: ci,j = cj,i =
f (0) = cL. We shall assume that f (·) is (weakly) increasing in
its argument and cL > 0.
We note two interesting cases of our specification. First, when
f (0) = f (1) = ... = f (m− 1) = c the insider-outsider model
degenerates in the linear payoff model presented in Bala and
Goyal (2000a). Second, if we assume that f (d) = cH , ∀d > 1,
and f (0) = cL < cH , we then have a two-cost levels model: the
cost of creating an outside link across groups, cH , is higher than
the cost of creating an inside link within a group, cL.
Let Nd,k (i; g) = {j ∈ Nk|gi,j = 1} , for k = 1, ...,m,; then
define Nd (i; g) ≡ ∪mk=1Nd,k (i; g) . Furthermore, let µ
d,k
i (g) be
the cardinality of Nd,k (i; g) . In other words, µd,ki (g) represents
the number of links initiated by i with members of group k.
Hence, given a network g and a player i ∈ Nl, the payoff function
10This normalization simplifies the statement of our results; on occasion this normal-
ization can create some confusion between the notions of component value and com-
ponent size. For instance, our statements relating costs of forming links with specific
networks are clearly restrictions on component value and not on component size alone.
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described by (2.1) can be rewritten as follows:
Πi (g) = µi(g)−
mX
k=1
µd,ki f (|l − k|) (2.5)
We now develop some additional notation. Given a network g,
we say that two players i, i0 ∈ Nl are internally linked if either
gi,i0 = 1 or there exists a group of distinct players {i1, i2, ..ik}
where ix ∈ Nl for any x ∈ {1, ..., k} such that g¯i,i1 = g¯i1,i2 =
... = g¯ik,i0 = 1. A group Nl is entirely internally linked if ev-
ery pair of players i, i0 ∈ Nl is internally linked. Similarly, a
pair of players i, i0 is externally linked if gi,i0 = 0 and there ex-
ists a group of distinct players {j1, j2, ..jk} where jx /∈ Nl for
any x ∈ {1, ..., k} such that g¯i,j1 = g¯j1,j2 = ... = g¯jk,i0 = 1.
A group Nl is entirely externally linked if every pair of play-
ers i, i0 ∈ Nl is externally linked. Finally, let the diameter of a
non-singleton component C (g) be defined as the length of the
largest geodesic distance between any pair of players belonging
to it, i.e. D (C (g)) = maxi,j∈C(g) d (i, j;C (g)).11 We now define
some network architectures that arise in this model.
Definition 2.1. A generalized center-sponsored star is a min-
imally connected network which satisfies the following condi-
tions:
(i) There is a group l0 and a player i0 ∈ Nl0, such that gi0,j =
1,∀j ∈ Nl0Â {i0} .
(ii) For any j ∈ N , i0
g←→ j, is an i0 − oriented path.
(iii) Consider an i0 − oriented path, where i0, i1, i2, ..., in with©
gi0,i1 = ... = gin−1,in = 1
ª
. Let ik ∈ Nlk , for k ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} ,
then f (|lk − lk+1|) < f (|lk − lx|) for x ∈ {k + 2, k + 3, ..., n} .
We note that a generalized center-sponsored star will have
the feature that along any path starting from the central player
11Given two players i and j in g, the geodesic distance, d (i, j; g) , is defined as the
length of the shortest path between them.
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there can be at most m players. Thus the diameter of any such
network is at most 2m, which is independent of the size of the
society and only depends on the number of groups. We shall use
ggcs to refer to any generalized center-sponsored star network.
A network in which each group constitutes a distinct center-
sponsored (periphery-sponsored) star and there are no links
across groups has the unconnected center-sponsored (periphery-
sponsored) stars architecture. We shall use gucs (gups) to refer
to any network with this architecture.
Our first result provides a complete characterization of strict
Nash networks in the insider-outsider model.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose (2.4) and (2.5) hold. Assume that
nl > 2, ∀l = 1, ...,m.
1. If cL > 1 then the empty network is the unique strict
equilibrium.
2. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1), then there are three cases: (2a) if
f (1) ∈ (cL, 1) , then a generalized center-sponsored star
is the unique strict equilibrium network. (2b) If f (1) ∈
(1,max [n1, ..., nm]), then a strict equilibrium does not ex-
ist. (2c) If f (1) > max [n1, ..., nm] , then a network with
unconnected center-sponsored stars is the unique equilib-
rium network.12
Figure 2.1 illustrates the different strict Nash architectures for
a society with two groups of three players each (n1 = n2 = 3).13
We note that strict equilibrium networks have very specific ar-
chitectures and thus strictness is a useful refinement. We discuss
some aspects of this characterization result. The first remark
is about insider and outsider links. Our result shows that in
connected equilibria there is one group, the core group, which
is entirely internally linked, while all other groups are entirely
12We note that weak equilibrium always exist in the insider-outsider model: in case
(2b) a network in which each group forms a star and the centers of the stars are linked
is a weak equilibrium. Moreover, all equilibria are weak in this case.
13 In this figure a bold line on a link next to a player indicates that this player has
formed the link and pays for the link. We are assuming here that f (1) > f (0) .
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externally linked. In other words, the formation of local connec-
tions is not allowed in equilibrium (except for one group). Two,
we note that the diameter of connected strict equilibrium net-
works is independent of the number of players, and depends only
on the number of groups. Thus we expect equilibrium networks
to have a relatively short diameter.
The third observation concerns the centrality and center spon-
sorship properties. If the strict Nash network is connected, there
is a player i such that all paths are oriented toward him. Hence,
this player plays a particularly central role in the network. Fur-
thermore, if the strict Nash network is non-empty but uncon-
nected, then each component consists of members of one group
and it has the center-sponsored star structure. Therefore, cen-
trality and center-sponsorship are prominent properties of equi-
librium networks.
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Figure 2.1. Strict Nash Architectures.
We now turn to the issue of efficiency. We first introduce some
new terminology that will be used in the proposition below. Let
gmc refer to a minimally connected network with each group
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Nl forming a minimally connected component with nl − 1 in-
side links and (m− 1) outside links of distance one. Finally, a
partially connected network with each group generating a min-
imally connected component will be denoted as gpcm .
The following result provides a complete characterization of
efficient networks for the case of equal group sizes.14 Let nl = n
for all l = 1, 2, ..,m; moreover, we define c1 = mn2 and c2 =
[mn(mn− 1)− (mn−m)cL]/(m− 1).
Proposition 2.4. Suppose (2.4) and (2.5) hold. In addition
suppose that nl = n, ∀ l = 1, 2, ..,m.
1. Suppose cL ∈ (0, n). If f(1) ∈ (cL, c1) the network gmc is
uniquely efficient, while if f(1) > c1 then the network gpcm
is uniquely efficient.
2. Suppose cL ∈ (n,mn). If f(1) ∈ (cL, c2) then the network
gmc is uniquely efficient, while if f(1) > c2 then the empty
network is uniquely efficient.
3. If cL > mn then the empty network is uniquely efficient.
Figure 2.2 illustrates an efficient architecture for a society
composed of three groups and three players each.We have showed
that if gmc is efficient the corresponding set of strict Nash net-
works does not contain any architectures compatible with the
efficient one. This conflict persists until the level of f (1) is such
that any outside link is not beneficial both from an individual
and social point of view. When this is the case, our problem de-
generates in a sum of independent homogeneous problems lead-
ing to unconnected center-sponsored stars networks. It follows
that the trade-off between efficiency and stability fades in this
case.
14 If we allow groups having different sizes a variety of efficient networks arise. However,
the architectural properties of these networks are qualitatively the same as in the case of
equal size. To illustrate this consider the two-cost levels case in a society composed of a
small group and two large groups. Let g be an efficient network. When cL is low enough
each group is entirely internally linked in g. Furthermore, when cH is low enough g is
connected. For moderate level of cH the two large groups are connected while the small
group is left isolated. Finally, for sufficiently high level of cH each group is isolated.
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4.1 The role of decay
In the basic model, we assume that the transmission of value
is independent of the length of the path between players. In
this section we examine the robustness of our findings to the
presence of decay. A general analysis of decay is outside the
scope of the present paper. We will consider the case of small
levels of decay and we will focus on the case of two groups. Our
principal finding is that centrality and small distances are salient
properties of equilibrium networks while center-sponsorship is
not a robust feature of equilibrium networks in the presence of
decay.
Wemeasure the level of decay by a parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Given
a network g it is assumed that if the shortest path between agent
i and j has q ≥ 1 links, then the value of j’s information to i is
δq. The costs of forming links still take the form (2.4) and the
payoff (2.5) to player i ∈ Nl in a network g can be rewritten as
follows:
Πi (g) =
X
j∈N(i;g)
δd(i,j;g) − µd,li cL − µ
d,k
i cH (2.6)
where l, k = 1, 2 and l 6= k
A network in which each group constitutes a star and a sin-
gle player i of group l forms a link with the central player j of
group l0, l0 6= l, is referred to as an interlinked stars network. If
each star is center-sponsored (periphery-sponsored) we will say
that the network is an interlinked center-sponsored (periphery-
sponsored) stars. A one group periphery-sponsored star is a par-
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tially connected network where one group forms a periphery-
sponsored star, while the other group is empty.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose (2.4) and (2.6) hold. In addition
suppose that there are two groups and that nl = n ≥ 3, ∀ l =
1, 2.
1. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1). There exists a δ˜ (cL, cH) < 1 such
that for any δ ∈ (δ˜ (cL, cH) , 1) the following is true: (1a)
if cH ∈ (cL, n) any interlinked stars network is a strict
equilibrium. (1b) if cH > n any unconnected stars network
is a strict equilibrium.
2. Suppose cL ∈ (1, n). There exists a δ˜ (cL, cH) < 1 such
that for any δ ∈ (δ˜ (cL, cH) , 1) the following holds: (2a) if
cH ∈ (cL, n) the interlinked periphery-sponsored stars net-
work and the empty network are the only strict equilibria.
(2b) if cH > n the unconnected periphery-sponsored stars
network, the one group periphery-sponsored star network
and the empty network are the only strict equilibria.
3. if cL > n the empty network is the unique strict equilib-
rium.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the strict equilibria presented in part 2
of the above proposition. We first observe that the introduction
of a small amount of decay does not undermine the structural
properties such as centrality and short diameter, which were de-
rived in case of perfect information flow. However, in contrast
with the perfect information flow case, here we note that local
connections are allowed for any group. This is closely related
to the idea that peripheral players may invest in connections
while in the model without decay only central players invest in
connections. Secondly, we note that since the efficiency results
derived in Proposition 2.4 are strict, they also hold when a small
amount of decay is introduced. Thus, our analysis suggests that
some decay in flow of benefits can potentially serve to enhance
social efficiency.
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Figure 2.3. Strict Nash and decay.
4.2 Dynamics and local stars
In this section we shall examine a dynamic model of network
formation based on myopic best response decision making by
individuals. Our results establish that the dynamic process al-
ways converges and provide a characterization of the networks
that arise in the long run.
For a given set A, let ∆ (A) denote the set of probability dis-
tributions on A.We suppose that ∀i ∈ N there exists a number
pi ∈ (0, 1) and a function φi : G →∆ (Gi) where φi satisfies, for
all g ∈ G : φi (g) ∈ Interior ∆ (BRi (g−i)) . For gˆi in the support
of φi (g) , the notation φi (g) (gˆ) denotes the probability assigned
to gˆi by the probability measure φi (g) . If the network at time
t ≥ 1 is g0 = g0i ⊗ g0−i, the strategy of agent i at time t + 1 is
assumed to be given by:
gt+1i =
½
gˆi ∈ support φi (g) , with probability pi × φi (g) (gˆi)
g0i, with probability 1− pi
We assume that the choice of inertia as well as the random-
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ization over best responses by different agents is independent
across agents. Thus, our decision rules induce a transition ma-
trix T mapping the state space G to the set of all probability
distributions ∆ (G) on G. Let {Xt} be the stationary Markow
chain starting from the initial network g ∈ G with the above
transition matrix.
We will use the notion of curb sets in our analysis. A strategy
profile set, G˜ ⊆ G is closed under rational behavior (curb) if
BR (g) ⊆ G˜ for any g ∈ G˜. A curb set G˜ is minimal if there
not exist a proper subset which is a curb set.15 To provide a full
characterization of minimal curb sets we use a refinement of this
notion: super tight curb set. A set of networks G∗ ⊆ G is a super
tight curb set if BR (g) = G∗ for any g ∈ G∗. This set may be
considered a generalization of the strict Nash notion as the best
response set of a player i is invariant inside the set G∗. Our result
establishes an equivalence between minimal curb sets and super
tight curb sets and provides a full characterization of these sets.
Consider an interlinked center-sponsored stars network where
a single player i of group l forms a link with some player j of
group l0, l0 6= l. Note that as player i varies his links across
players of group l0, distinct interlinked center-sponsored stars
networks arise. We shall use Gilcssi to denote the set of these
networks. We shall use Gilcss to refer to sets with this property
in general. The next result considers a society composed of two
groups.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose (2.4) and (2.5) hold and there are
2 groups. For generic values of cH and cL, the dynamic pro-
cess converges to a super tight curb set, G∗, with probability 1.
Furthermore
1. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1): if cH ∈ (cL,max [n1, n2]) then G∗ ∈
{ggcs,Gilccs}, while if cH > max [n1, n2] then G∗ = {gucs}.
2. Suppose cL > 1: then G∗ = {ge}.
15A game with a compact strategy set and payoffs that are continuous with respect
to the strategies of players has at least one minimal curb set; however, a game may have
several such sets, each of them containing networks with different architectures.
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We would like to emphasize two aspects of the above result.
First, that myopic individual learning leads over time to a sta-
ble architecture of networks, which have a specific architectural
forms. This is a strong result given the very large number of
possible network architectures. Second, it shows how dynamics
can complement the static analysis nicely. In the static model
we noted that for some parameter ranges no limiting state ex-
ists and that there is a sharp conflict between strict Nash and
efficient networks. The study of dynamics shows us that in the
case where no strict Nash exist the process is still very well be-
haved and we can pin down precisely the long run outcomes:
interlinked center-sponsored stars networks.16 In this architec-
ture local connections are allowed within groups and the center-
sponsorship property holds only at the local level. Finally, we
find that these new long-run outcomes attain higher social wel-
fare than the strict Nash networks derived in the static analysis.
Thus dynamics may help resolve some of the tension between
individual and social incentives.
5 Conclusion
We have studied a connections model of network formation in
which players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well
as the costs of forming links. We start by showing that value
heterogeneity across players is crucial in determining the con-
nectedness of a network, while differences in costs of linking
across players are crucial in shaping both the level of connect-
edness as well as the architecture of individual components in a
network. We then explore an insider-outsider model in which it
is cheaper to form intra-group links as compared to inter-group
links. Our main finding here is that properties such as centrality
and short distances are robust features of equilibrium networks.
Moreover, we find that equilibrium networks are also socially
efficient in many instances.
16We note that such networks are weak Nash equilibria in case 2b of Proposition 2.3;
Moreover, all equilibria are weak in that case.
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6 Appendix chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We recall some definitions that
will be used in the proof. In a network g, a path between i
and j is said to be i − oriented if either gi,j = 1 or there is a
sequence of distinct players {i1, i2, ..., in} with the property that:
{gi,i1 = gi1,i2 = 1, ..., gin,j = 1}. The proof consists of a sequence
of steps, which are covered in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose g is a strict Nash network. If gi,j = 1,
where i ∈ Nl and j ∈ Nl0 , l 6= l0, then i does not access any
player j0 via the link gi,j = 1 where j0 ∈ Nk and k is such that
|l − k| ≤ |l − l0|.
Proof: Consider a strict Nash network g. Choose i ∈ Nl and
j ∈ Nl0 , l 6= l0, such that gi,j = 1. Let j0 ∈ Nk where k is
such that |l − k| ≤ |l − l0| . Suppose i accesses j0 via the link
gi,j = 1. The spatial cost structure implies that i can do at least
as well by deleting his link with j and forming a link with j0.
This contradicts strict Nash. ¥
Lemma 2.2. Suppose g is a strict Nash network. Assume
gi,j0 = 1, i ∈ Nl, j ∈ Nl0, l 6= l0 and let {j0, j1, ..., jk} where
jx ∈ Nlx for any x ∈ {0, ..., k} , be the set of players who agent
i accesses via the link gi,j0 = 1, then gj0,i = 0, ∀j0 ∈ Nk such
that |k − l| ≥ |k − lx| for some x ∈ {0, ..., k} .
Proof: Suppose gj0,i = 1. Since the cost of forming links is
non-decreasing in the distance between players’ groups, j0 can
do at least as well by deleting his link with i and forming a link
with jx. This contradicts strict Nash. ¥
Lemma 2.3. Suppose nl > 2, ∀ l = 1, ...,m and that g is a
strict Nash network, then in any non-singleton component there
exists a pair of players who belong to the same group (this group
will differ across components) and have a direct link.
Proof: Consider a non-singleton component C (g) . There ex-
ists gi,j = 1, i ∈ Nl and j ∈ NÂ{i}. Suppose that j ∈ Nl0 ,
l 6= l0. We first note that, given gi,j = 1, it must be true that
Nl ⊂ C (g). This follows by noting that the returns to a player
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k ∈ Nl from linking with component C(g) are strictly greater
than the returns to player i, while the costs are strictly smaller
(since k forms a link with i). Hence every player k ∈ Nl must
belong to C(g). Therefore i ∈ Nl must access every i0 ∈ Nl in g.
Lemma 2.1 implies that i cannot access i0 via j; thus, i accesses
i0 via a player j0, where gj0,i = 1. Because each group consists of
at least 2 players and player i was chosen arbitrarily it follows
that every player belonging to C (g) receives at least one link.
Therefore, there are at least |C (g)| links sponsored in C (g) ,
which implies that C (g) is not minimal. This contradicts that
g is Nash. Hence, the proof follows. ¥
Lemma 2.4. Assume nl > 2, ∀ l = 1, ...,m. Suppose g is
a non-empty strict Nash network. If gi,i0 = 1, i, i0 ∈ Nl, then
gi,i00 = 1, ∀i00 ∈ NlÂ {i} .
Proof: Consider a non-singleton component, C (g). Given the
argument in Lemma 2.3, if gi,i0 = 1, for i, i0 ∈ Nl, then Nl ⊂
C (g) . We first note that, if gi,i0 = 1, then gi00,i = 0 , ∀ i00 ∈
NlÂ{i}. This follows from the standard switching argument: if
gi00,i = 1 then player i00 is indifferent between linking with i and
i0, and g is therefore not a strict Nash network. We now have two
possible configurations. First, suppose that Nl ≡ C (g) . Then
an application of the switching argument immediately implies
that gi,i00 = 1, for all i00 ∈ Nl. Second, suppose Nl $ C(g).
Since C(g) is connected, there is a path between i and i00, and
d(i, i00) ≥ 2. Then there is some player j 6= i00 such that g¯i,j =
1. Suppose that j ∈ Nl. If gi,j = 1 then a simple switching
argument applies with regard to player i and this contradicts the
hypothesis that g is strict Nash. If gj,i = 1 then the switching
argument applies to player j, who is indifferent between the link
with i and the link with i0. This contradicts the hypothesis that
g is strict Nash. Similar arguments can be used in the case that
j /∈ Nl to complete the proof of this lemma. ¥
Lemma 2.5. Assume nl > 2, ∀ l = 1, ...,m. Suppose g is
a connected strict Nash network and let i ∈ Nl be the player
identified by Lemma 4. Then any path i
g←→ j, ∀j ∈ NÂ {i} ,
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is i− oriented.
Proof: Let g be a strict Nash network which is connected.
Since g is minimal, every path starting at i ends with a well de-
fined end-player. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose
there is a path ending with player j, which is not i-oriented. If
g¯i,j = 1 and j is not i-oriented then gj,i = 1. From Lemma 2.4
we infer then that j ∈ Nl0 where l0 6= l. Next, since nl ≥ 2,
we can apply a switching argument for player j with respect to
some i0 ∈ Nl, and that contradicts the hypothesis that g is a
strict Nash network.
Suppose next that g¯i,j = 0. Let {i1, i2, i3, ..., in}, be the players
on the path between i and j, with g¯i,i1 = ... = g¯in,j = 1. We
first take up the case gj,in = 1. Let j ∈ Nx; if in /∈ Nx then
a simple switching argument with regard to player j and some
member of group x implies that g is not a strict Nash network.
If in ∈ Nx, there are two possibilities: (i) gin−1,in = 1 and (ii)
gin,in−1 = 1. In the first case, player in−1 is indifferent between
a link with player in and a link with player j. This contradicts
the hypothesis that g is a strict Nash network. In the second
case, there are two sub-cases: suppose in and in−1 belong to
the same group; then a switching argument applies to player
j, with respect to players in and in−1. If in and in−1 belong to
different groups then a switching argument applies to player in
with regard to members of the group of in−1 (given that nl ≥ 2,
for all l = 1, 2, ...,m).
Consider finally the case gin,j = 1. Let k be the first player
along the path {i1, i2, ..., in}, such that gk,k−1 = 1. Let ik−1 ∈
Ny. Since gk−2,k−1 = 1 by hypothesis, Lemma 1 implies that
ik, ik+1, ..., in /∈ Ny. By hypothesis, ny ≥ 2, and so there is a
player p ∈ Ny, p 6= ik−1, and we know that p /∈ {ik, ik+1, ..i, j}.
This is true because otherwise ik−2 can switch from ik−1 to p.
Thus, p ∈ N\{ik−1, ik, ..., in, j}. In this case however, a switch-
ing argument would apply to player ik with regard to p. Hence
g is a not a strict Nash network. This contradiction completes
the proof of the lemma.¥
Lemma 2.6. Assume nl > 2, ∀ l = 1, ...,m. Suppose g is a
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connected strict Nash network. Then D (g) ≤ 2m.
Proof: This follows directly by Lemma 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5
¥
We now complete the proof of Proposition 2.3.
1. Consider a strict Nash network g and suppose cL > 1.
We claim that the only strict Nash network is the empty
one. Suppose that there exists a non-singleton component
C (g). Using arguments from Lemma 2.3 it follows that if
i ∈ Nl, and gi,j = 1, then Nl ⊂ C(g). If Nl ≡ C(g), then it
is easy to show by applying the switching argument that
C(g) is a center-sponsored star. However, this is impos-
sible given the hypothesis that cL > 1. If on the other
hand, C(g) contains players from more than one group
then it follows that g is a connected network. Lemma
2.5 now implies that there is central player and that all
paths are oriented towards this player. However, given that
f(1) ≥ cL > 1, this is not sustainable in equilibrium. This
contradicts the hypothesis that g is a strict Nash equilib-
rium. Hence the empty network is the only possible strict
Nash network.
2a. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1) and f (1) ∈ (cL, 1). Suppose g is a
strict Nash network; given the parameter restrictions, it
is immediate that g must be connected. Lemma 2.3 and
Lemma 2.4 imply that g satisfies property (i) of defini-
tion 2.1. Since g is connected, Lemma 2.5 holds and that
implies property (ii) of definition 2.1. Considering the re-
strictions imposed by Lemma 2.1, property (iii) of defini-
tion 2.1 follows by verification.
2b. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1) and f (1) ∈ (1,max [n1, ..., nm]) . Sup-
pose g is a strict Nash network; first we note that it must
be connected. Lemma 2.5 implies that g has a central
player i, and that all paths are i-oriented. However, f (1) >
1, g cannot be sustained in equilibrium, leading to a con-
tradiction. Hence, there does not exist a strict Nash net-
work.
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2c. Suppose cL ∈ (0, 1) and f (1) > max [n1, ..., nm]. Consider
a strict Nash network g. From Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 it fol-
lows that either g has m components corresponding to
each of the groups or it is connected. In the former case,
Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 imply that each of the components
is a center-sponsored star. In the latter case, Lemma 2.5
implies that g has a central player and all the paths are
oriented towards this player. But then the argument from
Part 2b applies and such a network cannot arise in equi-
librium given that f(1) > max[n1, ..., nm]. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.4. In this proposition we assume
equal group size, i.e. nl = n for any l = 1, ...,m. We first start
with two observations: (a) The no-decay assumption implies
that each non-singleton component part of an efficient archi-
tecture is minimal; (b) If g is efficient and non-empty then it is
either minimally connected with m− 1 outside links of ‘length’
one and mn−m inside links, or partially connected with each
group generating a minimally connected component. This obser-
vation follows by the assumption of equal group size and by the
definition of efficiency concept. If a link between two members of
the same group is socially efficient, then, from a societal point of
view, each group should be internally linked. Furthermore, the
assumption of equal group sizes implies that each group inter-
nally linked contributes equally to the total social welfare pro-
duced by the network. It follows that if an outside link is social
enhancing, then an efficient network should be minimally con-
nected. Moreover, since the definition of efficiency requires the
minimization of the total cost of information flow, a connected
efficient network should have m− 1 outside links, each of them
which requires a cost equal to f (1) . Using these observations
we compare three different architectures:
1) The social welfare from gmc, is given by:
W (gmc) = (mn)2 −m (n− 1) cL − (m− 1) f (1) (2.7)
2) The social welfare from gpcm , is given by:
W (gpcm) = m (n)
2 −m (n− 1) cL (2.8)
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3) The social welfare from ge is given by:
W (ge) = mn (2.9)
First, we compare gpcm with g
e. It is easily checked thatW (gpcm) >
W (ge) if and only if cL ≤ n.
Second, suppose cL ∈ (0, n] and compare gmc with gpcm . Sim-
ple computations show that W (gmc) > W (gpc) if and only if
f (1) ≤ mn2 = c1. It follows that given cL ∈ (0, n] if f (1) ∈
(cL, c1] the only efficient network is gmc, while if f (1) > c1 the
only efficient network is gpcm . This proves part (1) .
Third, suppose cL > n and compare gmc with ge. Again, sim-
ple computations show that W (gmc) > W (ge) if and only if
f (1) ≤ mn(mn−1)−(mn−m)cL
m−1 = c2. We note that c2 is a decreas-
ing function of cL and attains the value mn when cL = mn.
Suppose therefore that cL ∈ (n,mn). If f (1) ∈ (cL, c2] then
gmc is uniquely efficient, while if f(1) > c2 then ge is uniquely
efficient. Finally, if cL > mn then c2 ≤ cL. Given our hypoth-
esis that f (1) > cL it follows that empty network is uniquely
efficient. This proves parts (2) and (3). ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.5. The proof of parts 1 and 3 is
straightforward and omitted. We provide a proof of part 2. We
first observe that as δ is close 1 an equilibrium network is min-
imal. Second, we observe that if gi,j = 1, for some i ∈ Nl,
j ∈ N\ {i} , then group Nl is connected. Suppose not, then the
payoff to a player i0 ∈ Nl\ {i} from sponsoring a link with player
i is strictly higher than the payoff obtained by player i. Third,
it is immediate that the empty network is always a strict equi-
librium if cL > 1. In what follows we focus on non-empty strict
equilibrium networks, g. Here, we have two possibilities, which
we analyse in turn.
( I. ) There are no links across groups, i.e. gi,j = 0, ∀i ∈ Nx,
j ∈ Ny, x 6= y. The second observation above implies that in an
equilibrium either a group is connected or disconnected. Next
note that since there are no links across groups the problem
for each group is analogous to the homogeneous case studied
by Bala and Goyal (2000a). Then it follows from Proposition
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5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000a) that if a group is connected
then it forms a periphery-sponsored star. Hence, g is either an
unconnected periphery-sponsored stars network or a one-group
periphery-sponsored star network. It is clear that such networks
are strict equilibria only if cH > n.
(II). There are links across groups, i.e. gi,j = 1 for some
i ∈ Nx, j ∈ Ny, x 6= y. It is now easy to see that g must be
connected. We now prove the following: If cL ∈ (1, n¯) then there
exists a δ˜ < 1 such that for any δ ∈ [δ˜, 1) if gi,j = 1 for some
i ∈ Nl and j ∈ N 0l , l 6= l0, then gj0,j = 1 for any j0 ∈ Nl0.
We first note that since cL > 1 any end agent (say) ˆ who is
accessed by player i via gi,j = 1 sponsors his link; let gˆ,y1 = 1.
(We note that since cH > 1 there exists at least one such end-
player distinct from j.) Second, we show that i only accesses
players in Nl0 via the link gi,j = 1. Suppose not; then there
exists a player i0 ∈ Nl accessed by i via the link gi,j = 1. Let
g0 = g − gi,j + gi,i0, it is easy to see that Ni(g) = Ni(g0). Thus,
Πi(g)− Πi(g0) =
P
j∈N(i;g¯) δ
d(i.j;g¯) − δd(i,j;g¯0) − (cH − cL) < 0, as
δ → 1. This contradicts Nash. Third, we show that i accesses
every player in Nl0 via gi,j = 1. Suppose not; then there exists
some player Nl0 accessed by i via some player k 6= j. Among
such players let j0 be the player closest to player i and assume
j0 accesses i via the link g¯j0,i0 = 1. By construction i0 ∈ Nl; the
previous argument implies that gi0,j0 = 1 and that any player
accessed by i0 via the link gi0,j0 = 1 belongs to Nl0 . Select one
of the end players, say j1, who player i0 accesses via the link
gi0,j0 = 1. Since cL > 1, player j1 sponsors his link, say gj1,y2 = 1.
Using a variant of the switching argument it is now easy to see
that either ˆ or j1 strictly gains by deleting the link with y1
or y2 and creating a new link with y2 or y1, respectively. This
contradicts Nash. Fourth, we note that since groupNl0 is entirely
internally linked, we can use Proposition 5.4 in Bala and Goyal
(2000a) to conclude that Nl0 forms a periphery-sponsored star.
Finally, it is easy to see that player j must be the center of the
periphery-sponsored star; for otherwise player i strictly gains by
switching from j to the central player of group Nl0 .
Finally, we note that also groupNl is entirely internally linked
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and therefore forms a periphery-sponsored star. Thus, if g is a
strict equilibrium it is an interlinked periphery-sponsored star.
The proof follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
(I). cL < 1: The first step shows that from any initial net-
work g0 there is a positive probability of transiting to a minimal
network g1. Fix a network g0. Number the players 1, 2, ..., n.
Consider this sequence of players moving one at a time starting
with 1. We claim that after player n has moved the network g1
is minimal. Suppose not and there is a cycle of players. In that
case consider players in the cycle who initiate links. Within this
set of players fix the player who moved last. Clearly, this player
did not choose a best response, as deleting one of his links in the
cycle would have increased his net payoffs. This contradiction
completes the argument.
The second step shows that starting from a minimal network
g1 there is a positive probability that the process transits to a
minimal network g2 in which there is at least one group with
one internal link. We focus on the case where g1 is connected
and both groups are entirely externally linked. Then there exist
players i, i0 ∈ N1 with g¯i,j = 1 where j ∈ N2, and player i
accesses i0 via j. If gi,j = 1 then (since cL < 1) there exists
a best response for player i in which he will disconnect from
j and instead link with i0 and this will yield a hybrid group.
The other possibility is that gj,i = 1. Since nl ≥ 2, for l = 1, 2,
there is a player j0 ∈ N2 who is accessed by j. If this player is
accessed via i the above argument leads to N2 being a hybrid
group. Since g1 is minimal and we only let one player update at
a time, the network g2 must be minimal. The other possibility
is that j0 is accessed via some other player i00. In this case again
variants of the above argument apply and the process transits
to a network with one group having at least one internal link.
Similar arguments apply if the initial network is not connected.
The third step shows that starting from a minimal network
g2 in which group N1 is hybrid there is a positive probabil-
ity that the process transits to a minimal network g3 in which
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group N1 is entirely internally linked. Let σ1(g) be the num-
ber of links between pairs of players in group N1. By hypoth-
esis, σ1 (g) ∈ [1, n1 − 1). Let gi,i0 = 1, for some pair of players
i, i0 ∈ N1. We distinguish between two cases. The first case arises
if players of N1 are spread over more than one component. Pick
some player i ∈ N1 and get him to choose a best response. It
is straightforward to verify that since cL < 1 any best response
of i, g0i, has the property that he accesses all players in own
group. Let g0 = g0i ⊗ g−i be the new network. It follows that
σ1(g0) ≥ σ1(g) + 1. We note that since g is a minimal network
and g0i is a best response, it follows that g
0 is a minimal network
as well. The second case is one in which all members of group
N1 belong to a single component. Since N1 is hybrid it follows
that there exists a pair of players x, y ∈ N1 such that x
g¯↔ y
contains only players belong to N2. This implies in turn that
there is at least one player i00 ∈ N1 who is not internally linked
with i. We will focus on the case where the path i
g¯↔ i00 con-
tains only players j1, j2, ..jn ∈ N2.17 There are two sub-cases to
consider.
(2a). If gi,j1 = 1, then allow player i to play a best response. It
follows from the hypothesis cL < 1 that there is a best response
in which player i will maintain all his current links with players
in own group (since network is minimal); in addition in any
best response, he will delete the link gi,j1 = 1 and replace it
with a link with some player of his own group along the path.
We can suppose without loss of generality that the link gi,i00 = 1
is formed. Define g0 = g0i ⊗ g−i. It follows that σ1 (g0) > σ1 (g);
again note that g0 is a minimal network. A similar argument
applies if gi00,jn = 1.
(2b). gj1,i = gjn,i00 = 1: There are two possibilities here. (i).
j1 ∈ N2 does not access any player j0 ∈ N2 via the link gj1,i = 1
and (ii) j1 does access some j0 ∈ N2 via this link gj1,i = 1. We
take these cases up in turn.
2b(i). We first allow player j1 to choose a best response; he
17 It is possible that for instance player i0 lies along this path; the arguments given
below can be adapted to deal with this complication easily.
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is indifferent between linking with i and i0. If he does not link
with the component that contains i then we arrive a network
in which i does not access i00 and we get i to choose a best
response. This leads clearly to a network g0 in which σ1(g0) ≥
σ1(g) + 1, and we are done. The other possibility is that j1’s
best response g0i involves a link with i’s component and in that
case let us suppose that he forms a link with i0 and this yields
a new network g0 = g0i ⊗ g−i. In the new network g0, player i is
indifferent between linking with i0 or i00. Given g0 let j1 and i
move simultaneously. There is a best response in which player
i switches from i0 to i00, while player j1 switches from i0 to i,
yielding the network g00. We note that in g00, player i0 will be
isolated and that g00 will not be minimal. Now allow player i0
to choose a best response. Any best response will involve a link
with the component containing i and we can suppose without
loss of generality that he forms a link with player i. We now get
player j1 to move and any best response will involve deletion of
the link gj1,i. We have reached a minimal network g
000 in which
σ1(g000) ≥ σ1(g) + 1.
2b(ii). Let j0 be the first player of group N2 along the path
j1, i, i1, ., in... in g. We first consider the case that gj0,in = 1.
Allow players j1 and j0 to choose a best response. In any best
response player j1 will delete the link gj1,i = 1 and instead link
with some player of his own group such as j0. Suppose this is the
case. Similarly, in any best response player j0 will delete the link
gj0,in = 1 and instead link with someone of own group such as j1.
Denote by g0 the resulting network. Now consider player i: in any
best response he will want to form a link with someone such as
i00. Allow player i to choose a best response. Finally, let player j1
move and the resulting network g00 is minimal as well. It follows
that σ1(g00) ≥ σ1(g)+1. Next we take up the case gin,j0 = 1. Let
j1 choose a best response. It follows that in any best response he
will delete the link with i and switch to a player of own group
such as j0. Denote the resulting network as g0. We now note
that g0 is minimal and in g0, agent in observes i00 via the link
gin.j0 . Thus, we are in case 2(a) above, and the argument follows.
We have thus shown that starting from a minimal network g
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with N1 as a hybrid group there exists a path which leads to
a minimal network g0 in which σ1(g0) ≥ σ1(g) + 1. Since the
minimal network g is arbitrary we can repeat this step to arrive
at a minimal network in which group 1 is entirely internally
linked.
The fourth step shows that starting from network g3 the pro-
cess transits with positive probability to a network g4 in which
group N1 is a center-sponsored star. Moreover, g4 is minimal.
Suppose that N1 is entirely internally linked. Now assume that
all players j ∈ N2 exhibit inertia. We note that the process is
analogous to a process with only homogenous players choosing
links starting at a minimally connected network. So the argu-
ments in Theorem 4.1 in Bala and Goyal (2000) can be applied
to show that there exists a sequence of best responses leading
to a network g0 in which N1 is a center-sponsored star.
We now complete the proof for cL ∈ (0, 1) and cH < max{n1, n2}:
First suppose g4 consists of two center-sponsored stars one for
each group. If the network is connected and minimal then it
must be the case that there is a single link between the two
stars. If this network is Nash then it is easily verified that the
process has entered a set of networks in which the player i initi-
ating this single cross-group link is indifferent between forming
this link with any of the players in the other star and the set
of networks generated by this switching of links by the player i
constitutes a super-tight curb set. Suppose the network is con-
nected but not Nash. Since cL < 1 and cH < max{n1, n2}, this
must mean that there is a player j ∈ Nl, l = 1, 2 who wishes to
delete the cross group link. Allow this player j to move. He will
delete this link and retain any internal links he has in g4 (since
cL < 1). Next choose the central player in the other group Nl0,
with l0 6= l and get him to choose a best response. From cL < 1
and cH < max{n1, n2} it follows that he will retain all his cur-
rent links with own group members and in addition form a link
with some player in n1. We have now reached a Nash network
and the first part of the argument can now be applied. We note
that if g4 contains two center-sponsored stars and the network
is not connected then allowing any player in the smaller group
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to move will lead to a Nash network as above.
Second, we examine the case where g4 has only one center-
sponsored star and let it consist of N1. Given that cL < 1 we can
assume that N2 is connected as well. Here we have two possibili-
ties. One, group N2 is a hybrid group. Using the arguments pre-
sented in steps 3-4 it follows that there exists a sequence of best
responses which leads to a network where groupN2 constitutes a
center-sponsored star as well. We can then apply the arguments
presented above. Two, suppose group N2 is entirely externally
linked. Then it has to be the case that g is minimally connected.
If all the links have the appropriate orientation then g is a gen-
eralized center-sponsored star. Then if cH ∈ (0, 1) it follows that
g is strict Nash and the proof follows. If 1 < cH < max{n1, n2}
then g is not Nash. In particular, no outside links with isolated
players are profitable. Let all i0 ∈ N1 move while all j ∈ N2
exhibit inertia. Denote the resulting network by g0. Note that
in g0 group N1 is a center-sponsored star, while each j ∈ N2
is a singleton. Now have a player j ∈ N2 move and any best
response by him will yield a network with 2 center-sponsored
stars. If in addition there is a single link across the groups ini-
tiated by j then we are done. Otherwise, get a player i ∈ N1
to move and he will form a link with some j ∈ N2 (because
cH < max{n1, n2}. Finally, assume one of the links is not suit-
ably oriented. Since group N2 is entirely externally linked, and
N1 constitutes a center-sponsored star, there exists some player
j ∈ N2 who forms a link with some i0 ∈ N1. Let player j update.
It follows from cL < 1 and cL < cH that the link to i0 will be
replaced by a link to some j0 ∈ N2. In the resulting minimal net-
work group 2 is a hybrid group, while the architecture of group
1 is unchanged. We then apply arguments in steps 3-4 to arrive
at two center-sponsored stars and the above arguments in this
step to complete the proof.
We next complete the proof for cL ∈ (0, 1) and cH > max{n1, n2}:
If there are two center-sponsored stars in g4 then this network
is a strict Nash network and we are done. If there is only one
center-sponsored star consisting of group N1 then consider the
other group. Suppose as before that it is connected. If it is hybrid
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then we first use arguments in steps 3-4 to get this group to form
a center-sponsored network and then follow with the arguments
above. The other case is that this group is entirely externally
linked. We get players from group 1 to move and since cH > 1,
they will all delete links with players in N2. Now get a player
in N2 to move and this player will link with all players in own
group. We have arrived at a network with two center-sponsored
stars and we are done.
(II). cL > 1: First, we note that the empty network is the
unique strict Nash network in this parameter range. We will
argue that there is a positive probability of transiting from any
network g to the empty network ge. The first step constructs
a path of transition to a minimal network g1. This is similar
to what we did in step 1 in part (I) above. The second step
checks if there is any player who wants to form a link. If the
answer is no then we have all players move at the same time
and they all delete any links they have and form no new links,
which yields the empty network and we are done. If the answer
is yes then we suppose that this player i belongs to N1, without
loss of generality. We then construct a path of transition such
that the process reaches a minimal network in which players in
N1 are directly or indirectly connected. Here, we first get player
i to move and let g0 be the resulting network. We then choose a
player i0 ∈ N1 who is not a member of the same component as
i in g0 to move and so on. The resulting network is denoted by
g2.
The third step is the main part of the proof: here we construct
a path which leads to a network g3 in which all members of N1
are isolated. Let C1 be the component that contains all members
ofN1 and let in ∈ N1 who has the maximum internal links. Since
g2 is minimal it follows that for each path leading away from in,
we can define a player who is furthest away from in and call
him an end-player. Let Ek(g2) for k = 1, 2 be the set of end
players belonging to groups 1 and 2, respectively. We first take
up end-players i ∈ E1(g2) who have initiated links. We let them
move one at a time. If they have a best response in which they
form no links then we allow them to delete their links and they
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become isolated. Note that they will not form links with any
other component if they do not form a link with C1. If they
have a best response which involves forming links then surely
they have a best response in which they form a single link with
player in. Let them all link with in and continue this process so
long as there is any end-player of group 1, who initiates links
with some player other than in. This process thus leads to a
network g0 in which if an end-player belongs to group 1 then he
either does not initiate a link or initiates a link with in. Moreover
if x ∈ N1 but x /∈ C1(g0) then x is isolated.
We now take an end-player i ∈ E1(g0) who does not initiate
a link. If there is some such player x then there exists y ∈ N2
such that gy,x = 1. Let player y move. Since 1 < cL < cH , any
best response of y must have gy,x = 0, and player x will then be
isolated. We repeat this step until all end-players not initiating
a link have been isolated, and so all end-players in group 1 are
initiating a link with in. Now consider an end-player j ∈ N2
and look at the path j ↔ in. If there is no such player then we
have arrived at a periphery-sponsored star and we can proceed
to the last part of this argument. If there is such an end-player
and he initiates the link then check whether this player wants
to remain linked with this component. If not then allow the
player to move and delink from the component, and the end-
players as above. If this player wishes to remain linked with the
component, then using arguments above we arrive at a network
in which all players in group 2 are connected. Now define jn ∈ N2
the player who has the maximum internal links and it follows
that player j has a best response in which he forms a link with
player jn. We now repeat the steps above but for end-players
in group 2 and arrive at a network in which all end-players of
group 2 are initiating links with jn or isolated.
We have now defined two central players one for each group
1 and 2, respectively. We repeat the above argument in tandem
to proceed with the agglomeration process with regard to each
of the groups. This process leads to a network g000 with one
the following structures: there is a single component which is
an inter-linked periphery-sponsored star with members of N1
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forming one star and members of N2 forming the other star, it
is two distinct periphery-sponsored stars, it is one periphery-
sponsored star with members of group 1 or group 2 and the
other group has disintegrated or the network is empty. In the
last case we are done. In the first three cases we use the following
transition path: we number the periphery-players of a star from
1 to m, and get player 1 to switch his link from the center to
a link with player 2 and player 2 to link with 3 and so on,
until m links with 1. This leads to the central player becoming
isolated. We now get all players in the circle to move and their
unique best response is to delete their single link in the circle.
We have thus reached a network in which no pair of players in
the group are connected to each other. It is now easy to repeat
the argument with the other group and we arrive at the empty
network. ¥
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1 Introduction
The role of social and economic networks in shaping individ-
ual behaviors and aggregate phenomena has been widely docu-
mented in recent years.1 Such evidence provides the main moti-
vation for developing a theory which aims at understanding the
process of networks’ formation and what are the networks’ ar-
chitectural properties. The most popular model of network for-
mation is the "connections model".2 Although variants of this
model have been proposed, in order to analyse different social
and economic situations, much of the work has explored settings
with homogeneous players. However, it is also true that ex-ante
asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in reality. For
instance, in the context of information networks, it is often the
case that some individuals are more interested in particular is-
sues and, therefore, better informed than other individuals, fact
that makes them more valuable contacts. Similarly, individuals
differ in their communication and social skills and, therefore,
forming links is cheaper for some individuals as compared to
others.3 In this paper, we analyse the role played by ex-ante
asymmetries across players in shaping network architectures. To
do this, we consider a version of the connections model where
individuals unilaterally invest in social ties (one-sided network)
1There is a large body of work on this subject. See e.g., Burt (1992) on the career
of professional managers, Montgomery (1991) on wage inequality in labour markets,
Granovetter (1974) on the flow of job information, and Coleman (1966) on the diffusion
of medical drugs.
2This model has been extensively studied in the literature; see e.g., Bala and Goyal
(2000a, 2000b), Dutta and Jackson (2000), Goyal (1993), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
and Watts (2001a, 2001b).
3 In other settings players can be classified in terms of the cost of accessing them. For
example, on the web the terminology user-friendly web site is used to describe home
pages which are easier to access as compared to others.
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and the flow of benefits is frictionless and directed only towards
the investor (one-way flow network).
Bala and Goyal (2000a) analyse this model with homogenous
players (i.e. the costs of forming links and values of accessing
players are homogenous). They show that if players’ payoffs are
increasing in the number of the other players accessed and de-
creasing in the number of links formed, a strict Nash network is
either a wheel (i.e a connected network in which each player cre-
ates and receives one link) or the empty network (with no links).
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider a minimally
connected network where player 1 initiates a link with player
2 and 3, and each of these players has a link with player 1.
Whenever players are homogeneous, this network is not a strict
equilibrium: player 2 is indifferent between maintaining the link
with 1 and switching to player 3. A generalization of this argu-
ment implies that a connected strict equilibrium is symmetric
and has a wheel architecture. It is worth noting that this result
depends crucially on the assumption of homogenous values and
costs. To see this, assume that player 1 is just slightly cheaper
to be linked with than player 2 and 3, ceteris paribus. The in-
troduction of such small heterogeneity implies that the network
described above becomes a strict equilibrium. In the present pa-
per, we study the role played by heterogeneous players in shap-
ing equilibrium networks. Players are heterogeneous in terms of
the costs of linking and the values of accessing other players.
We start with a setting where values and costs of linking are
heterogeneous across players but such heterogeneity is not part-
ner specific: the cost for player i to invest in a social tie is ci, and
the benefit to player i of accessing another player is Vi. We show
that a connected equilibrium is a wheel network and that an un-
connected equilibrium network is either a center-sponsored star,
a wheel with singletons, a wheel with local center-sponsored
stars or empty (Proposition 3.1). Figure 3.1 illustrates all strict
equilibria in a society with four players. This result shows that
players’ heterogeneity alters the level of connectedness of the
equilibrium networks. In any non-empty unconnected equilib-
rium there is a set of players sharing a maximum amount of in-
3. One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity 59
formation while the remaining players are socially isolated (they
do not access any information). In sharp contrast with the ho-
mogeneous setting, these equilibria are asymmetric and central
players may emerge: (i) the players maximally informed are con-
nected in a wheel component and the players socially isolated
are either (iia) singletons or (iib) spokes of center-sponsored
stars. We finally note that the wheel is robust to asymmetries
that are independent from the potential partner.
We then turn to settings where heterogeneity also depends on
the potential partner. We show that the wheel architecture is
still prominent if costs are not partner specific; otherwise any
minimally connected network is a strict equilibrium for some
costs and values (Proposition 3.2). This leads us to conclude that
costs heterogeneity is responsible for shaping the architecture of
the equilibrium networks.
To investigate the role heterogeneity plays in shaping the ar-
chitecture of equilibrium networks we impose some restriction
on the cost of forming links. To this end, we study a targeted-
partner model: the cost of forming a link with a player i is sym-
metric across players, but each player has a different cost of
being accessed. We show that a connected equilibrium is either
a wheel or a flower, in which case the player with the lowest ac-
cess cost occupies the central position. Furthermore, an uncon-
nected strict equilibrium is either a wheel with a local periphery-
sponsored star or a flower with a local periphery-sponsored star
(Proposition 3.3).4 Figure 3.2 illustrates these architectures in
a society composed of 4 players.
Let us now comment on three aspects of these results. Firstly,
the unique asymmetric connected equilibrium has a flower ar-
chitecture and the center of the flower is the player with the
lowest access cost. The center is the only player in the network
which promotes and receives more than one link. His function
is to connect sets of players which would be otherwise discon-
4The strict equilibria with only singleton components are a limit case of the architec-
tures described in Proposition 3.3 and they are described in the appendix (Proposition
3.4).
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nected. Secondly, unconnected strict equilibria have well defined
architectures. A set of individuals shares information with each
other (the core group), while the remaining players (the periph-
ery group) access the information of the core group directly from
the players with the lowest access cost in the population. We fi-
nally note that the flower (and its variants) is a less efficient
equilibrium as compared to the wheel equilibrium (and its vari-
ants). The inefficiency inherent in asymmetric equilibria arises
from the over-investment carried out by the central player.
This paper represents a contribution to the theory of network
formation, which, at present, is a very active area of research.
Whereas most of the existing literature focuses on homogeneous
player models, our analysis elaborates on the role of heterogene-
ity, with respect to both values and costs of forming links, in
shaping the equilibrium architectures of a one-way flow connec-
tions model. The work that comes closest to ours is Kim and
Wong (2003). They study a one-sided connections model with
heterogeneous players where agents form two-flow connections
but where basic links are only one-flow. In other words, this
implies that a player i accesses player j only if there exists a
sequence of basic links connecting i to j and vice versa. The
current paper departs from Kim and Wong (2003) in two direc-
tions. First, we analyse several forms of players’ asymmetries,
while Kim and Wong (2003) focus exclusively on settings where
asymmetries are not partner specific. Second, we do not distin-
guish between basic links and flow connections, which implies
that in this framework a player can access another individual,
without the reverse being necessarily true.5
Finally, we relate the findings to a recent experimental pa-
per by Falk and Kosfeld (2003). This paper shows that the
predictions based on Nash and Strict Nash equilibria for the
one-way flow model are consistent with the experimental re-
sults, while they generally fail in the two-way flow model.6 The
5For example, the web is characterized by one-way link and one-way flow connections.
6Bala and Goyal (2000a) show that with homogeneous players and when information
flow is bidirectional a strict equilibrium is either a center-sponsored star (only one player,
the center, promotes all the links) or empty (no links).
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authors argue that the success of the one-way flow model re-
lies, among other things, on the strategic symmetry (symmetric
distribution of links) which characterises equilibrium networks
under the one-way flow assumption. The analysis developed in
the present paper shows that the property of symmetric dis-
tribution of links depends on the assumption of homogeneous
players. An experiment, which takes into account ex-ante asym-
metries in the costs of forming links, may help to understand
the role played by strategic symmetry in the process of network
formation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model. Section 3 presents the results on equilibrium
networks under general cost and value heterogeneity. Section 4
analyses the targeted-partner model. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of players and let i and j be typical
members of this set. We shall assume throughout the model
that the number of players is n ≥ 3. Each player is assumed
to possess some information which are of value to himself as
well as to other players. He can augment his information by
communicating with other people. This communication takes
resources, time and effort and is made possible via pair-wise
links.
A strategy of player i ∈ N is a (row) vector gi = (gi,j)j∈N\{i}
where gi,j ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ NÂ {i} .We say that player i has
a link with j if gi,j = 1. We assume throughout the paper that
a link between i and j allows player i to access j’s information.
The set of strategies of player i is denoted by Gi. Throughout the
paper we restrict our attention to pure strategies. Since player
i has the option of forming or not forming a link with each of
the remaining n− 1 players, the number of strategies of player
i is clearly |Gi| = 2n−1. The set G = G1× ...×Gn is the space of
pure strategies of all the players.
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A strategy profile g = (g1, ..., gn) in G can be represented as a
directed network. Let g ∈ G, we say that there is a path in g from
i to j if either gi,j = 1 or there exist players j1, ..., jm, distinct
from each other, and i and j such that {gi,j1 = ... = gjm,j = 1} .
We write i
g→ j to indicate a path from i to j in g. Given two
players i and j in g, the geodesic distance, di,j (g) , is defined
as the length of the shortest path from i to j. Furthermore,
we define Nd (i; g) = {k ∈ N |gi,k = 1} as the set of players
with whom i maintains a link, whereas we refer to N (i; g) =n
k ∈ N
¯¯¯
i
g→ k
o
∪ {i} as the set of players that i observes in
g. Let µdi : G → {1, ..., n} and µi : G → {1, ..., n} be defined as
µdi (g) =
¯¯
Nd (i; g)
¯¯
and µi (g) = |N (i; g)|.
Given a network g, a non-singleton component of g is a non-
singleton set C (g) ⊂ N where ∀i, j ∈ C (g) , there exists a
path between them but there is not a path between ∀i ∈ C (g)
and a player k ∈ NÂC (g) . A component C (g) of a network
g is minimal if, ceteris paribus, C (g) is no longer a component
upon replacement of a link gi,j = 1 between two agents i, j ∈
C (g) by gi,j = 0. A network g is minimal if every component
of g is minimal. A network g is connected if it has a unique
component containing all players. If the unique component is
minimal the network g is minimally connected. A network which
is not connected is unconnected. Given a network g, a player i
is a singleton player if gi,j = gj,i = 0 for any j ∈ N. Finally,
the empty network, denoted as ge, is an unconnected network
where no links are formed.
To complete the definition of a normal-form game of network
formation, we specify the payoffs. Let Vi,j denote the benefits
to player i from accessing player j. Similarly, let ci,j denote the
cost for player i of forming a link with player j. Player i0s payoff
in a network g can be written as:
Πi (g) =
X
j∈N(i;g)
Vi,j −
X
j∈Nd(i;g)
ci,j (3.1)
We shall assume that ci,j > 0 and Vi,j > 0 for all i, j ∈ N.7
7The results developed further qualitatively carry on when relaxing the linearity
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Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained
when all player i’s links are removed. Note that network g−i can
be regarded as the strategy profile where i chooses not to form
a link with anyone. Network g can be written as g = gi ⊗ g−i
where ‘⊗’ indicates that g is formed as the union of the links in
gi and g−i. The strategy gi is said to be a best response of player
i to g−i if:
Πi (gi ⊗ g−i) > Πi (g0i ⊗ g−i) for all g0i ∈ Gi. (3.2)
The set of all of player i0s best responses to g−i is denoted
by BRi (g−i) . Furthermore, a network g = (g1, ..., gn) is said
to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi (g−i) for each i, i.e. players
are playing a Nash equilibrium. If a player has multiple best
responses to the equilibrium strategies of the other players this
could make the network less stable, as the player can switch to
a payoff equivalent strategy. This switching possibility in non-
strict Nash networks has been exploited and has been shown
to be important in refining the set of equilibrium networks in
earlier work (see e.g., Bala and Goyal (2000a)). In the present
paper we will therefore focus on strict Nash equilibria only. A
strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where each player
gets a strictly higher payoff from his current strategy than he,
otherwise, would, using any other alternative strategy.
3 General Heterogeneity
In this section we investigate the effects of values and costs of
linking heterogeneity on the level of connectedness and the ar-
chitecture of strict equilibria. We shall show that values’ and
costs’ heterogeneity are equally important in determining the
level of connectedness of the equilibrium networks, while only
cost heterogeneity shapes the architecture of non-singleton com-
ponents. We shall also show that when players are heterogeneous
equilibrium networks are asymmetric.
assumption of the payoffs functions.
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We start by considering a setting in which players have dis-
tinct costs of linking, as well as distinct benefits from accessing
other players. While these costs and values vary across play-
ers, they are independent from the identity of the partner, i.e.
Vi,j = Vi and ci,j = ci, for any i, j ∈ N. For example, some
individuals are more expert in surfing the net as compared to
others; ceteris paribus, this allows them to access other internet
members at a lower cost.8 Before carrying out our analysis, let
us introduce some architectures.
A star architecture is an unconnected network where there
exists a player i, the center, such that either gi,j = 1 or gj,i = 1
for any j ∈ N\ {i} , and no other links are formed. The net-
work g has a center-sponsored star architecture if g is a star
and the center forms all the links. A non-singleton component
has a wheel architecture if players within the component are
arranged as {i1, ..., in} with gi2,i1 = ... = gin,in−1 = gi1,in and
there are no other links between players within the component.
A wheel architecture is a connected network with the unique
component being a wheel. A wheel network with local center-
sponsored stars is an unconnected network with a unique wheel
component, say C(g), and where ∀j /∈ C(g), ∃!i ∈ C(g) such
that gi,j = 1. Finally, a wheel network with singleton players is
an unconnected network with a unique wheel component made
up of at least three players and where gi,j = gj,i = 0 for any
i /∈ C (g) and for any j ∈ N .
The next result shows which networks can be sustained in
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. Let payoffs satisfy (3.1) and assume that
ci,j = ci and Vi,j = Vi ∀j ∈ N\ {i} . A connected strict equi-
librium is a wheel. Otherwise, a strict equilibrium is either the
empty network, or the wheel with singletons, or the wheel with
local center-sponsored stars or the center-sponsored star. Con-
8 Similarly, some individuals may value more information provided on the web as
compared to others. In general, individuals differ in communication and social skills and
it seems natural that the costs of establishing links as well as the values of accessing
information vary across individuals.
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versely, any of such networks is a strict equilibrium for some
{ci, Vi}i∈N .
Figure 3.1 illustrates all the strict equilibria in a society com-
posed of 4 players. We represent a link gi,j = 1 as an edge
starting at j with the arrowhead pointing at i. The proof of
Proposition 3.1 proceeds as a sequence of Lemmas. We sketch
here its main steps. We firstly show that a strict Nash net-
work is minimal. This follows from the no-decay assumption.
Secondly, using a standard switching argument, we show that
each player receives at most one link. Thirdly, using this equi-
librium property, it follows that each non-singleton component
has a wheel architecture. Therefore, a connected strict equilib-
rium is a wheel. Fourthly, we take up the case of non-empty
unconnected equilibria in which each component is composed of
a single player. Using the finiteness of the set of players, we show
that an equilibrium is a center-sponsored star network. Finally,
an elaboration of the arguments used in the previous lemmas
establishes the result for those unconnected equilibria having at
least a non-singleton component.
Wheel
Wheel  with  local center-
sponsored stars
Wheel with 
singletons
Center-sponsored star Empty network
1 2
34
1 2
34
1 2
34
1 2
34
1 2
34
1 2
34
1 2
34
Figure 3.1. Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 provides some interesting insights. As in the
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homogenous setting, the unique connected equilibrium is the
wheel. Therefore, the wheel architecture is prominent also in
settings where costs and values asymmetries are partner inde-
pendent. Next, values and costs heterogeneity alters the level
of connectedness of strict equilibria. In any unconnected (and
non-empty) equilibrium there is a set of players accessing a
maximum amount of information while all the other players
are socially isolated (they do not access any information). Fur-
thermore, the maximally informed players are connected in a
wheel, while the isolated players are either singletons or spokes
of center-sponsored stars. Thus, unconnected equilibria are gen-
erally asymmetric and central players may emerge. Finally, we
note that the results presented in Proposition 3.1 carry on in
settings with homogenous values (costs of linking) and hetero-
geneous costs of linking (values). This implies that, as far as
heterogeneity is independent from the partner, costs and values
asymmetries have equivalent effects on strategic interaction.
We now ask under which conditions ex-ante asymmetries across
players alter the architecture of equilibrium networks. The next
result establishes that the wheel architecture is prominent as far
as the costs of linking are partner independent.
Proposition 3.2. Let payoffs satisfy (3.1). First, assume
ci,j = ci while values vary freely, then a connected equilibrium
is a wheel. Conversely, the wheel is an equilibrium for some
{ci, Vi,j}i,j∈N . Second, assume Vi,j = Vi while costs vary freely,
then a connected equilibrium is minimal; conversely, any mini-
mally connected network is a strict equilibrium for some {ci,j, Vi}i,j∈N .
We note that when values vary freely while costs asymme-
tries are partner independent connected equilibria have (still)
a wheel architecture. This result also holds with homogenous
costs of linking. Differently, when the costs of linking are al-
lowed to vary freely across players, the only restriction imposed
by the equilibrium notion to connected network is minimality.
This results holds regardless of values asymmetries.
The analysis of this section can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, the level of connectivity of a network is equally sen-
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sitive both to values and costs heterogeneity. Interestingly, un-
connected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may
emerge. Secondly, asymmetries in values do not alter the archi-
tecture of non-singleton components, as compared to the homo-
geneous setting. The same observation applies when cost het-
erogeneity is independent from the potential partner. Thirdly,
when the costs of linking are allowed to be partner specific, so-
cial interactions lead to a ‘everything is possible’ type of result.
Hence, we can conclude that it is heterogeneity in the cost of
linking which is mainly responsible in shaping the architecture
of equilibrium networks. The next section explores the possibil-
ity to set plausible conditions on the cost parameters, in order
to obtain further restrictions on the architecture of equilibrium
networks.
4 Targeted-partner Model
In this section we consider a setting where values are homoge-
neous, while the costs of linking are exclusively partner specific.
In particular, each player i has a different cost of being accessed,
which is, however, homogenous with respect to the players who
initiate a link with i. For example, some web sites are user-
friendlier than others, feature that allows players to access the
information provided more easily.9 Formally, let Vi,j = V, for
any i, j ∈ N and assume the following cost structure:
ci,j = cj for any i ∈ N (3.3)
We shall assume that c1 > 0 and, without loss of generality,
that cj < cx whenever j < x.10 Given a network g and (3.3) ,
9We provide some other examples. Individuals have different opportunity costs. It
seems natural to consider that to access players with higher opportunity costs is more
costly as compared to others. To apply for some jobs is less costly than for others.
Different countries have different immigration policies. Countries which implement more
strict immigration policy are more difficult to be accessed as compared to countries with
"soft" immigration policies.
10Further, we shall discuss the implication of allowing groups of players having the
same accessibility cost.
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the payoff to player i can be rewritten as follow:
Πi (g) = µiV −
P
j∈Nd(i;g)
cj (3.4)
We introduce some additional notation. An unconnected net-
work with a unique wheel component, say C(g), where gj,i = 1
for any j /∈ C(g) and a unique player i ∈ C(g), is called a
wheel with a local periphery-sponsored star with center i. A
flower component, C (g) , of a network g partitions the set of
players belonging to C (g) into a central player, say i, and a
collection of P = {P1, ..., Pq} , where each P ∈ P is non-empty.
A set P of agents is referred to as petal. Denote the agents in
P as {j1, ..., jn} . A flower component is then defined by setting©
gi,j1 = gj1,j2 = .... = gjn,i = 1
ª
for any P ∈ P and gi,j = 0 oth-
erwise. If g is connected with a flower component and i is the
center, then g is a flower network with center i. An unconnected
network with a unique flower component where player i is the
center and where gj,i = 1 for any j /∈ C(g) is called a flower
with a local periphery-sponsored star with center i. Figure 3.2
depicts all the aforementioned possible architectures in a society
composed of four players.
Wheel Flower  with center 1
Wheel  with a local periphery-
sponsored star with center 1
Flower  with a local  periphery-
sponsored star with center 1
1 2
34
1 34
2
1 34
2
1 34
2
1 34
2
1 34
2
Figure 3.2.
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4.1 Strict equilibrium networks
We start by introducing some necessary conditions to charac-
terize strict Nash equilibria. The role of these conditions is to
constrain the arrangement of players belonging to the architec-
tures we introduced above. We start by defining the ordered
condition for a wheel network with a local periphery sponsored
star.
Definition 3.1. A wheel with a local periphery-sponsored star
network, say g, where player h is the center , is ordered if for
any gi,j = 1, i, j ∈ C (g) then (i) cj− cy < dj,y (C (g))V for any
y ∈ C (g) and (ii) cj − cy < dj,h (C (g))V for any y /∈ C (g) .
Condition (i) requires any player i linked to player j in a
wheel component not to find profitable to switch to another
player belonging to the same wheel. Condition (ii) takes care of
the switching possibilities of a player belonging to a component
with players outside the component. Note that a wheel network
is ordered if condition (i) in Definition 1 is satisfied. We now
turn to define the ordered conditions for networks with a flower
component.
Definition 3.2.A flower with a local periphery sponsored star
network, say g, where player h is the center, is ordered if for
any P ∈ P and for any gi,j = 1, i, j ∈ P, then (i) cj − cy <
dj,y (P (g))V, ∀ y ∈ P and (ii) cj− cy0 < dj,h (P (g))V, ∀y0 /∈ P.
The interpretation of definition 3.2 is analogous to the one in
definition 3.1. As cn−c1 < V the ordered conditions in definition
3.1 and 3.2 are always satisfied. The next proposition provides
the set of strict equilibria of this model. We focus on equilibria
in which there exists at least one non-singleton component.11
Proposition 3.3. Let (3.3)-(3.4) be satisfied. A connected
strict equilibrium is either an ordered wheel or an ordered flower
where player 1 is the center. An unconnected strict equilibrium
11The analysis of equilibria in which each component is composed of a single player is
provided in the appendix (see proposition 3.4). The architecture of these equilibria are
a limit case of the architectures of equilibria with a non-singleton component.
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with at least a non-singleton component is either an ordered
wheel or an ordered flower with a local periphery sponsored star
where player 1 is the center. Conversely any such network is a
strict equilibrium for some {ci, V }i∈N .
The proof of Proposition 3.3 proceeds as a sequence of Lem-
mas. We sketch here its main steps. First, the assumption of
no-decay in the information flow implies that a strict equilib-
rium is minimal. Second, using a standard switching argument,
we show that in a non-singleton component it is only the player
with the lowest access cost that can receive more than one link.
This implies that a connected equilibrium is either a wheel or
a flower where player 1 is the center. Third, we show that if a
player j /∈ C(g) promotes a link with a player i ∈ C(g), then j
does not receive any link. Suppose player j0 forms a link with
j, then the player linked with i in C(g) gains by switching to
player j. Finally, using the fact that the set of players is fi-
nite, we show that players within a component do not promote
links with players outside that component. These last two ob-
servations together imply that any two players belonging to two
different components access two distinct sets of agents. A sim-
ple switching argument establishes that in a strict equilibrium
at most one non-singleton component exists.
Let us now discuss some aspects of this result. The first re-
mark is about the flower architecture. When players are het-
erogeneous in terms of cost of being accessed, asymmetric con-
nected networks are strategically viable and a coordinator emerges,
i.e. the player with the lowest access cost. The coordinator con-
nects sets of players who would otherwise be disconnected. It is
worth noticing that the flower network also arises in homoge-
neous settings when a small amount of decay in the information
flow is introduced. In particular, Bala and Goyal (2000a) show
that, for a sufficiently small amount of decay, the flower archi-
tecture is the only strict Nash network.12 In that case the role
of the center is to decrease the distance between the players.
12See Bala and Goyal (2000a) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
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Differently, in this model the flower arises because the center is
the more profitable player to be linked with. Bala and Goyal’s
(2000a) result on decay is reinforced in our setting where the
advantage deriving from linking with the center is not only to
have short information channels but also to obtain a decrease
in the investment cost.
The second remark is about unconnected equilibria. In these
equilibria players can be divided in two groups. On the one hand,
a core group composed of players belonging to a non-singleton
component; on the other hand, a periphery group composed of
all the remaining players. Interestingly, all players in the society
access the players in the core group, but no player accesses those
individuals belonging to the periphery group.
Thirdly, we would like to make some considerations on the
assumption that the ranking of players, in term of their costs of
being accessed, is strictly increasing.13 Suppose that the players
in the society can be grouped inm distinct and different groups,
N = ∪mi=1Ni and that the players belonging to the same group
have the same cost of being accessed. If N1 is composed of a sin-
gle player, then an ordered flower network, where player 1 is the
center, can be sustained as a strict equilibrium. Indeed, in this
case, the ordered conditions are enough to take care of switch-
ing possibilities. By contrast, when also groupN1 is composed of
more than one player the problem becomes more delicate. The
following example clarifies this point. Consider three groups, say
1, 2 and 3, each composed of three players, say a, b and c. Let
g be the network depicted in figure 3.3 and let c3 < (n− 1)V.
The network g is not strict Nash. On the one hand, player 2a
(3a) is indifferent between retaining a link with 1a or switching
either to 1b or 1c; on the other hand, all other players have a
unique best response. However, it has to be noticed that each
player’s best responses are insensitive to such changes made by
either player 2a or 3a. This implies that the considered network
g, along with the possible best responses of player 2a and 3a,
13 In other words, we discuss the effect of allowing groups of players to have the same
accessibility cost.
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constitutes a minimal curb set of the game.14 Using standard
results on best response dynamics it follows that this set is ab-
sorbing, in the sense that once a best response dynamic enters
such a set it will cycle within the set forever.
2b 2a
1a
2c
3c 3b
3a
1c1b
Figure 3.3.
Finally, we compare the efficiency properties of the wheel ar-
chitecture with respect to the flower architecture.15 Consider a
wheel and a flower network. It is easy to see that both architec-
tures generate the same amount of network externalities, but the
former, the wheel, requires a lower level of total investment.16
It follows that the flower network is less efficient than the wheel
as the flower’s center over-invests in social ties. The same ar-
gument holds along all the variants of the flower and wheel ar-
chitectures. The reasoning above implies that if we move away
from an homogenous setting and we go towards an heteroge-
neous environment, in such a way as to make social interactions
less costly, then the strategic interactions lead to the emergence
of inefficient equilibria. For example, let’s assume that players
are fully homogeneous and that V > c. In this case, the unique
equilibrium is the wheel architecture. Furthermore, the wheel is
uniquely efficient. Assume now that a player becomes slightly
cheaper to be linked to, as compared to the others. The intro-
duction of such a small heterogeneity implies that the flower
14For a formal definition of supertight curb set see section 2.4.2 of chapter 2. See Basu
and Weibull (1991) for a discussion of the notion of minimal curb set.
15We consider the social welfare of a network g as the sum of payoffs of all players.
16 It is easy to see that the wheel architecture is the more efficient architeture in the
class of connected architectures.
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architecture is also an equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is
inefficient.
5 Conclusion
We have studied a connection model where heterogeneous play-
ers decide unilaterally to invest in social ties that imply a di-
rect return for the investor only. The main results obtained can
be summarized as follows. Firstly, the level of connectedness of
a network is equally sensitive to value and cost heterogeneity.
Furthermore, non-empty unconnected equilibria have an asym-
metric distribution of links and central players may emerge in
equilibrium. Secondly, the wheel architecture (along with its
variants) is robust to players’ asymmetries, as far as cost hetero-
geneity is independent from the potential partner. Conversely,
when the costs of linking are allowed to vary freely, the only
restriction imposed by the strategic interaction on the archi-
tecture of non-singleton components is minimality. We also ex-
plored the role played by partner specific cost asymmetries, in
the targeted-partner model, i.e. each player has a distinct cost
of being accessed. Here, non-singleton components are either
wheels or flowers. The flower network has an asymmetric archi-
tecture where the central player connects sets of players who
would otherwise be disconnected. Finally, note that asymmetric
architectures are less efficient than symmetric ones. We interpret
these results as saying that, in heterogeneous settings, equilib-
rium networks are asymmetric and central players emerge.
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6 Appendix chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
First part.We first note that an equilibrium network is min-
imal. This follows from the assumption of no-decay in the infor-
mation flow. The proof now proceeds as a sequence of Lemmas.
The next result shows that in equilibrium each player receives
at most one link.
Lemma 3.1. Let g be a strict equilibrium. If gi,j = 1 then
gk,j = 0 for any k ∈ N\ {i} .
Proof: Suppose, for a contradiction that gi,j = 1 and gk,j = 1.
Since g is minimal, i does not access player k in g; however, in
this case player i strictly prefers to delete the link with player j
and linking up with player k, instead. This is a contradiction.¥
Using this result we show that each non-singleton component
part of a strict equilibrium is a wheel.
Lemma 3.2. Let C(g) be a non-singleton component part of
a strict equilibrium g. Then C(g) has a wheel architecture.
Proof: We note that if a player i belongs to a non-singleton
component, say C(g), then gi,j = 1 for at least one player
j ∈ C(g) and gk,i = 1 for at least one player k ∈ C(g). These two
observations and Lemma 3.1 imply that each player i ∈ C(g) re-
ceives one and only one link from the players belonging to C(g).
We now claim that for any player i ∈ C(g), then gi,j = 1 for
only one player j ∈ C(g). Suppose, for a contradiction, that for
some i ∈ C(g), gi,j = gi,k = 1 for some j, k ∈ C(g) and j 6= k.
Since j, k ∈ C(g) then j and k must access player i; therefore,
there exist two paths {gi,k = gk,k1 = ...gkn−1,kn = gkn,i = 1}
and {gi,j = gj,j1 = ...gjn−1,jn = gjn,i = 1}. Since i receives only
one link it must be the case that jn = kn. However, the same
argument applies for player jn(= kn), and therefore it must be
the case that jn−1 = kn−1. By induction, it follows that k1 =
j1; since k 6= j, it follows that k1(= j1) must receive more than
one link. This constitutes a contradiction. These observations
altogether implies that C(g) is minimally connected and it has
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a symmetric architecture. It is readily seen that the unique di-
rected graph which satisfies these properties is the wheel. This
proves the Lemma.¥
Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 implies that a connected equilibrium net-
work is a wheel. We now take up the case of non-empty uncon-
nected strict equilibria in which each component is a singleton.
The next Lemma proves the result.
Lemma 3.3. A non-empty unconnected strict equilibrium
where each component is a singleton has a center-sponsored star
architecture.
Proof: Since g is non-empty there exists some gi,j = 1. There
are two cases. First, suppose gj,j0 = 0 for any j0 ∈ N. Since
g is strict Nash it must hold that Vi − ci > 0; this implies
that ∃i g→ j0 for any j0 ∈ N. Select player k which is at the
maximum distance from i in g, i.e. k = argmaxj0∈N di,j0(g).
If di,k(g) = 1 player i accesses each other player directly and
the proof trivially follows. If di,k(g) > 1, it must be the case
that {gi,j1 = gj1,j2 = ... = gjm,k = 1} and gk,s = 0 for any s ∈
N. Since g is strict Nash then Vjm − cjm > 0 and therefore
player jm accesses any player in g. This implies that player i and
jm belongs to a non-singleton component, which constitutes a
contradiction. Second, suppose gj,j0 = 1 for some j0 ∈ N. Since g
has only singleton components it follows j0 ∈ N\{i}. Therefore,
if gj0,k = 0 for any k ∈ N , the previous argument applies and
we end-up with a contradiction. If gj0,k = 1 for some k, then it
must be the case that k ∈ N\{i, j}. Since the number of players
is finite, it must exist a player h which is accessed by player i
via the link gi,j = 1 and such that gh,h0 = 1 and gh0,h00 = 0 for
any h00 ∈ N. However, also in this case the fact that g is strict
Nash implies that Vh−ch > 0 and therefore player hmust access
player i in g. This constitutes a contradiction. Hence the proof
follows.¥
We now turn to unconnected strict equilibria where at least a
non-singleton component exists. Let C1 (g) , C2 (g) , ..., Cm (g) be
the components of an unconnected strict equilibrium g. Lemma
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3.1 and 3.2 implies that: (a) Cx(g) is a wheel ∀x = 1, ...,m; (b)
gj,i = 0, ∀i ∈ Cx (g) and ∀ j ∈ N\ {Cx (g)} , ∀ x ∈ {1, ...,m} .
Lemma 3.4. Let g be a strict equilibrium and let i ∈ Cx(g).
If gi,j = 1 where j /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g), then gj,k = 0 for any k ∈ N .
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. gi,j = gj,k = 1. Lemma 3.1 implies
that k /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g)∪{j}; moreover, it also implies that if gk,h =
1 then h /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g) ∪ {j, k}. Suppose that gk,h = 0 for any
h /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g) ∪ {j, k}; since g is a strict Nash it follows that
Vj > cj. In this case player j strictly gains by forming a link
with player i. This constitutes a contradiction. If gk,h = 1 for
some h /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g)∪ {j, k} we can iterate the argument above
and since the number of players is finite the proof follows.¥
Lemma 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 implies that any pair of players, say
i and j, belonging to two different components, say Cx(g) and
Cy(g), access two distinct set of players, i.e. if i ∈ Cx (g) and
j ∈ Cy (g) , with x 6= y, then Ni(g) ∩ Nj(g) = Φ. The next
Lemma uses this observation to prove that a strict equilibrium
network has at most one non-singleton component.
Lemma 3.5. A strict equilibrium has at most one non-singleton
component.
Proof: Suppose not and let, without loss of generality, |Ni(g)| ≥
|Nj(g)| , where i ∈ Cx (g) and j ∈ Cy (g) , and x 6= y. Since g
is strict Nash it follows that |Nj(g)|Vj − cj > 0; however, if
this is the case, player j is weakly better off by deleting his
link in Cy (g) and linking up with player i, i.e. |Ni(g)|Vj − cj ≥
|Nj(g)|Vj − cj > 0. This contradiction proves the lemma.¥
The next lemma completes the analyses of unconnected strict
equilibria which have a non-singleton component.
Lemma 3.6. Let g an unconnected strict equilibrium with a
non-singleton components. Then gj,j0 = 0 for any j, j0 /∈ C(g).
Proof: Suppose, for a contradiction, that gj,j0 = 1. Lemma
3.1 implies that each player outside the component does not
access players belonging to the component. Therefore, Lemma
3.5 applies to the set of players N\{C(g)}, i.e. gj,j0 = 1 for
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some j0 /∈ C(g). However, in this case player j strictly gains
by creating a link with a player i ∈ C(g). This constitutes a
contradiction. Hence, Lemma 3.6 follows.¥
The combination of Lemma 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 implies that
an unconnected strict equilibrium with some non-singleton com-
ponents is either a wheel with local center-sponsored stars, a
wheel with singleton players or a wheel with some local center-
sponsored star and some singleton player. It is immediate to
see that this last architecture cannot be sustained as a strict
equilibrium. This completes the proof of the first part of the
proposition.¥
Second part. First, let g be the empty network and let ci >
Vi for any i ∈ N ; it follows that g is a strict equilibrium. Second,
let g be a wheel and set ci < Vi for any i ∈ N ; it follows that
g is a strict equilibrium. Third, let g be a center-sponsored star
network where player i is the center. For any j ∈ N\ {i} let cj >
(n− 1)Vj, while for the central player i let ci < Vi. It follows
that g is a strict equilibrium. Fourth, let g be a wheel network
with singleton players and let C(g) be the wheel component
in g. For any player i ∈ C (g) set Vi and ci such that ci ∈
(Vi, (|C(g)|− 1)Vi) , while for any other player j /∈ C (g) set Vj
and cj such that cj > |C(g)|Vj. It follows that g is a strict
equilibrium. Finally, let g be a wheel network with local center-
sponsored stars and let C(g) be the wheel component. For any
player i ∈ C (g) , set ci and Vi such that ci < Vi and for any
other player j /∈ C (g) set cj and Vj such that cj > (n− 1)Vj . It
follows that, g is a strict equilibrium. This completes the proof
of the second part.¥
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is completed.¥
Proof of Proposition 3.2.We start by assuming that ci,j =
ci, for any j ∈ N, while Vi,j varies freely. Let g be a connected
strict equilibrium network. The no-decay assumption implies
that g is minimal. Furthermore, Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 of Proposi-
tion 3.1 applies also to this case; hence g has a wheel architec-
ture. We now prove the converse. Let g be a wheel network and
for any link gi,j = 1 let Vi,j > ci. This implies that each player i
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finds it optimal to maintain his links and not to form any other
links. Hence, the first part of the proof follows.
We now turn to the second case, i.e. Vi,j = Vi for any j ∈ N
and ci,j varies freely. Let g be a connected network. The no-
decay assumption implies that g is minimal. Conversely, let g
be a minimally connected network. For any link gi,j = 1 let
ci,j < Ii,jVi, while for any gi,j = 0 let ci,j > (n− 1)V. These two
conditions assure that each player is playing his unique best
response. This completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
First part. We first note that the no-decay assumption im-
plies that an equilibrium network is minimal. The proof now
proceeds as a sequence of Lemmas. The first lemma shows that
if a player belonging to a non-singleton component receives more
than one link, then this player has the lowest access cost across
players within that component.
Lemma 3.7. Let C (g) be a non-singleton component of a
strict equilibrium and let j ∈ C (g). If gi,j = 1, for more that
one player i ∈ C (g) then cj = minj0∈C(g) cj0 .
Proof: Suppose, for a contradiction, that gi,j = gk,j = 1, for
some i, k ∈ C (g) , i 6= k and ch < cj for some h ∈ C (g) \ {j} .
Since g is minimal and i, k, j ∈ C (g) , player i (or k) accesses h
via the link gi,j = 1 (or gk,j = 1). In this case, player i (or k)
strictly gains by deleting the link with j and linking up with h,
instead. This contradiction proves the lemma.¥
Lemma 3.8. A non-singleton component of a strict equilib-
rium is either a wheel or a flower.
Proof: We have two possibilities. First, suppose any player
i ∈ C(g) receives at most one link in C(g).We note that Lemma
3.2 in Proposition 3.2 also applies in this case. Therefore C(g)
has a wheel architecture. Second, suppose i ∈ C(g) receives
more than one link, i.e. gj1,i = gj2,i = ... = gjk,i = 1. Lemma 3.7
implies that player i is the player with lowest access cost inC(g).
We now claim that if player i receives k distinct links, then C(g)
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is a flower with k petals. Since {i, j1, ..., jk} ∈ C(g), there exists
a path i→ jx, for any x = 1, ..., k. The same argument presented
in Lemma 3.2 of Proposition 3.2 implies that if player h belongs
to the path i → jx then h cannot belong to another path i →
jy, x 6= y and x, y = 1, ..., k. Consider an arbitrary path i→ jx;
using Lemma 3.2, it follows that each player belonging to that
path forms one and only one link. It is readily seen that the
only possibility left is that C(g) has a flower architecture with
k petals and player i is the center. This completes the proof.¥
Lemma 3.8 implies that a connected strict equilibrium is ei-
ther a wheel or a flower with player j = 1 the center. We now
note that if g has wheel architecture and it is strict Nash then the
wheel is ordered. Suppose, for a contradiction, that g is a wheel
but it is not ordered, i.e. for some gi,j = 1, i, j ∈ C (g) ,then
cj − cy ≥ dj,y (C (g))V for some y ∈ C (g) . If this is the case,
player i (weakly) gains by deleting the link with player j and
linking up with y, instead. A similar argument shows that a
flower equilibrium network is ordered.
We now turn to consider unconnected networks with some
non-singleton components.
Lemma 3.9. Let g be an unconnected network and let C(g)
be a non-singleton component. If gk,i = 1, for some i ∈ C (g)
and k /∈ C (g) then gk0,k = 0 for any k0 ∈ N.
Proof: Assume, for a contradiction, that gk0,k = 1 for some
k0. We first note that k0 /∈ C(g); for otherwise k ∈ C(g). Then,
let us assume that k0 /∈ C (g) and let player i0 ∈ C(g) be linked
with player i, i.e. gi0,i = 1. We note that if player i0 deletes
the link with i and creates a new link with player k, he will
still observe all the players he was accessing before the switch-
ing (via the new link with player k) and in addition he ac-
cesses all players that k accesses in g and that are not accessed
by i in g, i.e σ˜k =
¯¯¯
{h : @i g→ h ∧ ∃k g→ h}
¯¯¯
. Since g is strict
Nash it must be the case that ck − ci > σ˜k. Next, we note that
if player k0 deletes the link with player k and creates a new
link with player i, then he (player k0) will not accessed any-
80 3. One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity
more all players h that player i does not access in g and that
k0 accesses in g exclusively via the link with the player k, i.e
σk =
¯¯¯
{h : @i g→ h ∧ ∃k g→ h ∧ @k0 g0→ h}
¯¯¯
. Since g is strict
Nash it must be the case that ck − ci < σk. It is readily seen
that σk ≤ σ˜k; however, this implies that the two conditions
are incompatible. This contradiction completes the proof of the
lemma.¥
Lemma 3.10. Let g be a strict equilibrium and let C1(g), ..., Cm(g)
be the non-singleton components belonging to g. If i ∈ Cx(g),
then gi,j = 0, ∀j /∈ Cx(g).
Proof: For a contradiction assume that i ∈ Cx(g) and that
gi,j = 1 for some j /∈ Cx(g). Moreover, let player i0 ∈ Cx(g)
and such that gi,i0 = 1. Lemma 3.9 implies that j /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g).
Therefore, we have two possibilities. First, assume that ∀k ∈
N, gj,k = 0. In this case player j does not access any player.
Since player i has a link with player i0 and g is strict Nash then
player j strictly gains to initiate a link with player i0. This is
a contradiction. Second, assume that gj,k = 1 for some k ∈
N. Lemma 3.9 implies that k /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g) ∪ {j}. Iterating the
previous argument it follows that if gk,h = 0 for any h ∈ N, then
player k strictly prefers to create a link with player i0. Therefore,
it must be the case that gk,h = 1 for some h, which, using Lemma
3.9, implies that h /∈ ∪my=1Cy(g) ∪ {j, k} ∀y = 1, ...,m. We can
continue to iterate this argument and since the set of players is
finite, it must be the case that there exists a player, say l, who
does not access any player and that is accessed by player i via a
path in g. However, in this case player l strictly prefers to create
a link with player i0. Thus the proof follows.¥
Lemma 3.10 implies that if i ∈ Cx(g) and j ∈ Cy(g), x 6= y
∀x, y = 1, ...,m, then Ni(g) ∩ Nj(g) = Φ. Using this property
we note that only one non-singleton component can be part
of a strict equilibrium. For otherwise, one player belonging to
a non-singleton component (weakly) gains be switching to an-
other non-singleton component. Summarizing, it follows that a
strict equilibriumwith at least a non-singleton components must
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satisfy: (1) there exists a unique non-singleton component, say
C(g), which has a wheel architecture or a flower architecture,
and (2) each player within the non-singleton component does
not promote links with player outside the component (Lemma
3.10). We now note that each player outside the non-singleton
component, say j /∈ C(g), accesses players within the compo-
nents. This fact and Lemma 3.10 implies also that each player
outside the component is directly linked with the player who
has the lowest access cost within the component. It is now im-
mediate to see that the player with the lowest access cost in the
society should belong to the non-singleton component. Finally,
the ordered conditions are easily verified. This completes the
proof of strict equilibria with some non-singleton components.
Hence, the proof of the first part of the proposition follows.¥
Second part: We now prove the converse. Let g be a wheel
and set ci < V for any i ∈ N. We note that given ci < V
any wheel is ordered (no player wants to switch) and that each
player is playing his unique best response. Therefore g is a strict
equilibrium. The same set of restrictions in the costs of linking
imply that the flower network with player 1 the center is a strict
equilibrium. Finally, suppose that g is a wheel with a periphery-
sponsored star with player 1 the center. Set ci < V for any
i ∈ C (g) , while cj > nV for any j /∈ C (g) . It follows that g
is ordered and it is a strict equilibrium. The same conditions
applies to the flower network with a periphery-sponsored star
with player 1 the center. This completes the proof of the second
part of the proposition.¥
The proof of the proposition in now completed.¥
We conclude by providing the characterization of strict equi-
libria in which each component is composed of a single player.
We first introduce some notations. A generalized periphery spon-
sored star with center j is an unconnected architecture where
each component is a singleton and where there exists a player,
the center j, such that gi,j = 1 for some (or all) i ∈ N and the
remaining players, say {j1, j2, ..., jm} ⊆ N, are arranged in the
following way {gj,jm = gjm,jm−1 = ... = gj2,j1 = 1}. Note that
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if {j1, ...., jm} = N then g is a line where the information flow
from jm to j, from jm−1 to jm and so on. While if {j1, ..., jm}
is empty then g is a periphery-sponsored star with player j the
center. The next definition defines the ordered condition for a
generalized-periphery sponsored star network.
Definition 3.3. A generalized periphery-sponsored star net-
work g is ordered if ∀ gj0,j00 = 1 then cj00 − cy < dj00,y (g)V, ∀ y
accessed by j0 via the link gj0,j00 = 1.
Proposition 3.4. Let (3.3)-(3.4) be satisfied and let g be
a strict equilibrium in which each component is composed of a
single player. Then g is either the empty network or the ordered
generalized periphery sponsored-star network where g1,i = 0 for
any i ∈ N. Conversely, any such network is a strict equilibrium
for some {ci, V }.
Proof.
First Part: The first part of Proposition 3.4 is based on two
Lemmas.
Lemma 3.11. Let g be an unconnected strict equilibrium. If
gi,j = 1 and gk,j = 1 then i and k do not receive any link, i.e.
gj0,i = gj0,k = 0 ∀j0 ∈ N.
Proof: For a contradiction, suppose first that gj0,k = 1 for
some j0 ∈ N. Since g is minimal j0 6= i; since g is unconnected
j0 6= j and is different from any player k0 such that there exists
j
g→ k0 in g. Since g is strict Nash, the link gi,j = 1 implies that
ck − ci > V, and the link gj0,k = 1 implies that ck− cj < V. This
is a contradiction. The same applies to the case where gj0,i = 1.
This completes the proof of the Lemma.¥
Lemma 3.12. Let g be a non-empty unconnected equilibrium
where each component is a singleton. Then each player promotes
at most one link .
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. there exists a player j such that
gj,i = gj,k = 1 for some distinct k and i. We first note that
if gj,i = 1, then player j accesses via the link with player i
some player, say i0, such that gi0,i00 = 0 for any i00 ∈ N. To
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see this note that if gi,i1 = 0 for any i1 ∈ N, the proof triv-
ially follows. Moreover, if gi,i1 = 1, then i1 6= j; for otherwise
i and j would be part of a non-singleton component. Iterat-
ing the argument and noting that set of player is finite, the
claim follows. Second, this implies that if player j is linked
with i and k, then there exist {gj,i = gi,i1 = ... = gin,i0 = 1} and
{gj,k = gk,k1 = ... = gkn,k0 = 1} , where gi0,s = gk0,s = 0 for any
s ∈ N. It is easy to see that if k0 = i0 then Lemma 11 is vio-
lated. Furthermore, if k0 6= i0 since g is a strict Nash equilibrium,
player kn strictly gains by forming a link with player i0. This
constitutes a contradiction. Hence, the proof follows.¥
It is easy to see that Lemma 3.11 and 3.12 imply that a
strict equilibrium where each component is a singleton has a
generalized periphery-sponsored star. Moreover, if the ordered
condition does not hold than some player has an incentive to
deviate, which contradicts the fact that g is a strict Nash equi-
librium. Finally, we note that the agent which does not promote
any link is always the player with the lowest access cost in the
whole society, i.e. player 1. Suppose, for a contradiction, that
player k does not promote any link. Since there exists a player,
say j, such that gj,k = 1, it follows that ck < V, but then also
c1 < V and therefore player k strictly gains by creating a new
link with player 1. This completes the proof of the first part of
the proposition.¥
Second Part: Let g be the empty network and let ci > V
for any i ∈ N ; it is trivial to see that the empty network is a
strict equilibrium. We finally consider the case where g has a
generalized periphery-sponsored star architecture where player
1 is the agent which does not promote any link. Set the following
conditions on the costs of linking: (i) c1 < V, (ii) for any i ∈ N
such that gi,j = 1 then ci > nV, (iii) mV < cj < (m+ 1)V and
(iv) (x− 1)V < cjx < xV, for any x = 2, ...,m. These conditions
imply that: one, each agent who promotes a link obtain a strictly
positive utility, two no agent wants to form an additional link.
Therefore, given these conditions, whenever g is ordered g is also
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a strict equilibrium.17. This completes the proof of the second
part of the proposition.¥
The proof of Proposition 3.4 follows.¥
17Note that if in the generalized periphery sponsored star players are arranged as
follow: gy,x = 1 for any y > x and {gx,x−1 = gx−1,x−2 = ... = g2,1 = 1}, then g is
always ordered whenever ch−ch−1 < V for any h = 1, ..., x. This condition is consistent
with conditions (i)-(iii).
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Exploitation and cooperation
in networks
1 Introduction
Why should I not free-ride on my coauthor in our scientific col-
laboration? Why should a firm not free-ride on another firm in
the collaboration for the development of a new product? What
is that drives economic agents not to free-ride in collaboration
activities? We show that the presence of network externalities in
the individuals interaction process play a crucial role for the for-
mation of stable and efficient collaborations. Individuals invest
in connections, taking into account the potential externalities
inherent in networks. In turn, externalities shape individuals’
incentives to behave efficiently. We also show that the individu-
als’ incentives in their mutual interactions depend on the archi-
tecture of the social network, as well as on the position of the
individuals within the network.
We examine a framework where the investment in social or
economic ties has a long run nature.1 A collaboration between
two players brings benefits and costs to the two parties involved.
Benefits result from the potential exchange of some valuable
non-rival good, such as information and knowledge. Costs arise
because maintaining a collaboration requires exerting effort and
spending time. A player may or may not cooperate and free-
riding problems characterize the cost side. As an illustration,
we consider the following example. Two researchers establish a
scientific collaboration. The benefit accruing to each researcher
is the possibility of exchanging ideas, opinions and knowledge.
1The assumption that social ties have a long run nature captures the idea that the
interaction between two acquaintances occurs more frequently than the formation of
the relationship itself. For example, once a scientific collaboration is in place, the two
parties meet and interact frequently before the project has been completed. Similarly,
if two firms form a collaboration for the development of a new product, they typically
interact frequently before the collaboration ends.
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Part of the knowledge is intrinsic to these two researchers, but
part of it is obtained as a result of the interactions with the
other agents in the social network. Further, maintaining the
relationship is costly, in terms of both effort and time. If the
two parties cooperate, the maintenance cost of the link will be
lower as compared to the case in which they both free-ride on
each other. The increase in the maintenance cost of the link
reflects some sort of inefficiency (for example, a delay in the
project) which would not occur in case of cooperative behavior.
However, given that one of the two parties cooperates, the other
would prefer to free ride and save time to develop other projects
on his own. In this paper we ask how the individual investments
in collaborations may help to overcome free-riding problems.
We start by presenting the main features of the model. There
is a finite set of individuals, each of them endowed with some
non-rival information. At the beginning of the game players pro-
pose collaborations (links) and this generates a network of re-
lationships. Once the network is in place, every pair of linked
players interacts for an infinite number of periods. In the in-
teraction phase, each player observes the entire network and
the history of actions that each of his social acquaintances has
taken in the interaction with him. Neither the actions his ac-
quaintances played with third parties, nor the actions played by
non-acquaintances are observable.2 In each period each pair of
acquaintances, say i and j, plays two simultaneous move games:
an accessibility game and a prisoner’s dilemma game. In the
accessibility game player i (j) either withholds or provides the
information he has (his non-rival good) to player j (i). The out-
come of this game across all pairs of social contacts determines
how information flows in the network and, therefore, defines the
benefits accruing to each player in that specific period. Con-
versely, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, player i (j) decides
2 The assumption that players fully observe the network is realistic when the network
represents a physical infrastructure. When a link means a social relationship, it is hard
to think that players observe the entire structure of the social network they belong
to. We shall show that, for our results to hold, it is enough that each player has local
information of the social network.
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whether to cooperate or to defect with player j (i). This de-
termines the cost of that particular collaboration and how it is
met by the two parties.3 Hence, a strategy profile specifies the
network and the way players act in the interaction phase. An
equilibrium is a strategy profile where the proposed network is
pairwise stable and the strategy profile is a sequential equilib-
rium. In the analysis we first characterise efficient outcomes and
then focus on efficient equilibria. Let us proceed to discuss our
main results.
An efficient outcome is characterised either by the empty net-
work or by any minimally connected network where players pro-
vide full accessibility (Theorem 4.1). In this last case two effi-
cient outcomes arise given two distinct ranges of parameters.
First, we obtain a symmetric efficient outcome where individ-
uals cooperate with their acquaintances to maintain the cost
of their relationship. Second, an asymmetric efficient outcome
where for each pair of linked players, one individual cooperates
and bears the entire cost of the link, while the other player
free-rides on him. Figure 4.1 depicts two possible efficient con-
figurations in a society with 4 players.
We now turn to explore when symmetric and asymmetric effi-
cient outcomes may arise as a result of strategic considerations.
We start by examining the existence of equilibria that sustain
the asymmetric efficient outcome (exploitative efficient equilib-
ria). We show that the exploitative efficient equilibrium that
exists for the widest range of parameters has the following fea-
tures. First, the social network has a star architecture. Second,
each player i provides information and cooperates with player j
if the amount of information player j accesses exclusively from
player i is weakly less that the the amount of information player
i accesses exclusively from player j (otherwise player i free-rides
on player j). In other words, the way a player behaves with re-
spect to his social contact depends on how much valuable for
3 In particular, whenever two linked players play symmetrically in the prisoner’s
dilemma game they share evenly the cost of that link (at the defection level if both
players defect, or at the cooperative level otherwise); if they play asymmetrically the
player who cooperates bears entirely the cost of that link (at the exploitative level).
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the former is the relationship with the latter. This equilibrium
exists for a discount factor range that becomes wider as the size
of the population increases (Theorem 4.2).
Let us comment on the nature of this equilibrium. Firstly,
we observe that the asymmetric efficient outcome is strategi-
cally best sustained when players are embedded in the star
network. The reason is that, in the star architecture, the cen-
tral player can directly detect any eventual deviation. Further-
more, his structural position allows him to punish any cheater
with immediate social isolation, i.e. withholding all the informa-
tion. Secondly, in the star network, relationships are periphery-
sponsored: the central player always free-rides on his social con-
tacts while the spoke players always cooperate. The role of the
periphery-sponsored property is to transfer utility from poorly
connected players (spoke players) to well connected players (cen-
tral players). Such a mechanism aligns individuals and social
incentives and, therefore, enhances efficiency. Thirdly, we show
that the larger the population the more likely that an efficient
equilibrium exists. This is due to the fact that, ceteris paribus,
the magnitude of the punishments is increasing in the amount
of network externalities. These results suggest centrality and
periphery-sponsorship to be crucial in order to sustain efficient
asymmetric relationships.
We finally explore the existence of equilibria that sustain the
symmetric efficient outcome (cooperative efficient equilibria).
We show that the cooperative efficient equilibrium that exists
for the widest range of parameters has the following features.
First, the network has a line architecture. Second, players coop-
erate and provide information, while they punish deviations in
the network stage, as well as in the interaction phase, by defect-
ing and withholding information (cooperative strategy profile).
Finally, this equilibrium exists for a wider discount factor range
in larger populations (Theorem 4.3).
Let us focus on this last result. First, in sharp contrast with
the exploitative case, symmetric efficient relationships are easily
sustained in symmetric architectures. Indeed, the line network
is the most symmetric network among the class of minimally
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connected networks. The underlying reason of this result is that
individuals’ incentives to deviate in the network formation stage
are inversely related to the number of connections players have.
Second, we observe that, similarly to the exploitative case, when
the exchange of information is used strategically, players may
credibly threat their social acquaintances by withholding infor-
mation. This creates more severe punishments as compared to
settings where information is not strategic. Therefore, also a rel-
atively impatient society can sustain cooperative efficient equi-
libria.
In the last few decades a number of empirical studies have
shown that network relationships play a crucial role in shap-
ing individuals’ behavior in a variety of strategic situations.4
The present study attempts to examine the interplay between
endogenous strategic links formation and stable efficient rela-
tionships. Thus, it relates to different strands of the economic
literature such as repeated games, theory of networks, and so-
cial capital and trust. We will discuss how our paper relates to
these different branches of the literature after having presented
our main results. The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterises efficient
outcomes. Section 4 and 5 analyze exploitative and cooperative
efficient equilibria, respectively. Section 6 reviews the related
literature and section 7 concludes. Proofs are shown in the Ap-
pendix.
2 The model
There is a finite set of players and each agent is endowed with
some non-rival good, to which we will refer as information here-
after. At the beginning of the game, players form an undirected
graph (network formation stage). Undirected graphs are used to
4For example, Munshi (2003) shows that network effects are crucial in determining the
labor market participation of Mexican migrants in the U.S. Krishnan and Sciubba (2004)
shows that informal institutions matters in determining productivity in agriculture in
rural Ethiopia. See also Kosfled (2004) for a survey of experimental work on networks.
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model the network of relationships among players. A graph is
composed by a set of nodes and a set of links. Each node repre-
sents a player while each link indicates a bilateral relationship
between two players. Once the network is formed, each pair of
linked players play an infinitely repeated game, which consists
of two simultaneous move games: in game one, players may aug-
ment the information they have by means of exchanging it with
their social contacts (Accessibility game); in game two, inter-
acting players play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which defines
the cost a player has to pay for each link he has. The strategy
of each player is, therefore, two-dimensional, fact that will play
a crucial role in our analysis. Let us now introduce the model
in a more formal way.
• Network Formation
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of players and let i be a typ-
ical member of this set. To avoid trivialities, we shall assume
throughout that n ≥ 3. In period zero, each player i proposes
a set of links, i.e. ω0i =
¡
ω0i,1, ω
0
i,2, ..., ω
0
i,n
¢
, where ω0i,j ∈ {0, 1},
∀j ∈ N\{i}. If ω0i,j = 1 we say that player i wants to form a
link with j. A link between two agents, say i and j, is formed if
both players agree on it, i.e. ω0i,j = ω
0
j,i = 1. These decisions are
summarised in ω0 = (ω01, ω
0
2, ..., ω
0
n) and result in an undirected
network g (ω0) = (g1 (ω0) , g2 (ω0) , ..., gn (ω0)) , where gi (ω0) =
(gi,1 (ω0) , gi,2 (ω0) , ..., gi,n (ω0)) , gi,j (ω0) = ω0i,j ·ω0j,i ∀j ∈ N\{i}
and gi,i (ω0) = 0 ∀i ∈ N. When there is no confusion we will
use g0 instead of g (ω0) . We say that players i and j have a
direct link if g0i,j = 1, otherwise g
0
i,j = 0.
5 Let G be the set of all
possible undirected networks on N. For a network g ∈ G the set
Ndi (g) = {j ∈ NÂ {i} : gi,j = 1} defines the bilateral relation-
ships (social contacts) of player i. Let µdi (g) be its cardinality.
• Infinitely Repeated Game
- Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG)
5We note that g0i,j = g
0
j,i, ∀{i, j} ∈ N.
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In any period t ≥ 1, each pair of acquaintances (i, j) plays
a PDG as represented in table 1. Let denote by αti,j ∈ {C,D}
the action chosen by player i in the interaction with j, where C
means cooperation and D defection.
i\j C D
C c, c f, e
D e, f d, d
Table 4.1
We shall assume, throughout the paper, that e > c > d >
f, 2d < f. We normalize, without loss of generality, e = 0.
We also denote by φti,j (αi,j, αj,i) the cost player i faces when
interacting with player j (which is represented in table 4.1). In
words, each pair of interacting players may either share the cost
of the link symmetrically (either at the cooperative level, c, or
at the defection level, d) or it is only one of the two players that
bears the entire cost of that link at the exploitative level, f.
- Accessibility Game (AG)
In any period t ≥ 1, each player is endowed with some non-
rival information which has a value v. Then, simultaneously to
the prisoner’s dilemma game, each player i ∈ N decides either to
withhold or provide (at no cost) information to each of the other
players j ∈ N\{i} (both his own information and the informa-
tion he acquires from other agents). We denote by λti,j ∈ {0, 1}
this decision, where λti,j = 1 indicates that player i transmits
the information to player j. For example, when the link is a
scientific collaboration, an R&D collaboration or a social tie,
then providing accessibility means to share ideas, opinions and
knowledge. If a link represents a collaboration to construct a
physical infrastructure, like a bridge between two cities, then
providing accessibility means to allow entry to the city using
that bridge.
Let us define λti =
©
λti,j
ª
j∈NÂ{i} . The pattern λ
t = Πi∈Nλ
t
i
determines the flow of information within a network g ∈ G. The
combination of g and λt results in a directed network gλ
t
, that
we will refer to as the “flow network”, where gλ
t
i,j = gi,j ·λtj,i. We
say that the information flows from j to i if gλ
t
i,j = 1; otherwise
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gλ
t
i,j = 0. A flow path from j to i in g
λt is denoted by j
gλ
t
→
i, where either gλ
t
i,j = 1 or there exists a sequence of agents
j1, ..., jm, different from i and j, such that gλ
t
i,j1
= gλ
t
j1,j2
= ... =
gλ
t
jm−1,jm = g
λt
jm,j
= 1. Thus, given a flow network gλ
t
, the set of
players that i accesses is Ni
³
gλ
t
´
=
½
j ∈ N\ {i} : j gλ
t
→ i
¾
with
µi
³
gλ
t
´
the cardinality of this set. For simplicity, we assume
that information flows across links without decay.
The following notation is important to define the strategy pro-
files of the game. Given gλ
t
, for any gλ
t
i,j = 1 the set Ii,j(gλt) =½
k ∈ N :
µ
∃k g
λt
→ i
¶
∧
µ
j /∈ k g
λt
→ i
¶¾
indicates the set of play-
ers agent j accesses exclusively via a path containing i and
Ii,j(gλ
t
) · v, where Ii,j(gλt) ≡
¯¯¯
Ii,j(gλt)
¯¯¯
, represents the bene-
fit player j obtains from the specific interaction with player i.6
The same definition applies to period t = 0 once we impose that
gλ
0
= g.
Combining the two games, the action space of each player,
with respect to each of his social contact, isA ≡ {(α, λ)}λ∈{0,1}
αj∈{C,D}.
Let us define Ai ≡ An−1 ∀i ∈ N and A = Πi∈NAi.We note that
any element in Ai is a vector of tuples ai = (ai,j)j∈N\{i} repre-
senting the actions played by agent i with the remaining players
in the constituent game of the infinitely repeated game.
• Strategy Profiles
We shall focus on pure strategy profiles. We assume that, at
each period t ≥ 1, each player i observes the social network, the
past actions of his social contacts in their specific collaboration,
and the information received by each of their social contacts,
i.e. at(i; g) = {(aτj,i, aτi,j),
³
Ij,i(gλ
t
), Ii,j(gλ
t
)
´
}j∈Ndi (g),τ∈{1,...,t−1}.
We also assume that players neither observe the behavior of
6To illustrate this, in a star network the strategic information of the center with
respect to any other player, say j, is (n− 1)v, while the strategic information of j with
respect to the center is v.
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their social contacts with third parties, nor the behavior of non-
acquaintances. Let Ψt(i; g) be the space of observable actions
for player i ∈ N.7 Then, the observed history at period t of
player i is ht(i) = {g, at(i; g)} and the set of histories of player
i at time t is Ht(i) ≡
n
{g, ψ}ψ∈Ψt(i;g)
o
g∈G
. We refer to s =
{ω0, ω1, ..., ωt, ...} as a pure strategy profile of this game; si is a
pure strategy of player i consisting in a set of link proposals, ω0i ,
and in a sequence of functions, ω1i , ..., ω
t
i, ..., where ω
t
i : Ht (i)→
Ai, ∀t ≥ 1. Let player i0s strategy set be denoted as Si, and let
S ≡
Q
i∈N Si be the set of pure strategy profiles.
It is important to note that a strategy profile s = {ωt}∞t=0 re-
sults in an undirected network g0 and in an infinite sequence of
directed networks {gλt}∞t=1, one for each period t. In the anal-
ysis we will focus on strategy profiles which are stationary, i.e.
players play the same action on the equilibrium path (at every
period).
• Payoff structure
We are now ready to define the payoff structure of the game.
Given a strategy profile s = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt, ...}, the total value
generated at each period t, vt (s) , and the utility player i obtains
at that period, uti(s), can be written as:
vt (s) =
X
i∈N
uti(s), where
uti(s) = µi
³
gλ
t
´
· v +
X
j∈Ndi (g0)
φi,j
¡
αti,j, α
t
j,i
¢
Therefore, the value generated by a strategy profile s in the
entire game, V (s), and the utility to player i in the entire game,
7With some abuse of notation, we can define in an arbitrary period t ≥ 1, the space of
observable actions for player i ∈ N as Ψt(i; g) ≡ A2(t−1)µdi (g)×{0, 1, ..., n−1}2(t−1)µdi (g).
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ui(s), may be represented as
V (s) =
∞X
t=1
δt−1v(s) =
X
i∈N
ui(s) (4.1)
ui(s) =
∞X
t=1
δt−1uti(s) (4.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor displayed by
all agents. Hence, the utility player i obtains is given by a dis-
counted sum of infinite earnings, derived from the information
i accesses, i.e. µti(g
λt) · v, and the cost player i bears in his in-
teractions, i.e.
P
j∈Ndi (g0)
φi,j (αi,j, αj,i) .
• Equilibrium and Efficiency Notions
We are interested in determining a strategy profile s such that
the proposed network g (ω0) is stable given the prescriptions of
the strategy s in the continuation game, i.e. {ωt}∞t=1; and that
this strategy is a sequential equilibrium (i.e. it prescribes to play
an equilibrium for any possible observed network g0 ∈ G and any
history of play in the infinitely repeated game). To determine the
stability of the network we use the notion of pairwise stability.8
Formally, given {ωt}∞t=1, the network g0 is pairwise stable if no
pair of players wants to form an additional link and no individual
player wants to delete any set of his links.9
Definition 4.1. The strategy profile s = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt, ...} is
an equilibrium if {ω1, ..., ωt, ...} is a sequential equilibrium, and
g0 is pairwise stable.
To complete, we define the notion of efficiency.
8The concept of pairwise stability has been introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). In the current paper we will use a modified version of this notion introduced by
Goyal and Joshi (2003)
9We propose that g0 must be pairwise stable, instead of requiring ω0 to be a Nash
equilibrium. In the latter case, given {ω1, ..., ωt, ...}, we would obtain a multiplicity
of equilibria of the type: whenever ω0i,j = 0 ∀{i, j} ∈ N, then player j is indifferent
between setting ω0j,i = 1 or ω
0
j,i = 0. The former case avoids this problem and stresses
the architecture of the equilibrium network, g0.
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Definition 4.2. A strategy s is efficient if V (s) ≥ V (sˆ) for
any sˆ ∈ S.
We note that if a strategy is socially efficient, it is also Pareto
efficient. The reverse does not hold.
3 Efficient outcomes
We start by characterizing the efficient outcomes. We shall then
proceed to investigate strategy profiles that sustain efficient
equilibria. We will focus on maximal punishment strategy pro-
files. This will clarify the role networks play on the emergence
of efficient social norms, as well as the effect of the latter in
shaping the incentives to invest in connections. By considering
these effects together, the analysis will also clarify the tension
between individual and social incentives.
We first introduce some notation. Given a network g, we say
that there is a path of links from j to i, denoted as j
g←→ i, if
either gi,j = 1 or if there exists a sequence of players j1, ..., jm
not including i and j such that gi,j1 = gj1,j2 = ... = gjm,j = 1. A
set C(g) ⊂ N is a component of g if, for any i, j ∈ C(g), there is
a path between them, and no path exists between any agent in
C(g) and N\C(g). A component is minimal if there exists only
one path between any pair of players i, j ∈ C(g). A network
g is connected if it has a unique component. If a network is
connected and its unique component is minimal, we say that it
is minimally connected. A player i in a network g is said to be
an end-agent if he has a unique link. A network is empty if there
are no links across players. A network g has a star architecture
and i is the central player if gi,j = 1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, and there are
no other links. A line is a minimally connected network where
only two end-agents exist. The following result characterises the
efficient outcomes.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold. (a) If nv +
max{2c, f} > 0 then s = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt, ...} is efficient if and
only if the following conditions hold: (i) g0 is minimally con-
nected; (ii) every period each player provides accessibility; (iii)
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every period the total cost for each link is max{2c, f}. (b) If
nv+max{2c, f} < 0, s is efficient if and only if g0 is the empty
network .
We sketch here the main steps of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
First, since exchanging information is costless and it (weakly)
increases social welfare, a social planner will prescribe the mu-
tual exchange of information. Second, the no-decay assumption
implies that an efficient network is minimal. Third, since linking
up two players otherwise disconnected creates positive network
externalities an efficient network is either empty or connected.
Finally, in any minimally connected network social welfare is
maximized whenever the cost for each link is as low as possible.
Theorem 4.1 shows that efficiency requires players to form
a minimally connected network and to exchange information.
Furthermore, two possibilities may arise. First, in some settings,
i.e. for 2c > f, players must mutually cooperate.10 We will refer
to this case as the symmetric efficient outcome. It is readily seen
that a symmetric efficient outcome generates a social welfare
equal to (n − 1)(nv + 2c)/(1 − δ). Second, in other settings,
efficiency requires that, for each link, a player cooperates and
bears the entire cost of that link, while the other player free-rides
on him. We will refer to this case as the asymmetric efficient
outcome, which generates a social welfare equal to: (n−1)(nv+
f)/(1− δ).11
Figure 4.1 depicts one possible symmetric and asymmetric ef-
ficient outcome in a society composed of 4 players. In the figure,
a link is represented by an edge connecting two players, whereas
an arrowhead pointed to one player indicates that information
10For example, assume that in order to maintain the link, agents must exert some
effort and that the cost of this effort for a player is convex. In this case, splitting the
mainteinance tasks between the two parties is more efficient than letting only one player
taking care of them.
11For example, when the performance of a task (the maintenance of the link) requires
a lot of coordination across players or the opening of different bureaucratic procedures,
it may be more efficient to leave the task to be solved unilaterally, than to solve it
bilaterally. In the scientific collaboration example, if the two reaserchers belong to two
different universities, it is generally more costly for the two researchers to meet at a
conference and both of them paying the plane fare, as compared to the case of only one
of the two researchers visiting the other one in his own university.
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flows in the direction of that player. Finally, the way the cost
of a link is met by the two players is indicated with the letters
above the edge.
Symmetric Efficient Outcome, 2c>f Asymmetric Efficient Outcome, 2c<f 
1
2
3
4
(c,c)(c,c)
(c,c)
1
2
3
4
(0,f)(f,0)
(0,f )
Figure 4.1.
In what follows, we shall study the circumstances under which
it is possible to strategically sustain the asymmetric and the
symmetric efficient outcomes, respectively. We will restrict our
analysis to the case in which max{2c, f}+nv > 0, which would
eventually be the case in large societies, even if the individual
cost of a link is high.
4 Exploitative efficient equilibria
We start by examining the existence of equilibria that sustain
the asymmetric efficient outcome. We will refer to these equilib-
ria as exploitative efficient equilibria. We first analyse a bench-
mark case where social ties do not play any strategic role in
the game. To do this, we assume that the communication of in-
formation is not strategic and that the players’ behavior in the
interaction phase does not depend on the realization of the net-
work stage.12 The following remark shows that, in this setting,
exploitative efficient equilibria do not exist.
Remark 4.1. Suppose social ties do not play any role and
2c < f . Then an efficient equilibrium does not exist.
We shall show that, when network externalities are endog-
enized, this inefficiency fades away and in order to do this we
12Recall we are restricting our analysis to stationary strategy profiles.
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characterise the efficient exploitative equilibrium existing for the
widest range of parameters. This equilibrium is characterised by
two features: one, the network has a star architecture; and two,
the central player always free rides while the peripheral play-
ers always cooperate. Therefore, in equilibrium the player who
values more a connection bears its cost.13 We will first define a
strategy profile, called exploitative strategy, which provides the
asymmetric efficient outcome. We then show that such strat-
egy sustains the exploitative efficient equilibrium for the widest
range of parameters, which is characterised.
The exploitative strategy prescribes players to form a set of
links, that generates a social network, say g0. If players observe
a network which is different from the prescribed one, they defect
and withhold the information. Conversely, if players observe g0,
each agent i provides the information and cooperates with player
j if the amount of information player j accesses exclusively from
player i is weakly less than the amount of information player i
accesses exclusively from player j; otherwise player i free-rides
on player j. Furthermore, a deviation in the interaction phase is
punished by withholding the information and defecting. It is im-
portant to notice that, even if players only observe the behavior
of their direct neighbors in their mutual interaction, they can
infer deviations of their social contacts with third parties and
deviations of non-acquaintances by observing the flow of infor-
mation they access in their interactions. In other words, even if
players have only local information, social punishments may be
indirectly implemented. To define the strategy profile formally,
we need to introduce some additional notation.
Definition 4.3. We say that the action taken by player i
against j at period t, ati,j, is well-behaved, WB, with respect to
the relative flow of information between i and j, if and only if
ati,j =
½
(C, 1) if Ii,j(gλ
t
) = Ii,j(g0) ≤ Ii,j(g0) = Ij,i(gλ
t
)
(D, 1) otherwise
13 In a different setting, Meléndez-Jiménez (2002) obtains that when two agents bargain
on the cost sharing of a link, the agent who values more the link bears a higher part of
the cost of the link, and when both value the link equally, they split evenly the cost.
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The exploitative strategy profile is then defined as sE = {ωE,ti }∞t=0,
∀i ∈ N, where ωEi = {ωE,ti }∞t=0 is such that for any gˆ ∈ G and
any j ∈ N :
ωE,1i,j =



(D, 1) if
½
gˆ = g0
Ii,j(g0) > Ij,i(g0)
(C, 1) if
½
gˆ = g0
Ii,j(g0) ≤ Ij,i(g0)
(D, 0) otherwise
, and ∀t ≥ 2 :
ωE,ti,j =



(D, 1) if
½
at−1k,i and a
t−1
i,k are WB, ∀k ∈ Ndi (g0)
Ii,j(g0) > Ij,i(g0)
(C, 1) if
½
at−1k,i and a
t−1
i,k are WB, ∀k ∈ Ndi (g0)
Ii,j(g0) ≤ Ij,i(g0)
(D, 0) otherwise
We are now ready to provide the main result of this section.14
Let us denote n¯ = (v−2d)(d−f)
v2
+ 1.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c <
f. An efficient equilibrium exists if and only if (i) f+(n−1)v ≥
0 and (ii) δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v . Furthermore, if n > n¯ then the unique
network which constitutes an efficient equilibrium for the widest
range of parameters is the star network.15
The proof of the theorem is based on Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2
which are provided in the appendix. We sketch here the main
arguments. In Lemma 4.1 we start by showing that the exploita-
tive strategy sustains the exploitative efficient equilibrium for
the widest range of parameters in a star network. The reason is
that in the star network the center punishes any deviations di-
rectly by withholding all the information; this implies that any
cheater would be socially isolated just after one period of his de-
viation. On the contrary, in any other minimally connected net-
work there exists some player who could deviate and yet enjoy
14 It is worth noticing that the exploitative strategy profile prescribes to play the Nash
equilibrium (D, 0) out-of-equilibrium path. Thus, to define the existence conditions of a
sequential equilibrium it is enough to focus on individuals’ incentives in the equilibrium
path.
15We note that even if n < n¯, the star network is an efficient equilibrium for the widest
range of parameters, but it is not the unique one.
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some information for some period after the deviation. Next, con-
ditions (i) and (ii) follow by solving the equilibrium conditions
for the exploitative strategy profile when the initial network has
a star architecture.
In Lemma 4.2 we first show that both conditions (i) and (ii)
are necessary conditions for the existence of an asymmetric ef-
ficient equilibrium. It is clear that if condition (i) is violated a
minimally connected network cannot be pairwise stable. Sup-
pose condition (ii) is violated; we show that to obtain an asym-
metric efficient outcome it must be the case that either there
exists an end-agent who entirely bears the cost of its relation-
ship or there exists a non end-agent player who pays for all the
links he has. In both cases these players strictly gain by defect-
ing. Finally, we prove that, if the population is large enough
(n > n¯), when conditions (i) and (ii) bind only the exploitative
strategy profile can sustain an asymmetric efficient equilibrium.
On the existence region of exploitative efficient equilibria, two
remarks are worth being made. First, both conditions (i) and
(ii) are weaker the higher the size of the population is. Asymp-
totically, when the size of the society tends to infinity, an ex-
ploitative efficient equilibrium always exists. This is due to the
fact that a large connected population produces a large amount
of network externalities, which in turn increase the magnitude
of the punishments. Thus the conflict between individual and
social incentives is less severe in large societies.
Second, we also note that the pairwise stability notion leads to
an equilibrium condition (condition (i)), that is invariant with
respect to the architecture of the network, provided that each
player pays at most the cost of one link. Therefore, the pair-
wise stability notion does not undermine the architecture of the
network. On the contrary, the requirement of sequential equilib-
rium crucially depends on the architecture of the network. This
implies that individuals’ incentives during the interaction phase
are embedded in the network of collaborations.
The second set of observations concerns the nature of the effi-
cient exploitative equilibria. Here, we emphasize three remarks.
First, the star architecture allows more likely to strategically
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sustain the asymmetric efficient outcome than other minimally
connected networks. The reason is that, in the star network, the
central player has the ability to maximally punish deviations.
Second, centrality is accompanied by the periphery-sponsored
property: the cost of each link is unilaterally met by the player
who values it more, i.e. the peripheral player of that specific in-
teraction. Here, the role that periphery-sponsorship plays is to
transfer utility from poor connected players to well connected
players. These findings suggest that centrality and periphery-
sponsorship are crucial structural properties to maintain stable
and efficient asymmetric relationships.
Third, we note that exploitative efficient equilibria exhibit
hierarchical structures. The following example illustrates this
point. Consider a society composed of 9 players, arranged in
the network depicted in Figure 4.2, who follow the exploitative
strategy profile.
1
2
4
5
(f,0)
(0,f)
3
8
9
6
(0,f)
(f,0 )
(0,f)
(0,f)(f,0)
(f ,0)
7
Figure 4.2.
Three types of players emerges. Player 1 is the exploitative
player in the sense that he free-rides on every of his neigh-
bors (players 2 and 3). The role of the exploitative player is
to connect two star components, that would be otherwise dis-
connected. Players 2 and 3 are hybrid players in the sense that
they cooperate with the central player while exploiting all the
social contacts they have. The remaining players (end-agents)
are always exploited. Note that hybrid players have higher in-
centives to deviate than exploited players because, as compared
to the end-agents, hybrid players could defect with their ex-
ploiter (the center), and yet they would enjoy the information
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from the end-agents for one period after that deviation occurs.
5 Cooperative efficient equilibria
We now explore the existence of equilibria that sustain the sym-
metric efficient outcome. We shall refer to these equilibria as co-
operative efficient equilibria. Similarly to the previous section,
we start by analysing a benchmark case where social ties do
not play any strategic role. In such cases the trade-off between
individual and social incentives is substantial.
Remark 4.2. Suppose that social ties do not play any role
and that 2c > f. An efficient equilibrium exists if and only if
v + c ≥ 0 and δ ≥ c/d
Given a minimally connected network, the continuation game
degenerates, for each period t ≥ 1, in a finite number of bilateral
prisoner’s dilemma games that are strategically independent.
As a consequence, the equilibrium condition to sustain mutual
cooperation in any link is obtained by applying the standard
Folk theorem, i.e. δ ≥ c/d. Once players are sufficiently patient,
the condition v + c ≥ 0 is necessary and sufficient so that a
minimally connected network is pairwise stable (in this case the
critical agent would be the one linked with an end-agent).
Let us now examine the effect of players being allowed to
use their information strategically. We shall show that in this
case the conflict between individual and social incentives is less
severe. As in the previous section, we analyse the cooperative
efficient equilibrium existing for the widest range of parame-
ters. This equilibrium is characterised by two features: first, the
network has a line architecture; second, every player cooperates.
We start by introducing the cooperative strategy profile. This
strategy prescribes players to form a set of links, generating a
network of relationships, say g0. In the interaction phase, each
player defects and withholds his information whenever a net-
work, which is different from the prescribed one, is observed.
Otherwise, each player cooperates and provides the information
to his neighbors, while he punishes any eventual deviation by
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defecting and withholding the information, in every period on-
wards, with respect to all his links. Also in this case, each player
directly detects the deviations of the social contacts in his inter-
actions, and indirectly uncovers, via the information flow, the
deviations of his social contacts with third parties and the de-
viations of non-acquaintances.
Formally, let us define the cooperative strategy profile as sC =
{ω0i , ωC,1i , ..., ωC,ti , ...}i∈N , where ωC,ti =
n
ωC,ti,1 , ..., ω
C,t
i,n
o
is such
that for any gˆ ∈ G, any j ∈ N and any k ∈ Ndi (g) :
ωC,1i,j =
½
(C, 1) if gˆ = g0
(D, 0) otherwise
and ∀t ≥ 2 :
ωC,ti,j =



(C, 1) if
½
at−1k,i =a
t−1
i,k = (C, 1)
(Ik,i(gλ
t−1
), Ii,k(gλ
t−1
))=(Ik,i(g0), Ii,k (g0))
(D, 0) otherwise
The Theorem below provides the main result of this sec-
tion.16 Let δ∗ be the solution of the following equation δ∗[v +
(n− 2) vδ∗ + c− d− dδ∗] + c = 0.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c >
f. An efficient equilibrium exists if and only if (i) (n−1)v+2c ≥
0 and (ii) δ ≥ δ∗. Furthermore, the unique network, which is
part of the cooperative efficient equilibrium that exists for the
widest range of parameters, is the line network.
The Theorem follows from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 presented in
the appendix. In Lemma 4.3 we show that the cooperative strat-
egy profile sustains the cooperative efficient equilibrium which
exists for the widest range of parameters when the initial net-
work has a line architecture. To prove this we first observe that,
given that players follow the cooperative strategy in the inter-
action phase, in the network formation stage players’ incentives
to deviate are increasing in the number of links they have. Fur-
thermore, we show that in any other network different from the
16 It is worth noticing that the cooperative strategy profile prescribes to play the Nash
equilibrium (D, 0) out-of-equilibrium path. Thus, to define the existence conditions of a
sequential equilibrium it is enough to focus on individuals’ incentives in the equilibrium
path.
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line, in the interaction phase players have at least the same in-
centives to deviate as compared to players embedded in a line
network. The equilibrium conditions (i) and (ii) are obtained by
imposing pairwise stability and sequential rationality, respec-
tively. In Lemma 4.4 we show that for any initial minimally
connected network the cooperative strategy profile prescribes
maximal punishments, which completes the proof.
Let us now comment on some aspects of the results presented
in Theorem 4.3. First, observe that with endogenous network
externalities cooperative efficient equilibria exist for parameter
ranges where they would not exist, otherwise (see Remark 4.2).
The reason is that players may credibly commit to provide the
information, conditionally on having inferred that each player
has cooperated in his interactions. Similarly to the exploitative
case analysed in the previous section, network externalities are
higher in a larger society, thus enhancing efficiency. The second
observation concerns the nature of the equilibrium existing for
the widest range of parameters. Figure 4.3 illustrates this equi-
librium in a society composed of 4 players.
321 (c,c) 4(c,c)(c,c)
Figure 4.3.
The main feature of this equilibrium is that players are em-
bedded in a very symmetric network: the line network. This sug-
gests that a symmetric distribution of connections across players
(fairly compatible networks) is crucial to sustain symmetric ef-
ficient collaborations.
6 Related literature
The current paper provides a theoretical account of the effects
of endogenous network externalities in the strategic formation of
informal relationships and individuals’ incentives. Our paper re-
lates to three strands of the economic literature, that is network
formation, cooperation in repeated games and social capital and
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trust. We will refer to each of them in turn.
The first contribution refers to the body of literature which
studies the interplay between strategic partnering and economic
and social structure, e.g. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001),
Goyal and Joshi (2003), Bloch and Jackson (2004). The general
structure of these games is that first individuals form connec-
tions with others and this determines a network of relationships.
Then, individuals choose actions and their final payoffs to an in-
dividual are shaped by his or her location in the networks. The
model we have developed fits in this class of games. However,
while the existing literature generally focuses on finite games,
we analyse an infinitely repeated games. This allows us to inves-
tigate the emergence of efficient social norms. Remarkably, we
show that in equilibrium there is a substantial overlap between
individual and social incentives.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the literature on coopera-
tion in repeated games. To some extent it relates to the work of
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). They analyse a setting where
players, belonging to a community, are repeatedly and randomly
matched to play a Prisoner’s dilemma game. The main result
is that cooperation can be sustained if players react to a de-
viation by punishing subsequent partners. Therefore, the com-
munity has a positive effect in the enforcement of cooperative
behavior: to free-ride on one player causes sanction by others.
The main difference in our approach is that players’ interaction
takes place in a fixed pattern of play (the community is endoge-
nously structured) and this allows us to investigate the effect
of network externalities on the enforcement of efficient long-run
and stable relationships.
A paper which shares the same spirit of ours is Haag and
Lagunoff (2000), which analyse a repeated prisoners’ dilemma
game played in a given social networks. Agents have a different
discount factor and the authors investigate the network archi-
tectures which support a maximum degree of cooperation. Un-
der some restrictions on strategies they show that a desirable
structure is one where there is a clique of patient players who
cooperates with all their neighbors. Each of these cooperators is
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linked with a limited set of impatient players, who in turn are
free-rides. This pattern can be sustained because of the high
level of patience of cooperators. Differently, we consider that
players have homogenous discount factor and we analyse the
incentive of individuals to cooperate and to free-ride in endoge-
nously formed networks.
Finally, we relate our paper to the theory of social capital and
trust.17 Social capital is a relational concept and its existence is
inherent to socioeconomic networks. Social capital affects indi-
viduals’ behavior as well as aggregate economic phenomena. An
individual player can use his social capital, which depends on
the nature of his connections, to obtain private economic gains.
From a societal perspective, social capital represents the basis of
trust in repeated interactions. Sociologists have widely studied
this subject. Coleman (1988) emphasizes the role of redundant
links for the emergence of trust introducing the so-called closure
argument. Consider, for simplicity, a society with three players.
Coleman (1988) argues that social capital is higher when players
are embedded in a cycle network as compared to a star network.
The reason is that in a cycle players can monitor rivals’ devia-
tions more efficiently than in a star: in a cycle if a friend cheats
on me I could communicate this to a common friends (in the star
there are no common friends), which would eventually react by
punishing the cheater.
By contrast, Burt (1992) emphasizes the importance of non-
redundant connections introducing the so-called structural hole
argument. Structural holes are players who connect networks by
linking different components, which would be otherwise discon-
nected. These players on the one hand integrate additive sources
of information, which in turn increases the value generated by
the network and on the other hand they may use strategically
their structural position to obtain private gains. These two the-
ories should be seen as complementary: the closure argument
explains how the benefits of network externalities can be re-
alized in a community, while the structural hole argument ex-
17See Sobel (2002) for an extensive discussion on the notion of social capital.
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plains how network externalities come about, and the structural
properties of players who are crucial for the emergence of these
externalities.
In economics, the notion of social capital has been mainly used
to study issues related to economic development, criminality
and education.18 However, a theoretical analysis of how social
capital emerges is still at a preliminary stage. The first attempt
to address this issue is Vega-Redondo (2002), who provides a
strategic foundation of the closure argument of Coleman (1988).
Agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma games played on the current social network.
The strategic effects of networks result from the fact that players
can communicate via their links behavioral information about
their acquaintances. This allows for the formation of stable and
dense networks in which players can monitor efficiently other
players’ behavior and this mitigates the incentives to free-ride.
By contrast, in our model social capital emerges because players
invest in connections that generates network externalities, and
players use these externalities to punish possible deviations. Our
paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a microeconomics
foundation of the notion of structural holes.19
7 Conclusion
Free-riding problems are often solved in many economic and so-
cial interactions. We have shown that when we take into account
that individuals interact non-anonymously there is a substan-
tial overlap between individuals and social incentives. We now
discuss how the results presented in the paper are robust to the
main assumptions. We first elaborate on the impact of relaxing
the assumption that players observe fully the structure of the
network. It is easy to see that for our results to hold it is enough
18See Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) for some empirical evidence on the effect
of social capital on socioeconomic outcomes. See Dasgupta and Sarageldin (1999) for a
discussion of the main contributions on social capital in economics.
19 See Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2004) for a strategic model on structural-holes.
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that players are aware about the connections held by their direct
social contacts and the information their social contacts can po-
tentially provide. Indeed, this information is sufficient to allow
players to employ the strategy profiles used in our analysis.
Second, we have shown that efficient equilibria are best sus-
tained when the size of the society is large. It is worth noticing
that this result holds as far as the payoffs functions are increas-
ing in the amount of information a player accesses. Thus, the
fact that we consider linear payoff functions is not crucial. A
weaker case can be made if we relax the assumption of fric-
tionless information flow. Suppose we assume that non-direct
information is slightly less valuable than direct information (in-
formation flow with decay), then an efficient outcome will be a
star network where players provide information and the cost of
each link is either shared at the cooperative level (when 2c>f)
or it is borne unilaterally at the exploitative level (otherwise).
In the former case, since the central player bears the coopera-
tive cost for each link, the existence conditions for a cooperative
efficient equilibrium will be independent of the size of the popu-
lation. On the contrary, in the latter case, the results presented
in section 4 carry on qualitatively.
Third, we have explored a model where investment in links is
sunk and players cannot change their network over time. We
note that the strategy profiles use also apply on a repeated
game where the network formation and players’ interaction oc-
curs simultaneously. Finally, we elaborate on the possibility of
time-preference heterogeneous players. Our analyses shows that
in equilibrium players having different position in the networks
have different incentives. Therefore it is not crucial that players
discount the features evenly. A formal analysis of these topics is
left for future research.
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8 Appendix chapter 4
Efficient Outcomes
We start by proving Theorem 4.1, which characterizes the
efficient outcomes of the game.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We start by proving part (a), i.e.
nv + max{2c, f} > 0. We first claim that if s is efficient then
conditions (i)-(iii) hold. First, the requirement that g0 is min-
imal follows from the no-decay assumption. Second, we note
that given a minimal network, to provide information strictly
increases social welfare. Thus, condition (ii) follows. Third, con-
dition (iii) assures that the cost of each link at any period is
minimized. Fourth, we note that g0 must be connected. For a
contradiction let assume that g0 is minimal but not connected.
Consider an end-agent belonging to a component C(g0) of car-
dinality k > 1; the social welfare produced by the link with
the end-agent is 2(k − 1)v +max{2c, f} ≥ 0, which is positive
since, by assumption, s is efficient. Let us consider a strategy
sˆ which prescribes a network gˆ0, which differs from the orig-
inal network in the fact that gˆ0 has an additional link, say
between i and j, where i ∈ C(g0), j ∈ N\C(g0), and the in-
formation is exchanged in the new link. It is readily seen that
V (sˆ) − V (s) ≥ 2kv + max{2c, f}. Since 2kv + max{2c, f} >
2(k − 1)v + max{2c, f} ≥ 0, it follows that V (sˆ) − V (s) > 0.
This contradicts the fact that s is efficient. Hence, the claim
follows. We now observe that any minimally connected network
in which conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied produces a social
welfare equals to V (s) = (n−1)(nv+max{2c,f})
1−δ > 0. This proves the
part (a) of the Theorem. Part (b) follows trivially. Hence, the
proof is completed.¥
Exploitative Efficient Equilibria
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof of the Theorem is based
on the next two lemmas. Let n¯ = (v−2d)(d−f)
v2
+ 1.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c < f.
The strategy profile sE is an efficient equilibrium if and only if
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(i) δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v and (ii) (n− 1)v+ f ≥ 0. Further, if n > n¯ then
the strategy sE is an efficient equilibrium for the widest range
of parameters when g0 is a star network.
Proof.Consider the strategy sE =
©
ω0, ωE,1, ..., ωE,t, ...
ª
where
g0 is minimally connected. We first observe that, given sE, in or-
der to obtain an asymmetric efficient outcome, we need to focus
on minimally connected network where Ii,j (g0) 6= Ij,i (g0) for
any gi,j = 1. Next, we observe that, given sE, in any minimally
connected network each player pays at most the cost of one link
at the exploitative level. It is readily seen that g0 is pairwise
stable if and only if (n− 1) v + f ≥ 0.
Second, we analyse the conditions for the discount factor δ
(relative to the interaction stage). We start by noticing that,
since as soon as players realize a deviation via the information
flow they reverse their behavior to the Nash equilibrium (D, 0) ,
it follows that sE is optimal, regardless of the players’ beliefs.
This implies that to determine the parameter conditions for a
sequential equilibrium we simply need to focus on the players’
incentives on the equilibrium path.
Third, let us assume that g0 is the star network. Here, we
start by noticing that the central player, say j, does not have
any incentives to deviate from sE, since he obtains the max-
imum achievable payoff in this game, i.e. ufj
¡
sE
¢
= (n−1)v
1−δ .
Furthermore, every agent i ∈ N\{j} faces the same problem;
select then an arbitrary player i in this set. Next, we show
that i does not deviate if and only if δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v . To see this
we note that the utility agent i obtains following the strat-
egy sE is ui
¡
sE
¢
= (n−1)v+f
1−δ , and the utility if he deviates
is udi
¡
sdi , s
E
−i
¢
= (n− 1) v + d
1−δ . Therefore an equilibrium re-
quires that ui
¡
sE
¢
≥ udi
¡
sdi , s
E
−i
¢
, which is satisfied if and only
if δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v . Hence, if (n− 1) v + f ≥ 0 and δ ≥
d−f
(n−1)v the
strategy sE where g0 is a star network is an equilibrium. Differ-
ently, if g0 is not a star network, we note that there always exist
at least two end-agents; it is readily seen that an end-agent does
not deviate from sE only if δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v .
Fourth, we show that if n > n¯ the strategy sE is an equilib-
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rium for the widest range of parameters only if g0 is a star net-
work. Suppose not, then when n > n¯, (n− 1) v+f ≥ 0 and δ =
d−f
(n−1)v , the strategy s
E is an equilibrium for some minimally con-
nected network g0 different from the star. We note that in any
minimally connected network g0 it exists an agent, say j, who
has k links with k end agents (k ≥ 1) and one additional link
with a non end-agent, i.e. µdj (g
0) = k+1. The utility this player
obtains following the strategy is uj
¡
sE
¢
= (n−1)v+f
1−δ . Assume
player j deviates with the k end-agents; the utility from such
deviation is udj
¡
sdj , s
E
−j
¢
= (n− 1) v+ d
1−δ+kvδ+
kdδ2
1−δ . Since g
0 is
part of an equilibrium, it must be the case that the incentives to
deviate of an arbitrary end-agent i are weakly higher than the in-
centives of player j, i.e. udi
¡
sdi , s
E
−i
¢
≥ udj
¡
sdj , s
E
−j
¢
.20 This is sat-
isfied if and only if (n− 1) v+ d
1−δ ≥ (n− 1) v+
d
1−δ+kvδ+
kdδ2
1−δ ,
which can be rewritten as v − δ (v − d) ≤ 0. We now note that
when δ = d−f
(n−1)v the condition v− δ (v − d) = v−
(d−f)(v−d)
(n−1)v ≤ 0
if and only if n ≤ (d−f)(v−d)
v2
+ 1. Since (d−f)(v−d)
v2
+ 1 < n¯, this
contradicts the assumption that n > n¯. Hence if n > n¯ the star
network uniquely allows the strategy sE to be an equilibrium
for the widest parameter range.
This completes the proof of the Lemma.¥
We now prove that, given any strategy profile an efficient
equilibrium exists only if the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theo-
rem 4.2 are satisfied and that given that these conditions are
binding then a strategy s = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt, ...} different from
the exploitative strategy profile is not an efficient equilibrium.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c <
f. An efficient equilibrium exists only if (i) (n− 1) v + f ≥ 0
and (ii) δ ≥ (d−f)
(n−1)v . Further, given that (n− 1) v+f = 0 and δ =
(d−f)
(n−1)v , if n > n¯ every strategy s = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt...} different
from the exploitative strategy is not an efficient equilibrium.
Proof. Let f > 2c.Assume that the outcome of s = {ω0, ..., ωt, ...}
20This is true because the utility to player i and j by following the strategy profile sE
coincides.
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is efficient, i.e. g0 is a minimally connected network, all links
are paid at the exploitative level and there is complete flow
of information. We first claim that s is pairwise stable only if
(n− 1) v + f ≥ 0. In order to get the lower bound condition
to attain pairwise stability we shall assume that the strategy
s prescribes a maximal punishment in the network formation
stage, i.e. if a network gˆ 6= g0 is observed then agents play
(D, 0) in all the interactions. Then, given that players follow
s in the interaction phase the payoff of an agent when the
network g0 is formed is
(n−1)v+µd,pi (g0,s)f
1−δ , where µ
d,p
i (g
0, s) ≤
µdi (g
0) represents the links agent i pays (at the exploitative
level) given s. The best deviation of player i in the network
formation stage would be to delete all his links and obtain a
payoff 0. Hence the condition for pairwise stability is obtained
when (n− 1) v +maxi∈N µd,pi (g0, s) f ≥ 0. Given s, for any g0,
min{maxi∈N µd,pi (g0, s)} ≥ 1, thus, s is pairwise stable only if
(n− 1) v + f ≥ 0 and the claim follows.
Second, we claim that s is a sequential equilibrium only if
δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v . We note that, in order to get a lower bound on δ,
we shall consider that the strategy profile s involves maximal
punishments in case of any deviation in the interaction stage.
Such strategy should prescribe that if at some period t an agent
i ∈ N deviates in his interaction with j ∈ Ndi (g0) then j plays
aτj,i = (D, 0) ∀τ ≥ t + 1. Therefore, given s, two possibilities
may occur: (1) there is at least one end agent, say j, who pays
for his link, and (2) no end-agent pays for his link. We start
considering case (1) ; the payoff to the end-agent j, if he follows
the strategy is uj (s) =
(n−1)v+f
1−δ , and the payoff if he deviates
in his interaction is udj
¡
sdj , s−j
¢
= (n− 1) v+ d
1−δ . Agent j does
not want to deviate whenever δ ≥ d−f
(n−1)v . Hence, in this case,
our claim follows.
We now consider case (2) , i.e. no end-agent pays for his link.
Let E0 (g0) ∈ N represent the set of end-agents in g0.We claim
that there exists some player i ∈ M0 (g0) ≡ N\E0 (g0) who is
paying all his direct links. Assume for a contradiction that no
agent pays for all his links, i.e. µd,pi (g
0, s) < µdi (g
0) ∀i ∈ N .
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Since the end-agents are not paying for their links, any agent
k0 ∈ M0 (g0) linked to an agent j0 ∈ E0 (g0) is paying for the
link {j0, k0}. This implies that in case g0 has a star architecture,
the center pays for all his direct links; this is a contradiction.
Therefore, let g0 be a minimally connected network different
from the star. Let g0,1 be a network obtained by removing from
g0 all agents belonging to E0 (g0) and their corresponding links.
We note that since g0 is minimally connected, also g0,1 is mini-
mally connected. Let E1 (g0) ∈M0 (g0) be the set of end-agents
in g0,1. We note that each player j1 ∈ E1 (g0) had some link
with some end-agent in g0 and he was paying for that particular
link; since j1 is an end-agent in g0,1 and no agent pay for all his
links in g0, it follows that j1 does not pay for the link in g0,1, i.e.
there exists some player k1 ∈ M1 (g0) ≡ M0 (g0) \E1 (g0) linked
to some agent j1 ∈ E1 (g0) and such that k1 pays for the link
{j1, k1}.
We can proceed with the same reasoning defining the network
g0,2 as the resultant network from removing from g0,1 all agents
in E1 (g0) and their corresponding links. We note that g0,2 is
also minimally connected. Let E2 (g0) ∈ M1 (g0) be the set of
end-agents in g0,2. Since each j2 ∈ E2 (g0) had some link with
some end-agent in g0,1, he was paying for that particular link
and this agent just have one link in g0,2 it follows that any agent
k2 ∈ M2 (g0) ≡ M1 (g0) \E2 (g0) linked to an agent j2 ∈ E2 (g0)
is paying for that link {j2, k2}. Since the number of players is
finite, by induction we obtain that at some finite iteration period
τ , the cardinality of the set Mτ (g0) is either 1 or 2. Consider
the case Mτ (g0) = {i1}. Then this agent pays for all his links,
which contradicts our initial assumption. Now consider the case
Mτ (g0) = {i1, i,2}; note that i1 and i2 must be necessarily linked
in g0 and, therefore, one of these agents pays for all his links, a
contradiction. This proves the claim.
This claim implies that there exists some player i such that
µd,pi (g
0, s) = µdi (g
0) . Since player i is not an end agent in g0,
µdi (g
0) ≥ 2. The payoff of such agent from following the strategy
s is ui (s) =
(n−1)v+µdi (g0)f
1−δ , and the payoff from deviating in all
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his interactions, sdi , is ui
¡
sdi , s−i
¢
= (n− 1) v + µ
d
i (g0)d
1−δ . For an
equilibrium it must be the case that ui (s) ≥ ui
¡
sdi , s−i
¢
, i.e.
δ ≥ µ
d
i (g0)(d−f)
(n−1)v . We observe that since µ
d
i (g
0) ≥ 2, µ
d
i (g0)(d−f)
(n−1)v >
d−f
(n−1)v . The argument developed so far shows that conditions
(i) and (ii) are necessary for a strategy s to be an efficient
equilibrium.
We now prove that if these two conditions are binding and n >
n¯, any strategy s different from sE is not an efficient equilibrium.
Assume s = {ω0, ..., ωt, ...} is an efficient equilibrium; we start
by noting that since (n− 1) v + f = 0 and s is an efficient
equilibrium it must be the case that each player i ∈ N pays
at most for one link, i.e. each player cooperates with at most
one of his social contacts. Next, consider now an arbitrary pair
of players, say i and j, who are directly linked, g0i,j = 1, and,
without loss of generality, let us assume that Ii,j (g0) > Ij,i (g0) .
We have two possibilities, which we analyse in turn.
I.) Suppose the strategy profile s prescribes in the equilib-
rium path that player j cooperates and player i defects. In this
case, since sE and s are equivalent in the equilibrium path and
sE prescribes maximal punishments for every deviation which
eventually occurs, it follows that the incentive of player j (i) to
follow s with i (j) cannot be higher than to follow sE. In this
case, we can use Lemma 4.1 to prove the claim.
II.) Suppose that the strategy profile s prescribes in the equi-
librium path that player i cooperates and player j defects. The
utility of player i to follow s is ui (s) =
(n−1)v+f
1−δ . If player i
deviates (using his best deviation) against player j at some
period t, the utility he obtains in the continuation game is
udi
¡
sdi , s−i
¢
= (n− 1) v+ (n− 1− Ij,i (g0)) vδ+ d1−δ +
(µdi−1)dδ2
1−δ .
Nowwe claim that player i have always incentives to deviate (for
δ = d−f
(n−1)v ). To see this, let us consider the case where player i
would have the lowest incentives to deviate,21 i.e. Ij,i (g0) = n/2
21Note that player i’s incentives to deviate are decreasing in Ij,i

g0

, because it
represents the amount of information he looses when deviating (with a lag of only one
period), and these incentives are also decreasing in µdi , since when player i deviates at
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and µdi = n − 2.22 In this case, the utility of the best devia-
tion of player i becomes u¯di
¡
sdi , s−i
¢
= (n− 1) v +
¡
n−2
2
¢
vδ +
d
1−δ +
(n−2)dδ2
1−δ . We now note that ui (s) ≥ u¯di
¡
sdi , s−i
¢
if and
only if (n− 1) vδ−
¡
n−2
2
¢
vδ (1− δ)− (n− 2) dδ2 > d− f. Since
δ = d−f
(n−1)v , we can rewrite this condition as −v + δ(v − 2d) =
−v + d−f
(n−1)v (v − 2d) > 0, which is satisfied if and only if n < n¯.
This contradicts the fact that n > n¯ and completes the proof of
the Lemma.¥
The two lemmas prove the Theorem.¥
Cooperative Efficient Equilibria
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We first observe that the coopera-
tive strategy profile prescribes players to play the Nash equilib-
rium (D, 0) in any possible out-of-equilibrium path. This implies
that, to define the existence conditions of a sequential equilib-
rium, we just need to focus on individuals’ incentives in the
equilibrium path. Using this fact, the proof of the theorem is
based on two Lemmas which are stated and proved below.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c >
f. The cooperative strategy profile, sC =
©
ω0, ωC,1, ..., ωC,t, ...
ª
is an equilibrium for the widest range of parameters when g0 is
a line network. In such case, sC is an equilibrium if and only if
(n− 1) v+2c ≥ 0 and δ ≥ δ∗, where δ∗ [v + (n− 2) vδ∗ + c− d− dδ∗]+
c = 0.
Proof.
Let us consider the strategy profile sC = {ω0, ωC,1, ..., ωC,t, ...},
where g0 is a minimally connected network. We first show that
the network which is pairwise stable for the widest range of pa-
rameters is the line network. The utility a player i obtains from
following the cooperative strategy is ui
¡
sC
¢
=
(n−1)v+µdi (g0)c
1−δ ,
where µdi (g
0) ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} . Suppose player i deviates in
some period t he will have to pay a cost d in his relationship with each of his social
contacts from period t+ 2 onwards.
22Note that this situation is not possible, but we use it to get a lower bound in the
incentives to deviate.
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the network formation stage. Since players play defection and
withhold information in the interaction phase if a network dif-
ferent from g0 is observed, it is clear that the best deviation
of player i is to delete any link he has and, doing so, player
i obtains zero utility. Thus, player i follows sC if and only if
ui
¡
sC
¢
≥ 0, which is equivalent to (n− 1) v + µdi (g0) c ≥ 0.
This implies that in any minimally connected network g0 the
player who has the highest incentive to deviate in the network
formation stage is player j, such that µdj (g
0) = maxi∈N µdi (g
0) .
We now observe that in the line network µdj
¡
gline
¢
= 2 < µdj (g
0)
for any minimally connected network g0 different from the line.
It is readily seen that, given sC, where g0 is the line network, the
network g0 is pairwise stable if and only if (n− 1) v + 2c ≥ 0.
We now analyse the conditions for the discount factor δ (rel-
ative to the interaction stage). Let us assume that g0 is the
line network. We first show that the player who has the high-
est incentive to deviate in the interaction phase is either an
end-agent, say i, or a player linked with an end agent, say j.
Consider an end agent i, then the utility this player obtains fol-
lowing the strategy is ui
¡
sC
¢
= (n−1)v+c
1−δ . If player i deviates in
the interaction stage, his utility would be (n − 1)v + c
1−δ ; thus
a deviation is not profitable when δ ≥ δ¯ ≡ −c
(n−1)v−d . Next, con-
sider a player j linked with an end-agent; we note that player
j has two links: one with an end-agent, say i, and one with a
non-end agent, say j0. The utility of player j from following the
strategy uj
¡
sC
¢
= (n−1)v+2c
1−δ . At any period t, player j has two
relevant possible deviations. One, player j may deviate only with
player i at period t and deviate with player j0 in period t + 1;
let us denote this deviation strategy as sd1j , then u
d1
j
¡
sd1j , s
C
−j
¢
=
(n− 1) v+(n− 2) vδ+c+ dδ
1−δ +
dδ2
1−δ . Two, player j may deviate
both with player i and j0 at period t; let us denote this devia-
tion strategy as sd2j , then u
d2
j
¡
sd2j , s
C
−j
¢
= (n− 1) v + 2dδ
1−δ .
23 We
23Player j may also deviate only with player i at period t. However, this deviation
is strictly dominated by the deviation sd1j . Finally, player j may deviate with player j
0
at period t and either deviate with i at period t + 1 or not. These two possibilities are
strictly dominated by sd2j .
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now observe that any other player who is neither an end-agent
nor a player linked with an end-agent, say j0, has a link with
two non end-agents and he may deviate similarly to player j: to
deviate only with the agent who is closest to an end agent of
the line, say sd1j0 , and to deviate with both of his social contacts,
say sd2j0 . It is readily seen that u
d1
j (s
d1
j , s
C
−j) > u
d1
j0 (s
d1
j0 , s
C
−j0) and
ud2j (s
d2
j , s
C
−j) = u
d2
j0 (s
d2
j0 , s
C
−j0). This proves the claim.
Second, we claim that agent j has a higher incentive to devi-
ate as compared to player i. Above we have shown that player
i follows sC if and only if δ > δ¯. We now investigate the in-
centive of player j. Assume δ > δ¯, then ud1j ≥ ud2j if and
only if δ ≥ δˆ ≡ −c
(n−2)v−d > δ¯. Player j follows s
C if and
only if uj
¡
sC
¢
≥ ud1j
¡
sd1j , s
C
−j
¢
, which is equivalent to δ[v +
(n− 2) vδ + c − d − dδ] + c ≥ 0. Let us define the following
function: Υ (δ) = δ[v + (n− 2) vδ + c − d − dδ] + c. We note
that ∂Υ(δ)
∂δ
> 0 and using the fact that c = dδˆ − (n− 2) vδˆ. we
observe that Υ
³
δˆ
´
= − (n− 3) vδˆ < 0. Hence for δ ≤ δˆ player
j has incentives to deviate. This proves the claim. Moreover we
can state the condition for player j not to deviate. Since when
δ > δˆ, the best deviation of player j is sd1j , for an equilibrium
we need that δ ≥ δ∗, where δ∗ > δˆ is such that Υ (δ∗) = 0.
We now claim that in any other minimally connected net-
work g0 different from the line, say g0, if δ < δ∗, sC is not
an equilibrium. We observe that in any minimally connected
network it must be the case that there exist a player, say j00
who has k links with k end agents (k ≥ 1) and one addi-
tional link, which may be either with a non end-agent, or with
an end-agent (this last case would only be possible with the
star network). Here we have two possibilities. One, if k = 1
then the incentives to deviate of player j00 are the same that
the incentives of a player linked with an end-agent in a line
network (player j above); in this case the claim follows. Two,
k ≥ 2; by construction µdj00 (g0) = k + 1 and the utility player
j00 obtains following sC is uj0
¡
sC
¢
= (n−1)v+(k+1)c
1−δ . Let us as-
sume that player j00 deviates in his interactions with the k end-
118 4. Exploitation and cooperation in networks
agents at some period t and with the remaining player at period
t + 1, sdkj00 . The utility from such deviation is u
dk
j00
¡
sdkj00 , s
C
−j00
¢
=
(n− 1) v+(n− 1− k) vδ+c+kdδ+dδ2
1−δ . Therefore player j
00 follows
sC if and only if uj00
¡
sC
¢
≥ udkj00
¡
sdkj00 , s
C
−j00
¢
, which is analogous
to δ[kv + (n− 1− k) vδ + c − kd − dδ] ≥ −kc. We now show
that when δ = δ∗, player j00 deviates. To see this we note that
Υ (δ∗) = 0 implies that −c = δ∗[v+(n− 2) vδ∗+c−d−dδ∗]. As-
sume for a contradiction that player j0 does not want to deviate
at δ∗, i.e. δ∗[kv+(n− 1− k) vδ∗+c−kd−dδ∗] ≥ −kc. If, in the
RHS, we substitute −c from the equation Υ (δ∗) = 0 we obtain
δ∗[kv+(n− 1− k) vδ∗+ c− kd− dδ∗] ≥ −kδ∗[v+(n− 2) vδ∗+
c− d− dδ∗]⇔ δ∗ ≤ −c
(n−1)v−d , which is a contradiction since we
have already shown that δ∗ > δˆ > δ¯ = −c
(n−1)v−d . This proves the
claim.
This completes the proof of the Lemma.¥
Lemma 4.4. Suppose (4.1) and (4.2) hold and assume 2c >
f. Consider the set of strategies S∗ ⊂ S which result in the
asymmetric efficient outcome. If a strategy s ∈ S∗ with g0 = g
is an equilibrium, then sE with g0 = g is also an equilibrium.
Proof.
Assume 2c > f. To prove this, it is enough to show that
sC is a maximal punishment strategy profile. To see this note
that if a player, say i, deviates in the network formation stage,
he receives the worst possible outcome from period 1 onwards
(because aτj,i = (D, 0), ∀j ∈ Ndi (g) , τ ≥ 1). If player i devi-
ates in the interaction stage, at some period t then the players
with whom player i deviates directly realize the deviation, and
hence they play (D, 0) from period t + 1, while the remaining
social contacts realize the deviation at t + 1 and hence they
play (D, 0) from period t+ 2 onwards. Clearly, given the infor-
mational structure, player i receives the maximum punishment
when he deviates. This completes the proof.¥
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 prove the Theorem.¥
This is page 119
Printer: Opaque this
Consumers networks and
search equilibria
1 Introduction
A large body of empirical work shows that in the market a va-
riety of informal relationships complement the price system in
coordinating the interaction among buyers and sellers. For ex-
ample, in marketing it is well established that consumers obtain
much of their information via their social contacts (Feick and
Price (1986, 1987)). In relation to this, firms have increasingly
recognised the need for using informal channels as a way to
market their products. The practice of consumers referral is an
example;1 according to the Direct Selling Association (1999), an-
nual sales of firms that rely entirely on consumer referral grew
from 13 billion to nearly 23 billion dollars between 1991 and
1998. Similarly, in the process of finding a job people heavily
rely on their social contacts in order to obtain information about
job opportunities (Granovetter (1974)). In medicine, and other
specialised fields, professional networks shape the adoption of
new technologies (Coleman 1966).
These examples share a common feature: informal relation-
ships connecting agents transform the information that each in-
dividual privately obtains into a public good, and this affects
players’ incentives as well as aggregate outcomes. This fact rep-
resents the primary motivation for the development of a the-
ory studying the interplay between network relationships and
market performance. This paper focuses on the role of local in-
formation sharing in shaping the information available in the
economy, firms’ pricing behavior, social welfare and consumer
surplus.
We examine a duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983).
1Firms provide different sorts of benefits such as discounts to clients who bring new
customers.
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On the supply side of the market there are two firms producing
a homogeneous good. Firms set prices so as to maximize prof-
its. Consumers have a common willingness to pay for the good
and buy at most a single unit. The only way for a transaction
to take place is that consumers have some information about
prices. Consumers may individually search for price quotations
and, in this case, they must pay a fixed search cost for each
price quotation observed. In addition, consumers are embedded
in a social network and they share information freely with their
direct neighbors. To maintain symmetry on the consumers side
we assume that each consumer holds the same number of con-
nections, say k.2 Once each consumer has searched, the informa-
tion observed is freely provided to his direct neighbors and then
transactions take place. The game is a one-shot simultaneous
move game: firms set prices and consumers decide how many
searches to make at the same moment. We focus on symmetric
Nash equilibria.3
When the network is empty (or inactive), i.e. k = 0, we ob-
tain the duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). By con-
trast, the possibility of sharing information, i.e. k > 0, creates
information externalities across consumers. These externalities
have two main effects on the functioning of the market. On the
one hand, for a given search efforts, they increase the likelihood
with which a consumer compare prices, thereby increasing firms’
competition. On the other hand, they create incentives for con-
sumers to free-ride on each other. It is exactly the interplay
between local information sharing and market competitiveness
to be the focus of the present paper. We shall show that, in more
dense networks, consumers search less intensively. This may de-
crease the total information generated in the economy even if
consumers are more connected. In such a case, firms charge on
average higher prices. Furthermore, we shall show that an in-
crease in the density of the network does not always enhance
2Thus, the consumer network is a regular graph with degree k.
3We shall discuss strategy profiles where consumers search asymmetrically in Section
6.
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social efficiency as well as consumer surplus.
We start by noticing that equilibria exhibit price dispersion.
More interestingly, for any positive degree of the network there
are two types of price dispersed equilibria. The first is a high
search intensity equilibrium, where consumers randomize be-
tween searching for one price and for two prices. This equilib-
rium exists for low search costs. The other is a low search inten-
sity equilibrium, where consumers randomize between searching
for one price and not searching at all, and it exists for moderate
search costs. By contrast, when consumers do not share infor-
mation (the network is empty) only the former equilibrium is
strategically viable. The low search intensity equilibrium arises
because even a consumer who does not search may observe two
price quotations, thereby creating the tension between some con-
sumers over which firms have monopoly power and others con-
sumers over which firms compete for. In what follows we discuss
the properties of these equilibria. In particular, we are interested
in the effect of an increase in the degree of the network on the
consumers’ search intensity, expected prices, social welfare and
consumer surplus.
Let us first comment on the high search intensity equilibrium.
Given that the degree of the network is strictly positive, this
equilibrium exists for sufficiently low search costs. Further, as
the degree of the network increases, the existence region of this
equilibrium shrinks. The intuition is that richer network rela-
tionships reduce the marginal gains of searching twice instead of
once. Thus, for sufficiently high search costs, consumers cannot
be indifferent between the two searching alternatives. Second,
we show that the equilibrium expected price is higher when the
network is more dense. The intuition is based on two consider-
ations. On the one hand, an increase in the degree of the net-
work increases information externalities across consumers, ce-
teris paribus. Since consumers compare prices more often, firms’
competition augments. On the other hand, consumers react to
an increase in the number of connections by free-riding more
on each other. This decreases information externalities. The re-
sult follows because the latter effect dominates the former, a
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fact which leads firms to compete less frequently and thereby to
charge on average higher prices.
Thirdly, we show that social welfare is higher, while consumer
surplus is lower, when the consumers network is more dense. The
increase in social welfare is due to the strategic substitutabil-
ity between searching and network degree, and to the fact that
consumers are active with probability one. The former effect re-
duces the waste in search costs, while the second ensures that,
in equilibrium, each possible transaction is indeed realized. The
decrease in consumer surplus is due to the fact that firms price
less aggressively when consumers hold more connections.
We finally turn to discuss the low search intensity equilibrium.
This equilibrium exists for moderate search costs; further, for a
given regular network, the lowest search costs for which this
equilibrium exists equals the highest search cost for which the
high search intensity equilibrium exists. Secondly, in sharp con-
trast with the previous equilibrium, an increase in the degree of
the network lowers the expected equilibrium price. The intuition
behind this result is that in the low search intensity equilibrium
when a consumer free-rides he takes the risk to do not observe
even one price. This has a substantial impact on the utility of
the consumer and as a consequence it mitigates the tempta-
tion of consumers to free-ride on each other. As a result, richer
consumers connections make consumers more likely to compare
prices and this enhances firms’ competition. Even if network re-
lationships are beneficial for consumers, i.e. consumer surplus
increases, they decrease social welfare. The reason is that the
number of realized transactions in equilibrium decreases, an ef-
fect which offsets the saving on search costs.
The present model relates to two branches of the economic
literature: the theory of networks and the search theory. We
start by discussing the contribution of this paper to the theory
of networks. The massive empirical documentation of network
effects is behind the increasing theoretical attention of the ef-
fect of decentralized interactions on a variety of settings such
as strategic partnering and competition, variations in criminal-
ity activity, local public good problems, income inequality and
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unemployment.4 All these studies (including mine) belong to
a new general class of games in which the economic activity
of players is embedded in a network, which affects non trivially
their incentives. In this perspective, the main contribution of the
current paper is the study of the interplay between consumers
connections and market functioning. The works which come
closer to mine are Bramoulle and Kranton (2003) and Goyal
and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). Bramoulle and Kranton (2004)
examine a model of social learning where individuals search
costly for new information and the results of their searching
are non-excludable along links. While in their model the benefit
each consumer obtains by searching is exogenously given, in the
present paper it is the outcome of firms’ competition. Goyal and
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) analyse a game where, prior competi-
tion, firms form pairwise agreement for the development of new
products and they set an R&D effort which is costly and pro-
vide a reduction of the marginal production cost. They find that
the R&D effort a firm chooses in each agreement is decreasing
in the effort that the partner firm sets and that this free-riding
effect may lead to inefficient market outcomes. While Goyal and
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) focus on the impact of network rela-
tionships on the supply side of the market, the current paper
focuses on information externalities across consumers.
The consumer search literature is well established in eco-
nomics.5 We have already discussed above the relation between
the present paper and the model of Burdett and Judd (1983).
Another paper which comes close to mine is Janssen andMoraga-
Gonzalez (2003). They study a version of Burdett and Judd
(1983) where consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous: one fraction
of consumers are fully informed, while the remaining fraction
must search costly to obtain price information. Increasing the
4For example, Calvo and Jackson (2004a, 2004b) study of the effect of social networks
on employment and inequality. Bala and Goyal (1998) examine the effect of network on
learning. Kranton and Minehart (2000,2001) study buyer and seller networks. Goyal and
Joshi (2003) investigate the effect of networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Ballester,
Calvo and Zenou (2004) study the in impact of networks in criminality activities.
5 See, among others, Anderson and Renault (2000), Bester (1994), Braverman (1980),
Burdett and Coles (1997), Morgan and Manning (1985) and Stahl (1989,1996).
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fraction of fully informed consumers creates positive externali-
ties for all consumers by boosting competitiveness and therefore
lowering the expected price. The present paper provides a simple
way of endogenizing information externalities across consumers
using network relationships and it shows that this may create
negative consumers externalities which have non trivial effects
on the functioning of the market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we de-
fine formally the model. Section 3 provides a preliminary equilib-
rium analysis. Section 4 and 5 characterize equilibria. Section 6
briefly discusses asymmetric equilibria and Section 7 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
We examine a model of non-sequential search where consumers
are embedded in a network of connections. On the supply side
there are N = 2 firms producing a homogeneous good at con-
stant returns to scale. We normalize their identical unit produc-
tion cost to zero, without loss of generality.
On the supply side instead, there is a finite number of con-
sumers, which we denote asm.All consumers are identical. They
want to buy a single unit of the product and their maximum
willingness to pay is p˜ > 0. For a transaction to take place, con-
sumers must observe at least one price quotation. A consumer
may search simultaneously, the cost for each search being c > 0,
where c < p˜. In addition, the price information each consumer
obtains is freely provided to his neighbors. For the same of sym-
metry on the consumers side, I assume that the consumer net-
work is a regular graph. Thus, the degree of the network, say k,
may vary between 0 to m− 1, and it represents the number of
connections each consumer holds.6
We note that, when k = 0, the model is equivalent to a
duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). By contrast, as
6A regular graph may not exist when m is odd. Hence, in the paper we assume that
m is even.
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k becomes positive, consumers strategically choose their search
intensity, taking into account that the information their neigh-
bors obtain is non-excludable along direct links. This clearly af-
fects the individual incentives and, therefore, the market equi-
librium outcomes. It is exactly on the interplay between the
externalities produced by the consumers network and market
performance that we focus in the present paper.7
Firms and consumers know the architecture of the network
and play a simultaneous move game. An individual firm chooses
its price, taking the price choices of its rivals, as well as con-
sumers’ search behaviors as given. We denote a firm’s strategy
by the price distribution F (p) defined on a support σ; let p and p¯
be the lowerbound and the upperbound of σ, respectively. Con-
sumers form conjectures about the firms’ price behavior and
decide how many price observations to pay for. Once each con-
sumer has searched, information is transmitted to the immediate
neighbors. A strategy profile for a consumer is then a probability
distribution over the set {0, 1, 2} .8 We denote as qi,x the proba-
bility of consumer i to search x time; thus a consumer’s strategy
is {qx}x∈{0,1,2} . We will consider symmetric Nash equilibria.9
3 Preliminary analysis
Let us first analyse the existence and characterization of equi-
libria in which consumers adopt symmetric pure strategies.
Proposition 5.1. For any k ≥ 0 and c > 0, the only equilib-
ria in which consumers use symmetric pure strategy take the fol-
lowing form: consumers never search, q0 = 1, and firms charge
a price p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜] .
7We are assuming that consumers surely provide the information to his neighbours.
This represents a situation where local communication across consumers is perfect. More
generally, we could relax this assumption by assuming that local information sharing
occurs with some probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). In this new setting the results we shall present
further will qualitatively carry on.
8 It is clear that the restriction of the consumers’ strategy set to {0, 1, 2} does not
affect the equilibrium characterization. Indeed, for a consumer to search more than twice
is a strictly dominated strategy.
9Asymmetric equilibria are discussed in Section 6.
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The proof relies on two facts. One, if consumers search surely
for one price quotations, then they either prefer to decrease their
search activity (if search cost are sufficiently high) or to search
more (otherwise). Two, if consumers search surely for two price
quotations, then firms’ competition will drive prices to marginal
cost. This creates incentive for consumers to search less. This
proposition pushes us towards investigating those equilibria in
which consumers use a mixed strategy. The next proposition
shows the possible candidates for an equilibrium.
Proposition 5.2. In any equilibrium in which consumers em-
ploy a symmetric mixed strategy firms price accordingly to an
atomless price distribution, F (p) , defined on a convex support
σ. Moreover, if k = 0 then q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1), while if
k > 0, then either q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or q0 + q1 = 1,
q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) .
There are two main observations which follow from Proposi-
tion 5.2. The first is that, despite the fact that consumers are
fully homogenous, price dispersion arises in all equilibria. Since
consumers search randomly, some consumers in the market are
ex-post more informed than others. In line with Burdett and
Judd (1983), this allows firms to extract profits by randomizing
their prices. Second and more interestingly, when the network
does not play any role, e.g. k = 0, consumers must randomize
between searching for one price and two prices for an equilib-
rium to be obtained. We refer to this as high search intensity.
However, when local information sharing is taken into account,
another equilibrium candidate emerges where consumers ran-
domize between searching once and not searching at all. We
call this possibility low search intensity. The intuition for this
is that the presence of network relationships allow that, with
some probability, even consumers who do not search at all ob-
serve both firms’ prices. This creates the tension between some
consumers over which firms have monopoly power and others
consumers over which firms compete for.
We shall now characterize the high search intensity equilib-
rium and low search intensity equilibrium. For each equilib-
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rium candidate we first characterize firms’ behavior, taking con-
sumers’ strategy as exogenous. In this way, we illustrate the di-
rect effect that networks have on the strategic way firms price.
Next, we endogenize consumers’ behavior in order to character-
ize equilibria. Finally, we analyse the impact of network density
on the consumers’ search intensity, firms’ pricing behavior, so-
cial welfare and consumer surplus. Taken together, this analysis
will clarify the effect of local information sharing on market
competitiveness.
4 High search intensity
Suppose consumers randomize between searching once and search-
ing twice, i.e. q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 > 0. The expected number of
consumers who observe only the price of firm i, say Di, and the
expected number of fully informed consumers, say Di,j, can be
written as
Di (k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
(5.1)
Di,j (k, q1) = m
µ
1− q
k+1
1
2k
¶
(5.2)
A consumer obtains only the price of firm i (expression (5.1))
when he and all his neighborhood observe only the price of firm
i, (q1/2)k+1. Further, a consumer observes only the price of firm
j with the same probability that a consumer observes only the
price of firm i, i.e. Di = Dj. Finally, with the remaining proba-
bility (expression (5.2)), a consumer observes both prices. It is
readily seen that for a given q1, the more dense the network (i.e.
the higher k), the smaller the fraction of partially informed con-
sumers, and the higher the fraction of fully informed consumers.
Using (5.1) and (5.2), the expected profit to firm i is
Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Di (k, q1) pi +Di,j (k, q1) pi [1− F (pi; k, q1)]
(5.3)
The next Proposition summarizes equilibrium pricing by firms,
given the consumers’ behaviour fixed.
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Proposition 5.3. Assume q1 + q2 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 1, 2.
In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q1) = 1−
qk+11
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢ p˜− p
p
, ∀p ∈ [ q
k+1
1
2k+1 − qk+11
p˜, p˜]
Furthermore, F (p; k, q1) dominates in the first order stochastic
sense F (p; k + 1, q1) , k = 0, ...,m− 1.
Not surprisingly, Proposition 5.3 shows that it is possible to
rank the price distributions with respect to k in the first-order
stochastic sense: F (p, k, q1) first order stochastically dominates
F (p; k + 1, q1) . Therefore, as k increases, firms charge on av-
erage lower prices. The intuition is as follows: when consumers
hold more connections, information externalities are higher, ce-
teris paribus. This implies that consumers compare prices more
often and thereby firms compete more. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the equilibrium price distribution for different levels of network
density.
K=0
K=1
K=2
Figure 51. Price distribution
We now endogenize the consumers side. We denote asE(p) the
expected price obtained by randomly sampling one price from
the distribution of prices F, while Emin(p) indicates the expected
minimum price obtained by randomly sampling two prices. The
expected utilities to a consumer from the two distinct searching
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alternatives are:10
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k
¶
Emin (p)− c(5.4)
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c (5.5)
In words, an arbitrary consumer j who searches once, expres-
sion (5.4), observes only one price quotation when all his social
contacts are searching once, qk1 , and each of them observes the
same price quotation that j observes, 1/2k. With the remain-
ing probability consumer j is fully informed. In equilibrium a
consumer should be indifferent between the two different search
alternatives, i.e. Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) . This leads to the
following equilibrium condition:
qk1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] = c (5.6)
Each consumer trades-off the marginal cost of searching once
more, c, with its marginal gain. The marginal gain of searching
twice instead of once is the difference between buying at the
expected price and at the expected minimum price, i.e. E(p)−
Emin(p), weighted for the probability with which a consumer
who searches for one price will indeed observe only one price
quotation, i.e. qk1/2
k. When the network is empty, i.e. k = 0,
the marginal gain becomes the difference between the expected
price and the expected minimum price.
The next result provides the full characterization of the high
intensity search equilibrium for any given k = 0, ...,m − 1. Let
c¯ (k) = 1
2k(2k+1−2)
³
2k+1
2k+1−2 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2
´
.
Theorem 5.1. If k = 0 there exists a c˜ > 0 such that for
any c ∈ (0, c˜) a stable high search intensity equilibrium exists
where firms behave according to Proposition 4.1 and q∗1 is the
smallest solution of (5.6). If k > 0, there exists c¯ (k) < c˜ such
10More precisely expression 5.4 (resp. 5.5) indicates the expected utility to a consumer
i who searches for one price quotation (resp. for two price quotations), given that all
other consumers are searching for one price quotation with probability q1, and for two
price quotations with the remaining probability, 1− q1.
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that for any c ∈ (0, c¯ (k)) a high intensity search equilibrium
exists where firms behave according to Proposition 4.1 and q∗1
is the unique solution of (5.6). Furthermore, this equilibrium is
stable.
We first elaborate on the existence condition of this equilib-
rium. Figure 5.2a below illustrates the equilibrium condition for
different level of k. In the Figure we plot the LHS of expression
(5.6) for different level of k as a function of q1. Figure 5.2b above
illustrates that the function c¯ (k) decreases in k.
C(1)
C(2)
K=0
K=1
K=2
C(k)
Figure 5.2a. Figure 5.2b.
As already discussed, when k = 0 the model is equivalent
to the duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). In this
case, for a given c there are at most two equilibria, but only
one is stable. Differently, when we introduce information shar-
ing, there is a unique solution of the equilibrium condition (5.6),
which is also stable. The first effect of information sharing is that
the high intensity search equilibrium exists only when search-
ing is relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, as k increases this
equilibrium exists for smaller and smaller search costs. The in-
tuition is as follows. Network externalities reduce the marginal
gains of searching twice instead of once, thereby for search costs
sufficiently high a consumer cannot be indifferent between the
two searching alternatives. The decrease in the marginal gains
is due to two effects. The first is that richer network connec-
tions increase the probability of a consumer who searches once
to compare prices, and the second is that the difference between
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the expected price and the expected minimum price decreases
in k.
We now turn to analyse the effect of consumers network on
search incentives, expected prices, consumer surplus and social
welfare. The next proposition summarizes the findings.
Proposition 5.4. Suppose we move from k to k + 1, k ∈
[1, ...,m− 2] and assume that c < c¯ (k + 1). Then: (a) con-
sumers search less frequently, i.e. q2 decreases, (b) expected price
increases (c) social welfare increases and (d) consumer surplus
decreases.
We would like to elaborate on three aspects of this local com-
parative static result. The first is that consumers search inten-
sity decreases as the network becomes denser: an increase in
the network degree leads consumers to free-ride more on each
other. Secondly, this has a somewhat surprising effect on the
equilibrium pricing behavior of firms: expected price is higher
in settings where consumers have more connections. The intu-
ition is the following. An increase in the degree of the consumers
network induces two effects. The first is highlighted in Propo-
sition 5.3 and it tells us that, keeping constant the consumers’
behavior, an increase in the number of connections increases
the expected number of fully informed consumers. The second
is a free-riding effect: more connections lead players to search
less intensively and this results in a decrease of the expected
number of fully informed consumers. When consumers search
intensively, the free-riding effect offsets the former effect and as
a consequence firms price less aggressively. In Figure 5.3a below
we plot the probability of a consumer who searches once to be
fully informed in equilibrium. In line with the intuition above,
Figure 5.3a shows that for a given search cost the information in
the market decreases when the degree of the network increases.
Figure 5.3b shows how the expected price varies with respect to
the degree of the network in equilibrium.
Next, we note that consumer surplus decreases. This follows
by noting that not only the expected price decreases but the
same holds for the expected minimum price. Finally, we show
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that an increase in the degree of the network enhances social
efficiency. This is due to the fact that the free-riding effect leads
to saving on the total search cost, yet, since consumers search
surely, each possible transaction is realized in equilibrium.
K=3
K=2
K=1
c
K=3
K=2
K=1
c
Probability of being fully informed Expected Price
Figure 5.3a. Figure 5.3b.
5 Low search intensity
We now analyse the case in which consumers randomize between
searching once and not searching at all, i.e. q0+ q1 = 1, q0, q1 >
0. We start by considering consumers’ behavior as exogenously
given. The expected fraction of consumers who observe only the
price of firm i, say Di, is:
Di (k, q0) =
m (1− q0)
2
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
(5.7)
+mq0
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
The the expected fraction of fully informed consumers, say
Di,j, is:
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Di,j (k, q0) = m (1− q0)
Ã
1−
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
(5.8)
+mq
Ã
1− qk0 − 2
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
The interpretation of expression (5.7) is as follows: the first
term denotes the fraction of consumers who have searched once
on their own and found firm i, i.e. m(1 − q0)/2, and that they
have either received the same information or no information
from their neighbors; the second term indicates the fraction of
consumers who did not search, but that have received the price
information of firm i from some of their social contacts. Expres-
sion (5.8) as a similar interpretation. Expressions (5.7) and (5.8)
can be rewritten as follows:
Di (k, q0) =
m
h
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
i
2k+1
(5.9)
Di,j (k, q0) =
m
h
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
i
2k
(5.10)
Thus, the expected profit of firm i is:
Eπ (pi, pj; k, q0) = Di (k, q0) pi +Di (k, q0) pi [1− F (pi; k, q0)]
(5.11)
The next Proposition summarizes the firms’ price behavior in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5.5. Assume q0 + q1 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 0, 1.
In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q0) = 1−
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2
³
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
´ p˜− p
p
,
∀p ∈
"
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2k+1 − (1 + q0)k+1
p˜, p˜
#
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Furthermore, F (p; k, q0) dominates in the first order stochastic
sense F (p; k + 1, q0).
As in the high intensity search equilibrium, an increase in the
degree of the network has a direct effect on the way firms price:
the higher the density of the network, the lower the expected
price. This is illustrated in the Figure 5.4 below.
K=1
K=2
K=3
Figure 5.4. Price distribution
We now endogenize the consumers’ search behavior. Let α (q0, k) =Pk
x=0
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x
and β (q0, k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x−1 ; the util-
ity a consumer gets from the two distinct search alternatives is:
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜− α (q0, k)E (p)− (1− α (q0, k))Emin (p)− c(5.12)
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− β (q0, k)E (p)− (5.13)
−(1− qk0 − β (q0, k))Emin (p)
The interpretation of expression (5.12) is the following. Since
a consumer searches once on its own he always buys: he buys
at the expected price whenever his neighbors provide redundant
or no information; otherwise he buys at the expected minimum
price. Differently, a consumer who does not search, expression
(5.13), buys only when at least one of his social contact searches,¡
1− qk0
¢
. The expressions (5.12) and (5.13) can be rewritten as
follows:
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Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
(1 + q0)
k
2k
E (p)− (5.14)
−
Ã
2k − (1 + q0)k
2k
!
Emin (p)− c
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
−
Ã
(1 + q0)
k − 2kqk0
2k−1
!
E (p)−(5.15)
−
Ã
2k−1
¡
1 + q0k
¢
− (1 + q0)k
2k−1
!
Emin (p)
In equilibrium every consumer must be indifferent between
searching once and not searching at all, i.eEu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q0 = 1) .
This condition is satisfied if and only if:
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] + qk0 (p˜−Emin (p)) = c
(5.16)
The interpretation of (5.16) is similar to the interpretation of
(5.6). The next result shows that for moderate value of search
costs there exists at least a stable low intensity search equilib-
rium.
Theorem 5.2. For any k > 0 there exists a c˜ such that for
any c ∈ (c¯ (k) , c˜) a stable low intensity search equilibrium exists
where firms behave according to Proposition 5.5 and q∗0 is the
smallest solution of (5.16).
Theorem 5.2 tells us that for moderate search costs there ex-
ists at least a stable solution of the equilibrium condition (5.16).
The proof in the appendix also shows that there always exists at
least another solution of the equilibrium condition (5.16), which
however is not stable. Further, numerical simulations reveal that
these are the only two possible solutions.11 In what follows we
11We have run numerical simulations of the equilibrium condition (5.16) for k =
1, ..., 100. The simulations reveal that there are at most two solutions, among which
only the smaller one is stable.
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focus on the stable equilibrium. We start with a discussion of
the existence of the low intensity search equilibrium. In Figure
5.5 below we plot the LHS of the equilibrium condition (5.16)
with respect to q0 for different levels of k.
K=1
K=2
K=3
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
Figure 5.5
We note that for any positive k the stable low intensity search
equilibrium exists for search costs which are higher than c¯ (k) .
Moreover, when the search cost is exactly equal to c¯ (k) in equi-
librium consumers search once with probability one and the low
intensity and high intensity search equilibrium coincide.12
We now turn to examine the local comparative statics with re-
spect to k. The intractability of the equilibrium condition (5.16),
leads us to rely on numerical simulations. The findings are sum-
marized in the following remark. 13
Remark 5.1. Suppose we move from k to k+ 1 and assume
that c ∈ (c (k) , c˜). Then: (a) consumers search less frequently,
i.e. q0 increases, (b) expected price decreases, (c) social welfare
decreases and (d) consumer surplus increases.
12 It is readily seen that the price distributions in Proposition 4.1 and 5.1 and the
equilibrium conditions (5.6) and (5.16) coincide when q1 = 1 (i.e. q0 = 1).
13We have run simulations for k = 1, ..., 100. For any k we first determine the range of
the search costs for which the stable equilibrium exists (the smaller solution of (5.16)),
say [c1(k), c2(k)]. Next, for each c ∈ [c1(k), c2(k)], we derive the stable solution of equa-
tion (5.16), q0 (k, c). Finally, using this value we compute the expected price , social
welfare and consumer surplus.
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The numerical simulations confirm that consumers free-ride
more on each other in denser networks. However, in sharp con-
trast with the high search intensity equilibrium, the effect on
the way firms strategically price is reverse: the higher the den-
sity of the network, the lower the expected price. This difference
is due to the fact that in the low search intensity equilibrium if
a consumer does not search he may be fully ignorant ex-post.
This mitigates the free-riding effects among consumers. Thus,
when the degree of the network increases the expected num-
ber of fully informed consumers in the economy increases. As
firms compete more often for consumers, they charge on aver-
age lower prices. Figure 5.6a below shows the expected price
for different network degrees in equilibrium. Figure 5.6b illus-
trates the equilibrium probability of not searching for different
network degrees.
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Figure 5.6a.
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Figure 5.6b.
Next, we note that total social welfare is decreasing in the
density of the network. Figure 5.6c plot the social welfare for
different degrees of the network. The reason is that when the
search cost is moderate, a consumer who completely relies on
his connections takes the risk to be ex-post completely ignorant
about prices. In such a case a transaction does not take place and
this generates a substantial decrease in social welfare. When the
degree of the network increases this negative effect dominates
the realized savings in search cost and therefore the overall so-
cial welfare decreases. Finally, even if social welfare decreases,
consumers surplus increases in the density of the network. Fig-
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ure 5.6d depicts the consumer surplus for different degrees of the
network. Two are the reasons behind this result. The expected
price and expected minimum price decrease in the density of
the network. Further, the overall increase of information shared
in the network leads consumers to be more likely to compare
prices.
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Figure 5.6c. Figure 5.6d.
6 Discussion: asymmetric strategies
The analyses we have developed so far is based on two main
restrictions: symmetric strategy and symmetric networks. The
main implication of these two restrictions is that for a given
regular network of degree of k consumers in different network
positions have identical incentives whatever the architecture of
the network is. In different words, given two symmetric net-
works with common degree but different architectures the equi-
librium characterization is identical. This is clearly an appeal-
ing property as it allows me to perform a standard compara-
tive static analyses to investigate how local information sharing
affects market functioning when the network becomes denser.
However, a number of interesting questions arise when we allow
the network to play a more serious role in the model. A natural
way of doing this is to analyse equilibria where consumers em-
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ploy asymmetric pure strategy.14 With some abuse of notation
we will refer to these strategy profiles as asymmetric strategies.
We shall provide an example to illustrate the nature of asym-
metric equilibria and a number of interesting questions which
arise.15
Consider a population composed of 8 consumers. Figure 5.7
depicts two symmetric networks with equal degree 4. The net-
work on the LHS represents a social structure with overlapping
neighborhoods, while the graph on the RHS represents a social
structure where each consumer has links with their immediate
neighborhood as well as more distant links (short-cuts). A black
node indicates a consumer who searches once, while a white node
an inactive consumer.
Overlapping 
Neighbourhoods Short-cutsFigure 5.7
It is possible to show that the depicted pattern of consumers’
search in each of the network is the only possible pattern for
an asymmetric equilibrium to exist. It is also easy to show that
an equilibrium exists where firms price randomly in both situa-
tions. There are three remarks worth doing. The first is that in
both networks only specialized equilibria exist: some consumers
search once (expert consumers), while others do not search at
all (free-rider consumers). This contrasts with the findings of
Bramoulle and Kranton (2004), who show that also distributed
(and mixed) equilibria arise.16 The reason for these differences
14Other possibilities are discussed in the conclusion.
15A formal and complete analyses of asymmetric equilibria is out of the scope of
the current study. A general analyses is in a companion note Galeotti (2004), which is
available upon request to the author.
16Rougly speaking a distributed configuration in this model is one where there are
consumers who search surely but with different search intensities.
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is that in the current paper the benefits of searching depend
on firms pricing behavior, while in their paper the benefits are
exogenously given. This reduces dramatically the multiplicity of
equilibria Bramoulle and Kranton (2004) obtain. Second, when
the network has overlapping neighborhoods a fewer number of
experts arise in the economy as compared to the case where
consumers have also short-cuts. This is a consequence of the
following equilibrium property: experts can only be linked with
free-riders.17 This suggests that the maximum number of experts
which can be sustained in equilibrium is somewhat negatively re-
lated to the clustering (the number of trials) of a network. Third,
in both networks we have price dispersed equilibria, which again
arise because consumers are ex-post asymmetrically informed.
There are a number of interesting questions that can be ad-
dressed. A natural one is how strategic pricing, consumers’ wel-
fare and social welfare is affected by the different allocation of
links across consumers. It is easy to show that the equilibrium
price distribution for the short-cuts network first order stochas-
tic dominate the one associated with the overlapping neighbors
network.18 Therefore expected prices are lower in the former
case as compared to the latter. The reason is that the presence
of short-cuts allow for the emergence of more experts in the
economy which in turn increases firms’ competition. It is also
possible to show that aggregate consumers welfare is higher in
the presence of short-cuts as compared to overlapping neigh-
borhoods.19 This is because the increase on firms’ competition
due to the higher number of experts dominates the associated
increasing in the total search cost. Finally, it is readily seen that
social welfare is higher in the network with overlapping neigh-
17Formally, the set of experts in equilibrium must form a maximally independent set.
Given a graph g an independet set is a set of nodes which are not directly connected. A
maximally independet set is an independet set which is not a proper subset of any other
independet set.
18Formally, the equilibrium price distribution in case of the overlapping neighborhoods
network is FO(p) = 1− (9/2)(v − p)/p, ∀p ∈ [(9/11)v, v] . In the case of the short-cuts
network FS(p) = 1− (17/14) (v − p) /p, ∀p ∈ [(17/31)v, v] .
19To see this note that the aggregate consumers surplus in the case of overlapping
neighbors is csO = 9 ln 11
9
− 1 − 2c, which in the case of short-cuts is csS = −1
2
+
34
7
ln 31
17
− 4c.
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borhoods because the total search cost is minimized and yet
each transaction takes place.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a search model which examines the effect of
local information sharing among consumers in the consumers’
search incentives, firms’ price behavior and social welfare. We
have shown that consumers search less frequently in denser net-
works due to a free-riding effect. This has a somewhat surprising
implication on the firms’ price behavior as well as on the overall
performance of the market. In particular, when the search costs
are sufficiently low the equilibrium expected price is higher and
the consumers welfare is lower in settings where consumers in-
teraction is denser. Furthermore, when search costs are moder-
ate, the market outcome becomes more inefficient as networks
density rises.
There are many extensions which may be of interest for fur-
ther research. The first is to examine the implication of asym-
metric connections across players. Even if an analysis for any
network architecture may be unfeasible, one could focus on a
particular class of networks which matches much empirical ev-
idence on social networks such as the star and variants of this
architecture. A second extension would be to endogenize the
quality of information sharing. It is natural to think that the
quality of each link and therefore how information flow from
one consumer to the other depends on the time the two parties
are willing to invest on. In this new settings one could inves-
tigate the strategic nature between networking investment and
private search investment and the implications on market func-
tioning. Finally, it is interesting to generalize the model to an
oligopoly. Information sharing introduces two important effects
on price. If search effort remains the same, price will reduce as
more consumers can make price comparisons. The other effect is
that consumers may free ride on others. Clearly, these two effects
will depend on the number of firms present in the market.
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8 Appendix chapter 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
First, it is easy to verify that the strategy profile {p, q0 = 1} ,
where p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜] is a Nash equilibrium. We now prove that
these are the only (generic) equilibria in which consumers em-
ploy pure strategies. There are two possibilities, which we anal-
yse in turn. First, suppose q1 = 1; if k = 0, then each con-
sumer will observe only one price and as a consequence firms
will charge p = p˜. However, as far as c > 0, a consumer strictly
gains by not searching at all. Consider then that k > 0; we
claim that if this were an equilibrium then firms will price ac-
cording to an atomless price distribution F (p) defined on a con-
vex support σ. The reason is that since k > 0 and q1 = 1
there is a fraction of consumers which will observe both firms’
prices with a strictly positive probability. Therefore, if firms
charge a price p with a mass point, they will tight at that
price with strictly positive probability, but then an individual
firm has a strict incentive to undercut the atom. We now show
that, given k > 0, an equilibrium where consumers search once
with probability one, i.e. q1 = 1, exists for a unique value of
the search cost (it is not generic). The utility to a consumer
is Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜ − 12kE (p) −
¡
1− 1
2k
¢
Emin (p) − c. In equi-
librium it must be the case that Eu (q1 = 1) ≥ Eud (qx = 1) ,
x = 0, 2, where Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜ − 12k−1E (p) −
¡
1− 1
2k−1
¢
Emin
and Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)−2c. Solving the two inequality
we obtain that:
c =
1
2k
(E (p)− Emin)
Second, suppose q2 = 1 and k ≥ 0. It is easy to see that
each consumer will observe always two prices. If this were an
equilibrium firms would charge the competitive price, p = 0.
However, a consumer is strictly better-off by searching only once.
This completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
Proof Proposition 5.2.
We first show that firms price according to an atomless price
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distribution F (p) . If k = 0 the model degenerates to the duopoly
version of Burdett and Judd (1983) and the claim follows. Next,
assume k > 0 and suppose there exists some price p∗ with a mass
point. Since consumers search at least once with some positive
probability and k > 0, it follows that a fraction of consumers
observe two prices with strictly positive probability. Therefore,
firms would tie at the price p∗ with strictly positive probability;
in such a case a firm gains by undercutting p∗. This is a con-
tradiction. We finally show that for any k ≥ 0 the support σ
must be convex. Suppose not, i.e. ∃σ˜ Ã σ : F (p) = c ∀p ∈ σ˜.
Let p∗ = inf σ˜, then a firm charging p∗ gains by increasing such
price. This completes the proof of the first part of the Proposi-
tion.
We now show that if k > 0 in any equilibrium either q1+q2 =
1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) . We start by
claiming that q0 + q2 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose it is, then firms would set the competitive price with
probability one. The reason is that the expected demand of a
firm derives from two sources: consumers who search on their
own and consumers who do not search but obtain information
from their social contacts. The former would always observe
two prices, while the latter either do not observe any price or
they also observe two prices. Using a standard undercutting
argument it follows that firms must charge the competitive price.
Since firms charge the competitive price with probability one a
consumer strictly benefits by searching only once.
Next we show that q0 + q1 + q2 = 1 cannot be part of an
equilibrium. Suppose it is an equilibrium; the same argument
above implies that F (p) is atomless and it is defined on a convex
support σ. In equilibrium it must be the case that Eu (qx = 1) =
Eu (qy = 1) , x, y = 0, 1, 2. Let α (k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 qx1
2x
, then we
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obtain that:
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− α (k)E (p)−
¡
1− qk0 − α (k)
¢
Emin (p)
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
µ
qk0 +
α (k)
2
¶
E (p)−
−
µ
1− qk0 −
α (k)
2
¶
Emin (p)− c
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c
Solving for the equilibrium conditions it follows that:
qk0 [p˜−E (p)] = qk0 [E (p)− Emin (p)]
Given that q0 > 0 this condition is satisfied if and only if p˜ −
E (p) = E (p)− Emin (p). We now show that this is impossible.
To see this we note that
Emin (p) = 2E (p)−
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp
Therefore:
E (p)− Emin (p) =
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp−E (p) =
Integrating by parts we can show that:Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp = p˜−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp
which implies that:
E (p)− Emin (p) = [p˜− E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)]
(5.17)
This is a contradiction and therefore the claim follows. Hence,
the proof for the case k ≥ 1 is complete.
We finally consider the case where k = 0. The same argument
used for k ≥ 1, shows that q0+q2 = 1 and q0+q1+q2 = 1 cannot
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be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, the only possibility left is
q0 + q1 = 1. If this were an equilibrium firms would charge the
monopolist price. However, in such a case consumers cannot
be indifferent between not searching and searching once, i.e.
Eu (q0 = 1) = 0 > −c = Eu (q1 = 1) . This completes the proof
of the proposition.¥
High Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 5.3.
We first note that the upper bound of the price distribution
must be the reservation price, p˜; for otherwise a firm charging
p < p˜ strictly gains by increasing it. This implies that the ex-
pected equilibrium profit is: Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
p˜. In equi-
librium a firm imust be indifferent between charging any price in
the support σ, i.e. Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) , ∀p ∈ σ.
Solving this condition we obtain the expression of F (p; k, q1)
and the expression of the lowerbound of the support is obtained
by solving for Eπi
³
p
i
, pj; k, q1
´
= Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) . Finally, let
ψ = q
k+1
1
2(2k−qk+11 )
, then it is easy to see that ∂F (p;k,q1)
∂k
> 0 if and
only if ∂ψ
∂k
=
qk+11 2
k−1
(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
q1
2
< 0. This completes the proof.¥
Proof Theorem 5.1.
The proof of the case k = 0 is the same as Burdett and
Judd(1983) and therefore it is omitted. We focus instead in the
case k > 0.
Let us define the RHS of expression (5.6) as φ (p; k, q1) =
qk1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] . We start by showing that ∂φ(p;k,q1)∂q1 > 0.
Suppose, without loss of generality that p˜ = 1. Using the expres-
sion of the price distribution F (p; k, q1) defined in proposition
5.3. We can invert it to obtain:
p (z; k, q) =
1
g (z; k, q1)
(5.18)
where
g (z; k, q1) = 1 +
2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
qk+1
(1− z) (5.19)
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We now note that:
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) = 2
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1)) dp−
−
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1)dp
Integrating by parts yields,
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) =
Z 1
p(k,q1)
[F (p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1))] dp
Using the inverse function p (z; k, q1) , we can write this ex-
pression as:
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
£
p
¡√
z; k, q1
¢
− p (z; k, q1)
¤
dz
Or,
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
Let a = qk+1, b = 2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
and c = 2k+1 (2k + 1) , then,
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
=
Z 1
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
= −
Z 1
2
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (1− 2z)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz +
+
Z 1
1
2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
We note that [ka(2z−1)+c(1−z)]
[a+b(1−z)]2 is positive and increasing in z
for any z ∈ (0, 1/2) and that [a+ b (1− z)]2 is decreasing in z.
Therefore:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1
2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz +
+
Z 1
1
2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
22k
dz
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We now note that [ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] is positive and it
is decreasing in z, which implies that:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1
2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz +
Z 1
1
2
qk+11 k (2z − 1)
22k
dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
Next, we note that limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and that limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) =
c (k) . The facts that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0, limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and
limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) = c (k) imply that for any c ∈ (0, c (k)) there
exists a unique solution, say q∗1 ∈ (0, 1) , of the equilibrium con-
dition (5.6), i.e. φ (p; k, q∗1) = c.
We finally show that consumers do not want to deviate. Given
that all consumers randomize between searching once and twice,
the expected utility to a consumer who deviates by not searching
at all is:
Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k−1
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k−1
¶
Emin (p)
For an equilibrium it must be the case that Eud (q0 = 1) ≤
Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the expression (5.4) it follows that this de-
viation is not profitable if and only if:
c ≤ q
k
1
2k
[E (p)− Emin (p)]
This condition is always satisfied because in equilibrium c =
qk1
2k
[E (p) − Emin (p)]. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
¥
Proof Proposition 5.4.
We recall that the RHS of the equilibrium condition (5.6) may
be written as:
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
qk1
2k
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
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First, we show that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0. The derivative of φ (z; k, q1)
with respect to k is:
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂k
= −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln
2
q1
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz +
+
q2k+11
2k
ln q1
Z 1
0
qk+11 (2z − 1)
2£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2dz
We note that the second term of this expression is weakly
negative and that −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln 2
q1
is also weakly negative. Therefore
it is sufficient to show that:
ξ =
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz > 0
To see this note that:
ξ = −
Z 1
2
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z) +
+
Z 1
1
2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z)
Since
µ
qk+11 +2(2k+1−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)
[qk+11 +2(2k−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)]
2
¶
is increasing in z for z ∈ (0, 1/2)
and
£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤
is decreasing in z, then:
ξ > −
Z 1
2
0
µ
2k+1
22k
¶
(1− 2z) +
+
Z 1
1
2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
22k
!
(1− 2z)
Furthermore, qk+11 +2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z) is also decreasing
in z, which implies that
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ξ > −
Z 1
2
0
2k+1
22k
(1− 2z) +
Z 1
1
2
qk+11
22k
(1− 2z) =
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
The fact that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0 and that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0 implies that
if k increases then q1 must also increase.
Second, we show that if k increases, then expected prices in-
crease as well. Let ψ (k, q1) =
qk+11
2(2k−qk+11 )
, then the expression of
the price distribution defined in Proposition 5.3 can be rewritten
as:
F (p) = 1− ψp˜− p
p
To prove the claim it is enough to show that:
dψ
dk
=
∂ψ
∂k
+ ψ
∂q1
∂k
> 0
We denote φk (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂k and φq1 (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂q1.
Using the equilibrium condition φ (k, q1) − c = 0 and applying
the implicit function theorem we can derive
∂q
∂k
= − φk (·)
φq1 (·)
where
φk (k, q1) = −
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] +
+
qk1
2k
ψk[(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
φq1 (q1, k) =
kqk−11
2k
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] +
+
qk1
2k
ψq1 [(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
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Plugging the expressions ∂q1
∂k
in dψ
dk
, we obtain that
dψ
dk
=
ψ
φq1
µµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−1
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶¶
Since φq1 and ψ (q1, k) are strictly positive it follows that
dψ
dk
>
0 if and only ifµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
> 0
Computing the derivatives ψk = −
qk+11 2
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
2
q1
and ψq1 =
(k+1)qk12
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 it follows that:
µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
=
q2k1
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢2 ln 2q1 > 0
Furthermore, using the expression of ψ (k, q1) we obtain that:
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2 = 2
k
2k − qk+11
ln
Ã¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
qk+1
!
− 2 >
>
2k
2k − 1 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2 >
> −2 + 2 ln 3 > 0
This proves the claim.
Third, we show that social welfare increases as k increases. To
see this note that for a given k, the social welfare is SW (k, q1, c) =
p˜ − q1c − (1− q1) 2c = p˜ − 2c + q1c; since when k increases, q1
increases then social welfare increases as well.
Finally, we show that the consumer surplus decreases as k
increases. To see this note that the consumer surplus is CS =
Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜ − Emin (p) − 2c. Given he price
distribution F (p; k, q1) , the distribution of the minimum price
is Fmin (p; , k, q1) = F (p; k, q1) (2− F (p; , k, q1)) . Using the ex-
pression for F (p; k, q1) illustrated in proposition 5.3. we obtain
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Fmin (p; , k, q1) = 1 − ψ2
³
p˜−p
p
´2
. Therefore ∂Fmin(p;,k,q1)
∂k
< 0 if
and only if dψ
dk
> 0, which follows from above. This completes
the proof.¥
Low Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 5.5.
We first note that for an equilibrium p = p˜; for otherwise a
firm charging p¯ < p˜ strictly gains by increasing such price. Using
expression 5.11 and the fact that p = p˜, it follows that the ex-
pected equilibrium profit isEπ∗ =
³
m
³
(1 + q)k+1 − 2k+1qk+1
´
/2k+1
´
p˜.
In equilibrium it must be the case that Eπ (p) = Eπ∗ ∀ p ∈ σ.
Solving the equilibrium conditions we obtain the expression for
F (p; k) . Similarly, the expression of the lowerbound is the solu-
tion ofEπ
¡
p
¢
= Eπ∗. Finally, let ψ (k, q0) =
(1+q0)
k+1−2k+1qk+10
2(2k(1+qk+10 )−(1+q0)
k+1)
;
then to prove the first order stochastic dominance relation it is
enough to see that
∂ψ (k, q0)
∂k
=
"
2k
¡
1− qk+10
¢
(1 + q0)
k+1 (ln (1 + q0)− ln 2)+
2kqk+10
³
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
´
ln (q0)
#
2
³
2k (1 + q(k+1))− (1 + q)k+1
´2 < 0
¥
Proof of Theorem 5.2.
Without loss of generality let p˜ = 1. Using the expression of
the price distribution F (p; k, q0) defined in proposition 5.5, we
can invert it to obtain:
p (z, k, q0) =
1
g (z; k, q0)
(5.20)
where
g (z; k, q0) = 1 +
2k+1
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− 2 (1 + q0)k+1
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
(1− z) (5.21)
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Using (5.20) the equilibrium condition (5.16) can be rewritten
as follows:
c =
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (2z − 1) dz +(5.22)
+qk0
µ
1− 2
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (1− z) dz
¶
We denote as ρ (z; k, q0) the LHS of 5.22 and we note that:
lim
q0→0
ρ (z; k, q0) = c¯ (k)
lim
q0→1
ρ (z; k, q0) = 0
Furthermore, we note that limit when q0 goes to zero of the
derivative of ρ (z, k, q) is positive:20
lim
q0→0
∂ρ (z; , k, q0)
∂q0
= 1
Hence, since ρ (q0, k) is positive at q0 = 0, increasing in the
neighbor of q0 = 0 and it is zero at q0 = 1 it follows that for
any k > 0 there exists a c˜ > c¯ (k) such that for any c ∈ [c¯ (k) , c˜]
There exists at least two solutions of the equilibrium condition
(5.16). It is easy to see that among these two solutions only the
smaller one is stable.
We finally show that a consumer does not have an incentive
to deviate. The expected utility to a consumer who deviates by
searching twice is:
Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c
For an equilibrium it must be the case that this deviation
is not profitable, i.e. Eud (q2 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the ex-
pression (5.14) we obtain that Eud (q2 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) if and
20 I develop the result using the program Mathematica. To do this I compute
the following transformation. Let ρq0 (q0, k) =
∂ρ(q0,k)
q0
, then limq0→0 ρq0 (q0, k) =
e
limq0→0 ln

ρq0 (q0,k)
q0
. The computation is avaialable upon request of the author.
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only if:
c ≥ (1 + q0)
k
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]
Using the equilibrium condition (5.16), we can rewrite this
inequality as
E (p)−Emin (p) ≤ p˜−E (p)
In the proof of proposition 5.2 we have showed that:
E (p)−Emin (p) = [p˜−E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)]
Hence, given that all consumers randomized between searching
once and not searching at all, a consumer does not want to
deviate by searching twice. This completes the proof.¥
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Conclusion
You can call it a clan, or a network, or a family, or a group
of friends. The way you call it is not relevant. What matters
is that it exists and often you will need one. A large body of
empirical work shows that networks are pervasive in social and
economic interactions. This is the primary motivation to develop
a systematic theory of networks.
On the one hand, the theory of network formation attempts
to provide a micro foundation for the emergence of social and
economic networks. How do networks come about when individ-
uals have the discretion to form informal relationships ? What
are the structural properties we are expected to observe ? Are
strategic networks efficient ?
On the other hand, we want to examine how networks in-
fluence strategic decision making in a variety of settings. This
requires the development of a common approach for addressing
economic questions from a structural perspective. That is, an
approach where the players and the set of relationships across
them are not considered as independent but, on the contrary, as
strategically connected. Do networks affect the emergence of effi-
cient social norms? How do consumers networks, firms alliances,
and buyers and sellers networks influence the functioning of the
market?
The first part of this thesis deals with network formation mod-
els. Bala and Goyal (2000a) offer a simple framework for the
study of this issue. The basic idea of their model is the fol-
lowing: social networks are the result of the choice of individual
players who trade-off the costs of investing in links with their po-
tential rewards (which consist in the benefits of accessing other
players). One of the crucial assumptions of their model is that
both the costs of forming links and the values of accessing other
agents are homogeneous across players. Chapter 2 and 3 exam-
ine the role that heterogeneity, both in the costs of forming a
link and in the benefits arising from it, plays in shaping the
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architecture of equilibrium networks.
Chapter 2 extends the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal
(2000a) to include ex-ante asymmetries across players. The for-
mation of many networks, such as communication networks, so-
cial gathering, phone calls and consumers networks, may be in-
terpreted in the spirit of this model. Empirical work on these
networks shows a widespread stability of structural properties
such as centrality and short-distances across players. The equi-
librium predictions of Bala and Goyal (2000a) are in line with
these empirical findings: an equilibrium network is either a center-
sponsored star or the empty network. The findings reported in
Chapter 2 show that centrality and short-distances are con-
firmed as distinctive features of equilibrium networks even in
settings with substantial heterogeneity.
Chapter 3 focuses on the one-way flow model of Bala and
Goyal (2000a). The formation of the World Wide Web can be
interpreted in the spirit of this model. Indeed, Web connections
are generally formed unilaterally. Furthermore, a link created by
user i with user j only allows the former to click-and-go from his
home page to the home page of the latter, while the reverse does
not hold true. Empirical investigations report that the World
Wide Web is fragmented and (within the core component) only
few players sponsor and/or receive many links (the so-called
central players). These properties contrast with the equilibrium
characterization of Bala and Goyal (2000a): an equilibrium net-
work is either a wheel network or the empty network. We find
that player heterogeneity breaks the connectedness of equilib-
rium networks and that central players emerge in unconnected
equilibria. Thus, in the one-way flow model players’ heterogene-
ity is crucial to predict properties, such as centrality, which are
widely observed in real social networks.
Chapter 4 examines how the endogenous formation of so-
cial and economic relationships affects free-riding problems. The
model applies to situations in which connections are used to
share non-rival goods such as information and knowledge. In
these cases, the externalities produced in the network are fully
realized only if the relationships are stable over time. Free-riding
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problems may undermine the stability of social relationships.
For example, it is natural to think that both the creation and
the maintenance of a relationship require costly investments,
and that each of the two parties prefers the other to bear such
costs. Henceforth, it is important to investigate the interplay
between stable network architectures and individual incentives
in games of conflict.
The results show that the stability of efficient norms crucially
depends on the network formed by the players. More specifically,
in settings where efficiency requires only one of the parties to
bear the entire cost of the interaction (one party cooperates and
the other one free-rides), efficient social norms are best sustained
in the star network. Here, the central player free-rides, while the
peripheral players cooperate. The star architecture enhances the
stability of efficient norms because it allows the central player
to detect any eventual deviator, and to punish him with imme-
diate social isolations. By contrast, when an efficient interaction
requires the players to evenly split the interaction costs (this is
the case of mutual cooperation), efficient social norms are best
sustained in the line network. The reason behind this result is
that players’ incentives to invest in connections are inversely re-
lated to the number of links held by each player. These results
indicate that a structural analysis is important in order to un-
derstand how individual incentives are shaped in many strategic
contexts.
The effects of consumers’ networks on consumers’ search ac-
tivity, on firms’ price behavior and on social welfare constitute
the focus of chapter 5. A large body of empirical work suggests
that the interactions between buyers and sellers are built on
a variety of network relationships. Examples of these are con-
sumers’ networks, professional networks and R&D networks. All
these examples share a common feature: informal relationships
transform the information privately obtained by each individ-
ual to a public good; this affects players’ incentives as well as
aggregate outcomes.
We study the interplay between market externalities and con-
sumers’ network externalities in a search model a’ la Burdett
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and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a network and
they may costly search for price quotations; the information
gathered is non-excludable along direct links. The first result is
that in the absence of the network (Burdett and Judd (1983))
only a high search intensity equilibrium exists. Otherwise, this
equilibrium exists for low search costs, while for moderate search
costs a low search intensity equilibrium exists. The second result
shows that in both equilibria consumers search less frequently
in more dense networks. Finally, this equilibrium property has
a somewhat surprising effect on firms’ price behavior and on so-
cial welfare: when search costs are low (moderate) the expected
equilibrium price and the social welfare are higher (lower) when
consumers hold more connections.
In conclusion, this essay is a contribution to the theory of net-
works. It addresses a number of different questions such as the
formation of networks and the effects networks have on strategic
decision making. What makes the research developed in this the-
sis novel is the explicit consideration of decentralized interaction
among individuals to analyse a variety of traditional economic
questions. This approach, which consistently accompanies each
chapter, delivers tractable models and provides a number of sub-
stantive insights which are novel and match empirical findings.
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Samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
U kunt het een clan noemen, of een netwerk, of een familie, of
een groepje vrienden; het doet er niet toe hoe u het noemt. Waar
het om gaat is dat het bestaat en dat u het vaak nodig heeft. Een
overvloed aan empirisch onderzoek laat zien dat netwerken een
grote rol spelen bij sociale en economische interacties. Dit is de
voornaamste reden om een systematische theorie over netwerken
te ontwikkelen.
Enerzijds tracht de theorie van netwerkvorming een microfun-
dering te leggen voor de totstandkoming van sociale en economis-
che netwerken. Wat voor netwerken komen tot stand als in-
dividuen de mogelijkheid hebben om zelf informele contacten
aan te gaan? Wat voor structurele eigenschappen zouden wij in
deze netwerken kunnen waarnemen? Zijn strategisch gevormde
netwerken efficiënt?
Anderzijds willen we onderzoeken hoe netwerken van invloed
zijn op strategische beslissingen in verschillende omgevingen.
Dit vereist de ontwikkeling van een onderzoeksmethode die economis-
che problemen op eenzelfde manier vanuit een structureel per-
spectief benadert; een methode waarbij de spelers en de relaties
tussen hen niet als onafhankelijk worden beschouwd, maar juist
als strategisch met elkaar verbonden. Dragen netwerken bij aan
de totstandkoming van efficiënte sociale normen? Hoe wordt het
functioneren van de markt beïnvloed door netwerken van con-
sumenten, allianties van bedrijven, en netwerken van kopers en
verkopers?
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift behandelt modellen met
betrekking tot de vorming van netwerken. Bala en Goyal (2000a)
bieden een eenvoudig theoretisch kader om netwerkvorming te
analyseren. Het basisidee van hun model is als volgt: sociale
netwerken zijn het gevolg van de keuzes van individuele spelers
die de kosten om in netwerkrelaties te investeren afwegen tegen
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de mogelijke opbrengsten (die bestaan uit de mogelijkheid om
via het netwerk andere spelers te benaderen.). Een essentiële
veronderstelling van hun model is dat zowel de kosten om een
relatie op te bouwen als de voordelen om andere agenten te
kunnen benaderen, homogeen tussen spelers zijn. Hoofdstukken
2 en 3 onderzoeken hoe heterogeniteit, zowel in de kosten om
een relatie te onderhouden als in de voordelen die het gevolg
daarvan zijn, gestalte geeft aan de architectuur van netwerken.
Hoofdstuk 2 breidt het ’two-way flow’-model van Bala en
Goyal (2000a) uit met het toevoegen van ex-ante verschillen
tussen spelers. De vorming van vele netwerken, zoals commu-
nicatienetwerken, sociale bijeenkomsten, telefoongesprekken en
consumentennetwerken, kan in de trant van dit model worden
geïnterpreteerd. Empirisch onderzoek naar dit soort netwerken
toont een wijdverspreide stabiliteit van structurele eigenschap-
pen zoals centraliteit en een korte afstand tussen spelers. De
evenwichtsvoorspellingen van Bala en Goyal (2000a) stemmen
met deze empirische bevindingen overeen: een evenwichtsnetwerk
is of een ’center-sponsored star’ (een netwerk in de vorm van
een ster waarin de centrale agent de kosten van het onder-
houden van contacten op zich neemt) of een leeg netwerk. De
bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 2 tonen aan dat een centrale ligging
en korte afstanden als specifieke eigenschappen van evenwicht-
snetwerken ook worden bevestigd in omgevingen met aanzienli-
jke verschillen tussen spelers.
Hoofdstuk 3 concentreert zich op het ’one-way flow’-model
van Bala en Goyal (2000a). De vorming van het World Wide
Web kan in de trant van dit model worden geïnterpreteerd. De
links tussen websites worden namelijk over het algemeen uni-
lateraal gevormd. Bovendien staat een link die door gebruiker
inaar de homepage van gebruiker jwordt aangemaakt, slechts
de eerstgenoemde toe om van zijn homepage naar de homepage
van de laatstgenoemde te surfen, terwijl het omgekeerde niet
mogelijk is. Empirische onderzoeken tonen aan dat het World
Wide Web versplinterd is, en (binnen de kerncomponent) slechts
weinig spelers vele links onderhouden en ontvangen (de ’cen-
trale spelers’). Deze eigenschappen staan tegenover de even-
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wichtskarakterisering in Bala en Goyal (2000a): een evenwicht-
snetwerk is of een ’wheel’ (een netwerk in de vorm van een kring)
of een leeg netwerk. Wij vinden dat heterogeniteit tussen spel-
ers de samenhang van evenwichtsnetwerken verbreekt en dat in
deze niet-samenhangende evenwichtsnetwerken centrale spelers
aanwezig zijn. Dus in het ’one-way flow’-model is de heterogen-
iteit tussen spelers essentieel om eigenschappen zoals centraliteit
te kunnen verklaren die wijdverbreid in echte sociale netwerken
worden waargenomen.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt hoe de endogene vorming van sociale
en economische relaties van invloed is op ‘free-rider’ problemen.
Het model is op situaties van toepassing waarin contacten wor-
den aangewend om niet-rivaliserende goederen zoals informatie
en kennis te delen. In deze gevallen komen de netwerkexter-
naliteiten alleen volledig tot stand als de netwerkrelaties sta-
biel zijn. ‘Free-rider’-problemen kunnen de stabiliteit van sociale
contacten ondermijnen. U kunt zich bijvoorbeeld indenken dat
zowel het aangaan als het onderhouden van een relatie kosten
met zich meebrengt, en dat de één graag ziet dat de ander deze
kosten op zich neemt. Het is daarom van belang om te onder-
zoeken hoe in conflictspellen een stabiele netwerkarchitectuur
zich verhoudt met individuele prikkels.
De resultaten laten zien dat het voor de stabiliteit van effi-
ciënte normen van cruciaal belang is wat voor netwerk door de
spelers gevormd wordt. Om specifieker te zijn, in omgevingen
waarin efficiëntie al bereikt wordt als slechts één kant van een
relatie de omgangskosten op zich neemt (één kant werkt mee
terwijl de andere kant hiervan profiteert) zijn efficiënte sociale
normen het beste in een ‘ster’-netwerk gediend. Hierin profiteert
de centrale speler van de spelers in de periferie terwijl zij al het
werk doen. De ‘ster’-architectuur bevordert de stabiliteit van ef-
ficiënte normen omdat dit het voor de centrale speler mogelijk
maakt om iedere afwijkende speler direct op te merken, en hem
meteen te straffen door hem in een sociaal isolement te plaatsen.
Aan de andere kant, als het voor een efficiënte omgang noodza-
kelijk is dat de spelers de omgangskosten eerlijk delen (wederzi-
jdse samenwerking), dan zijn efficiënte sociale normen het beste
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in een ‘lijn’-netwerk gediend. De reden achter dit resultaat is
dat de prikkels van spelers om in contacten te investeren min-
der worden als het aantal contacten van iedere speler toeneemt.
Deze resultaten wijzen erop dat een structurele analyse belan-
grijk is om te begrijpen hoe in verscheidene situaties gestalte
wordt gegeven aan individuele prikkels.
De effecten van netwerken van consumenten op de zoekac-
tiviteit van consumenten, het prijsgedrag van bedrijven en op
het sociale welzijn staan centraal in hoofdstuk 5. Een aanzienli-
jke hoeveelheid empirisch onderzoek suggereert dat de interac-
ties tussen kopers en verkopers gestoeld zijn op een verscheiden-
heid aan netwerkrelaties. Voorbeelden daarvan zijn netwerken
van consumenten, professionele netwerken en ‘R&D’-netwerken.
Al deze voorbeelden hebben het volgende overeen; informele
contacten zetten informatie dat door ieder individu persoonlijk
verkregen is, om in een publiek goed; dit heeft zowel invloed op
de prikkels van de spelers als op geaggregeerde uitkomsten.
We bestuderen het samenspel tussen de externaliteiten van de
markt en de externaliteiten van de netwerken van consumenten
in een zoekmodel à la Burdett en Judd (1983). Consumenten
zijn in een netwerk ingebed en ze kunnen naar prijsaanduidingen
zoeken, dat zoekkosten met zich meebrengt; de verzamelde infor-
matie is niet uitsluitbaar voor de directe contacten. Het eerste
resultaat is dat als een netwerk afwezig is (Burdett en Judd
(1983)) er alleen een evenwicht met een hoge zoekintensiteit
bestaat. In de aanwezigheid van een netwerk bestaat dit even-
wicht voor lage zoekkosten, terwijl voor gematigde zoekkosten
een evenwicht met lage zoekintensiteit bestaat. Het tweede re-
sultaat toont aan dat in beide evenwichten consumenten minder
vaak zoeken in dichte netwerken. Tot slot heeft deze evenwicht-
seigenschap een enigszins verrassend effect op het prijsgedrag
van bedrijven en op het sociale welzijn; als de zoekkosten laag
(gematigd) zijn, dan is de verwachte evenwichtsprijs en sociaal
welzijn hoger (lager) indien consumenten meer contacten onder-
houden.
Samenvattend, dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan de the-
orie van netwerken. Het richt zich op een aantal verschillende
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problemen zoals de vorming van netwerken en de effecten die
netwerken op het maken van strategische beslissingen hebben.
Wat het onderzoek in dit proefschrift zo vernieuwend maakt
is de expliciete beschouwing van gedecentraliseerde interacties
tussen individuen om een verscheidenheid aan traditionele economis-
che problemen te analyseren. Deze benadering, die steeds in
ieder hoofdstuk naar voren komt, levert handelbare modellen
en geeft een aantal belangrijke inzichten die vernieuwend zijn
en die met empirische bevindingen overeenstemmen.
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